Potential Gaza Ceasefire, Palestine Action, & the Meaning of Glastonbury & Zohran Mamdani

Jared: welcome everybody to another edition of millennials are killing capitalism live it is good to be with you on this saturday um wherever you are i know it has been a little while since we have done one of these i took a little bit of a break and we're back we're gonna have a lot of stuff this july so it's great to be with you take a minute like share subscribe uh it's great to have you Let me know if my video looks like it's flickering a little bit. I might have to do something with some of these lights. Our guest today, as folks know, is Abdul Jawad Omar. This is our 21st, I believe, conversation since October 7th, 2023. We're going to be talking about a few things. He's written recent pieces on Zohran Mamdani's win, which we'll probably save till the end, as well as the ceasefire between Israel and Iran. Both of those are on Mondoweiss. Just shout out to Mondoweiss. They have a current campaign to, you know, raise funds and currently they're doubling, you know, matching money on any contributions to them. So support them, support Palestinian journalism. And then we'll talk, we're going to talk a little bit about Bob Villain and the chant at Glastonbury and more importantly, the response to that, which I think is a lot of what we'll be talking about today is kind of responses. And of course, we're going to start off with, you know, talking about the ceasefire, you know, potential ceasefire in gaza which i think is one of the more more important news developments um we'll talk about how how that looks you know prospects of it happening certainly there seems to be some momentum there but you know we've been down this road many times since october 7th um and so you know we'll see basically but we'll talk about that uh and much more and then i also want to say before we start You know, Palestine action was prescribed by the United Kingdom yesterday. Stupid name for a country. You know, that doesn't mean anything as far as at least as I understand and having read up on it internationally, it doesn't place any limits on that. So there is a link to their legal defense. I've been trying to get answer of whether there are still further cases. I don't fully understand that, but I imagine that if not, then those defense funds will probably at least go to defending individuals who face charges related to direct action that get you know connected to palestine action i also know that there are a bunch of people who are participating in like civil disobedience against the prescription for people who don't know what that means prescription it's like being banned as a terrorist organization essentially which is uh quite ridiculous given that they have just engaged in by their own admission, you know, nonviolent direct action against Elbit Systems primarily, but other complicit, you know, organizations in this genocide. And so if anything, they're doing what we all should be doing. And so anyway, there's a link to where you can support their legal defense. I don't know if you're in the UK. you might want to check with somebody about whether you can actually support that fundraiser at this point. I don't know the answer to that. But those of us around the world, I don't think that there is anything that stops us from being able to support it. So having said all that, I'm going to welcome Abdul Jawad to the stage. Abdul Jawad, great to be with you again.

Abdul Jawad Omar: Thanks, Jared.

Jared: All right. Let's see. Slight flicker. Okay. I just was checking my video. All right. I'm not sure why that is, but I'll try to fix it. Well, how are you doing?

Abdul Jawad Omar: Surviving. Still breathing.

Jared: We're a little late because Abdul Jawad and I were having a heated debate before we got started about the meaning of Zoran Mamdani, which we'll let you in on later on in the episode. Not really. We actually, I think we agree a lot on what he laid out in his piece. But let's start with the ceasefire discussion. Where do you think things are at with this? We've been down this road multiple times, but it does seem that Hamas is putting forth its absolute best faith effort to meet what is not a great proposal. but they do still have some concerns that they're going to try to, it seems like, negotiate in the implementation plans that would be discussed. So, yeah, where do you think that this is at right now?

Abdul Jawad Omar: Well, look, I think after, you know, what Trump called the 12-day war with Iran, and we'll talk about that as well, there is this space that have opened up in which Israel mired in the moving sands of Gaza, specifically the attritional war that is occurring on a daily basis. I mean, last month, I think there was about 20 soldiers that were killed. Of course, dozens other injured. Much of these soldiers who were injured were also injured in a serious manner. So there's that level of desire on the Israeli military part to at least reconfigure, give soldiers rest, redeploy in a way that would allow them two options. The first is To continue this war after these two months of a ceasefire or a halt in the war, at least in its daily massacres, around 100 Palestinians, even more are now being killed daily in the Gaza Strip, of course, with different forms of massacre taking place. We're talking about the aid massacres, for instance, which look something like squid games. We're talking about air massacres, so using air power. We're talking about also the targeting of hospital workers, head of hospitals, journalists, as happened recently in much of the Israeli bombardment of Gaza as well. Not to mention, of course, the wholesale destruction of entire neighborhoods and cities. Specifically, currently, the Israeli campaign is concentrating after Rafael Khan Yunus. So all of these things happening at this current moment, which demand still some sort of halt or a pause, at least from an Israeli perspective. One, again, that would allow rest to take place for the soldiers. Because, you know, at some level, even on military level, when you reach this point of non-mobility, of having achieved some objectives, you become sitting ducks for the resistance fighters. And we saw some of these operations, including one operation where a Palestinian fighter actually dropped an improvised explosive device inside a tank, going on top of it. So things of that sort become more common and it becomes easier for the resistance to actually target the Israeli military in mired ways. So that kind of attrition plus the need to actually return the captives plus the opening or the political space within Israel and the pressure coming from the Americans to actually halt the fighting in order to also ensure on some level that Israel has the material means to which to continue this war further on in the months ahead. Because one of the things that happened also in the 12-day war is that Israel has lost also much of its munitions in the war it launched against Iran, whether it's munitions that it used to actually go on the offensive or those defensive weapons that it uses in its multi-layered air defense system that it has, which also needs the industrial base in the U.S. to actually provision it. So all of this together, I think, are factors that enunciate on some level the need for a pause in fighting. Of course, like many Palestinians, I suspect that that will only be a pause. They won't actually reach a final form of end of the war, although that is also a contingency. We're just making predictions here. Maybe it will, maybe it won't, but it doesn't seem like it. At least I think that the Israelis still are hell-bent on, you know, going deeper into Gaza, forcing the population deeper into concentrated areas and continuing with its model of, you know, aid massacres alongside this form of brute humanitarianism that we're seeing. And of course, you know, ensuring the extent of, to the extent possible that it will actually extract even a heavier and much more bloody price from the Palestinians before its hopes of ethnic cleansing can be realized, if they can be realized at any particular moment in the future. So this is at least where we're at in terms of the ceasefire, why it makes sense from an Israeli and American perspective to go for a pause in fighting and to allow more aid to come in. give a rest but also to to return these captives that's why i think uh we will see on uh you know a pause in fighting at least uh for the two months uh uh you know uh ahead of us but i'm not sure by september if we we will also see the resurgence of war again in its uh brute form as well yeah so say a little bit more about why you think uh

Jared: Hamas has had some pretty clear red lines throughout this that have made it that Israel and the United States have not been willing to meet in terms of full withdrawal and these sorts of things. And even still, it seems like some of the things that are being negotiated now or that Hamas has said are still issues for them. are getting troops to at least withdraw from certain strategic areas within Gaza, Israeli troops that is, and also ensuring that aid opens up beyond the death trap of the gaza humanitarian you know foundation so-called that the zionists and united states and contractors have set up through uh switzerland which it seems like actually is completely unraveling i mean i think that's one of the the interesting things here is that you know you there was reporting that basically their their foundation hasn't even like that it's not even legitimate within switzerland that like they haven't filed the proper paperwork that that's that's falling apart And, you know, there's also a lot of bourgeois media, even in the United States, like CBS recently ran a report, which is a very pro Zionists, you know, imperialist outlet, but they ran a report. where they were grilling one of the you know that's a that's a generous term to what they were doing but they were asking questions of the person one of the responsible people within the gaza humanitarian foundation that he did not like and that he was not didn't really directly answer you know of saying hey look like people are getting killed at your um distributions there was also some videos that came out that you know there's some disputes around them but they you know, show American contractors, show Israelis, there's gunfire happening, there's people saying, you know, I got one, this kind of stuff. And so there's a lot of, I think, attention, you know, being paid to that particular, you know, regime of aid distribution, which you've done great writing on that on the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which we talked about last time. So I guess that's a multi-tiered. But the reason I said that was because this is one of the demands also from Hamas is to open it up to say, hey, look, we need other NGOs, other humanitarian organizations to be delivering aid in multiple ways, not just through these kind of death traps. so yeah what do you what do you read within hamas right now in terms of their approach to this particular ceasefire negotiation which they have at least agreed to move forward to this next phase which is implementation which i think it should be clear to folks like it could still fall apart around negotiations around how this gets implemented because there are distances uh between the two perspectives but It's still further along than ceasefire negotiations have gotten since the last ceasefire was broken by Israel.

Abdul Jawad Omar: Well, look, I mean, when it came to this Israeli policy, I mean, Israel kind of identified, first of all, that to prolong its war on Gaza, there is a line that cannot be crossed, which is to induce complete famine in Gaza. So in order to be able to still commit massacres on a daily basis, but at the same time, ensure that there is a social breakdown, perhaps an infighting and inequality and hunger, the rise of, if you want, merchants of war around food and aid, and also the penetration of the Palestinian society in Gaza by organizing these forms of gangs that we have seen risen alongside these trade sorry, not trade, but aid routes that are taking place in the Gaza Strip. So that kind of strategy on the Israeli part, which I think the UN and its institutions and international organizations and institutions with all their faults, and as I write in that article, because I think there is still something similar between the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation and much of these institutions, at least in this form of humanitarianism. And looking at the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation as this kind of apex of a humanitarian logic that is so tied to war that it's weaponized and used against the people that are being, at this moment, eradicated and eliminated on Israeli terms. Beyond that point, the resistance in Gaza has also devised a multi-pronged strategy of fighting these forms of phenomena. Now, that strategy, I mean, we could speak of some of its excesses. Sometimes the resistance is capturing people involved in some of the companies that are actually you know, are involved in the logistics of aid. There's some pushback from Palestinian society in Gaza against these forms of excesses from the resistance part. But in large part, the strategy was based on delegitimizing, first of all, Palestinian elements that support this aid scheme. Of course, fighting directly the gangs that are formed and of course, pursuing them and even fighting them in terms of gun battles. So there's a delegitimization and of course an actual breaking of any kind of hesitation around killing or executing those who are involved in such acts or enabling this Israeli-American scheme to actually go forward. And at the same time, what they're trying to do is also, you know, strengthen some of the other elements within policy society, within its own civil society, specifically some of the families, some of the... tribes within Gaza, ensuring that not only Hamas and its resistance forces are involved in fighting, but also that an alliance that binds resistance, families, tribes, alongside the same logic, which is to contain and defend and, of course, defeat this project. To some degree, that element of the resistance strategy and fighting it and even setting up units that are concerned in securing aid or fighting back against some of the gangs and those involved in enabling this scheme, has been, in relative terms, successful. But that is how the resistance treated at least this element of the fight. It could not, you know, I mean, there were questions around whether, you know, and I think the resistance tried to do that is to try to demand from the people to not go to these aid sites, to not garner any aid distribution from, you know, aid distribution sites that were set up specifically in Rafah, but also in other parts of the Gaza Strip. But I don't think that was necessarily successful. It was successful. Most Palestinians in Gaza don't actually go to these sites. But some out of desperation, of course, and out of the lack of any other means to actually feed their family would go, despite the risks, of course, involved, including the massacres of those Palestinian civilians that are actually making it. Today, I mean, we saw news coming up. I'm not sure what really happened, if it was a mistake, but that two aid workers, American retired soldiers, I think, or something along those lines, were injured. in one of the aid distribution sites near Khan Yunus. So you're seeing more pushback from the Palestinian resistance against these actions. On the other hand, when we talk about the ceasefire, remember, look, in Gaza today, among Palestinians in Gaza, this is the popular demand. We want an end to the war. It's not only today. It's from the outside of this war. living within the domain of daily massacres and hunger and of course phenomena that I think Palestinians in Gaza are now complaining about. Things like if you send $100 in Gaza, they would only count as 50. Merchants of war are increasing. People are speaking of some sort of moral disintegration. of the lack of governance, the lack of security. So there's a lot of these elements that are, you know, making Palestinians in Gaza anxious. And a lot of them are just asking, even if they realize, I mean, some of them even realize that this pause in war is not necessarily a total ceasefire that would see the end of the war, but still they want that pause. And on that level, of course, the Palestinian resistance is also responsive uh uh to demands on the part of the palestinian uh people and population in the gaza strip and we need to take that into account and we'll try to ensure even though they're taking a risk again that you know uh they might reach here an end of the war or at least give the palestinians in gaza a pause but still maintaining some of the cards left which includes uh you know retaining some of the uh uh israeli captives uh uh both dead and alive within the domain of the Palestinian resistance and at the same time ensuring that there's some sort of guarantees coming from the Americans directly or from the mediators that would ensure that there's a prolonged negotiation to actually see the end of the war and not continue with the massacres as they were occurring in this particular moment. So that is Hamas's thinking and I think they got enough to ensure that the 60 days will actually go through. Because remember the early proposals actually spoke about, you know, an exchange from the very early days that would see all the Israeli soldiers that are now held captive being released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. But there would be no guarantee of what would happen after that one week. So they now have guarantees that at least these 60 days will be paused. And at the same time, I think when it comes to the implementation, specifically in relation to aid, that they're intended on killing at least this aid distribution scheme that is going by reinserting the role of UN institutions and international organizations rather than the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation with its direct complicity and set up by the Israeli government and of course the American government in this context. So I think that's at least the thinking of the Palestinian resistance now. I mean, we should remember that, you know, this is not, I mean, the Palestinians is not in a strong position of negotiations. for multiple reasons. The first is that there's blood every day. There's 100 Palestinians martyred. Many of them are from the same family. This is something that no matter how much people outside of Gaza get sanitized to, Palestinians in Gaza don't get sanitized because they're living within that domain of the massacre every day. And second of all, there needs to be alleviation of conditions, at least to give the population of Gaza some sort of pause. Having said that, I'm not certain, of course, that Israel will return to war. I mean, I don't want to hinge the analysis on that. There might be an actual end of this whole, if you want, episode that started two years ago for multiple reasons. First of all, because Israel did attack Iran. Now the question is, will it re-attack Iran or not? That's a question that remains open. There's a lot of ambiguity around that. And the second thing is that Israel at this moment will want to transform its operational successes, for instance, in Lebanon, the change in Syria, the battering of Palestinian resistance, the battering of Hezbollah in Lebanon. into some sort of political currency and there is a space that has opened up for Israel that I think some of the Arabs unfortunately are willing to give an offering to but that would be contingent on the non-ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in Gaza at least from the perspective of some of the Arab states who are you know part of this kind of imperial architecture in the region including places like Egypt to Jordan, the new Syrian government, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, and others. So in that kind of environment, I think that there is that off-ramp. That off-ramp serves to at least transform some of these successes into some sort of, if you want, new political grammar in the region. And as you remember, in one of my pieces as well, I spoke about the two options in Gaza between this kind of idea of total eradication and replacement that, you know, people like Bing Vita and Smotrich and, of course, Trump has even pronounced with his Trump-Riviera plan or whatever fantasy idea. And as well as, you know, the idea of neutralization where, you know, some sort of Arab force would come in or the Palestinian Authority or some sort of new governance apparatus can be set up in the Gaza Strip to replace the one that, you know, Hamas set up for the past 20 years or so since it took over the Gaza Strip in 2006, if I'm recalling it correctly. So this is this is this is at least two options and and and we can see Israel going for that specifically if there's enticement on the level of you know some sort of peace new peace agreement appeasements that could happen and this is part of if you want the American rescue plan of Israel because we should remember that despite everything that has unfolded that this is some sort of rescue plan that is being actually uh implemented to actually rescue israel not only from its over extension and access but also uh you know from the conflation between operational success and what it means to have actual strategic if you want victory whether it's sufficient or total and when you have people in the government the israeli government who are ideologues and not as pragmatic as the ones that actually came before them, the Ben-Gurions, the Moshe Sharifs, even the Menachem Begin who signed the peace agreement with Egypt. Beyond that, now you have these messianic religious Zionists who are also leading at least part of the coalition that is forming the Netanyahu government. And they're hell-bent on, of course, transforming this moment into some sort of total victory, whatever that means. And in essence, I think that, you know, as they pursue that, the question will remain in Israel, will military force actually incur more results or only lead to overextension, a tired military on the ground being faced with an attritional war on a daily basis, injured soldiers coming back, killed soldiers coming back, whether it's time for them to actually transform this moment in some sort of political currency. Unfortunately, of course, there's always these willing Arabs that will actually offer Israel some respite after two years of war where Israel's very existential security was on stake, specifically on October 7th, where there was a breach in the psyche of Israel's idea of impunity, of being this refuge for, as it was built or imagined, a refuge for the Jewish population across the world, of being the state that feeds on militarism and is always capable of defending itself, that breach and that void that opens up. But also even more recently with the rocket fire coming from Iran, and its damage to Israel not only on a strategic material level but also psychologically in terms of Israeli feeling the brunt of what a rocket campaign from Iran actually you know induced in Israeli society including destruction of wholesale neighborhoods some of the institutions of course a lot of the Israeli targets that were actually hit by Iran are kept well under secret. We don't know what really unfolded or occurred. The impression by Israel is that only, of course, civilian targets were hit, if you want to read the story as it shows in public media. But in fact, there's much more targeting that happened within the Iranian campaign. And of course, that kind of existential anxiety that was opened up in on october 7th was also reinforced in some way by the rocket fire that israel faced in the 12-day war as trump called it yeah thank you thank you for all of that um

Jared: Yeah. And I think I guess one of the other questions remains, you know, there's no there's no guarantors in this world anymore. Like, you know, and, you know, how much was that ever the case? I don't know. But like, you know, there's there is for Palestinians especially, there is no body international or otherwise, other than their own resistance forces that offer some kind of check and balance to what Israel and the United States, because I think anytime they move, they move together. what they decide to do, right? And I think this is the challenge of whether, if there is a ceasefire this time, whether it holds or whether it develops into a prolonged one, is that it does feel like in many ways that whether it holds and whether it leads to an end has to do with, as you're laying out, know the appetite of israelis to continue and to seek to achieve their own you know total victory um and and and the calculus of you know are we are we done with it like have we faced enough pain as well because obviously there is a lot of that i mean there's been You know, I know that this doesn't get shared within, you know, the mainstream media and I assume most people watching this see resistance, you know, videos and things like that as they come through Telegram or, you know, John Elmer shares them or things like this but... I think that most people in the world, especially most people in the United States, if they're not consuming, if they're not looking for those things, they wouldn't know that Israel has had some very difficult losses as well all through this war. But I think it's even really starting with the war, with the 12-day war, so-called with Iran, You also saw that the resistance in Gaza was even escalating its own operations more. Maybe Israel was divided a little bit between different campaigns or their attention was a little bit divided. And it seemed like they also suffered some very difficult losses recently. And I think that's part of the calculus as well is within the Israeli military, how much appetite is there to continue to do this for the united states how long do they want to continue to dump millions and millions and millions of dollars billions of dollars into um you know defense systems and weapons and bombs uh and so i think that's part of it as well i would you agree with that well look i mean it's always problematic to read israel in one direction no like

Abdul Jawad Omar: Even when people make statements like Israel is weak or vulnerable, you know, or I mean, Israel is a society that has contradictions like any other society, class contradictions, you know, ethnic contradictions. Even, you know, within the Jewish population itself, there's also like racial hierarchy between Ashkenazis for a theme. there's divisions alongside this kind of religious secular access as well. There's a lot of contradictions even in terms of how we assess resilience in the Israeli population or how to look through and read what Israeli society is and how it acts itself. And there's always an appetite at least being pushed when you have this kind of ideological wing that prioritizes the idea that, hey, we did not triumph over the Palestinians. There's still a problem, they're a headache, they claim this land, and they have millions, there's millions of them living between the river and the sea. And this is the priority for Israel. as much as Palestinian society was shaped by Israel, of course, Palestinians also shaped Israeli society in many ways through this kind of, you know, 100 or so years of fighting and back and forth and resistance and resilience and Samud and, you know, intifadas and revolts and revolutions and at the same time Israeli military encounter insurgency and the use of and unleashing of Israeli power and the occupation. Even the character of Israeli society now is one that is suspect because it's one where Not only did we see soldiers going into Gaza in this kind of obscene, genocidal appetite, you know, wearing women's lingerie and destroying campuses and killing people at will and celebrating it with this kind of... What that means for their own internal coherence later on is something that is also suspect. I think that one of the elements that we saw since October 7th, when we had this breach of this material wall that separates Gaza from what envelops Gaza, which is these series of settlements that attempt to contain Gaza demographically, and of course have a security function as well as, I've already iterated at least in some of our past episodes, You know, there's something that opens up in Israeli society, this idea that, you know, around the uncertainty of what it means to live in the state in the future. And since then, there's this kind of repairing element to what Israel is doing in terms of its operational development. military operational successes, even when it comes to how well it was prepared in terms of penetrating, in terms of intelligence, whether Iran or Hezbollah, at least on some level, and the ability to inflict pain on the axis of resistance in ways that would perhaps be unforeseen at the outset of the war. But they were prepared. They were prepared with operational plans. Of course, that means that that war would have happened at some point. And what we have seen unfolded since October 7, we have seen unfold in a different perhaps state or a different moment in history, but it would have unfolded as well. But there's something around Israel's inability to articulate a future that remains problematic on that front. This is one level of it. The second level of it is that the Iran war, despite Israeli success and despite the narrative that a lot of Israelis are also buying, there's a bit of, I think in Israeli society, there's a bit of arrogance around what they achieved in Iran. specifically because they went up against Iran itself. They penetrated Iran's airspace. They conducted these sophisticated, if you want, or not very sophisticated intelligence operation and assassinations. And at the same time, there were able to convince the Americans, perhaps that was the plan from the outset, but at least convince the Americans to come in and of course use their bunker buster bombs and hit some of the Iranian nuclear sites. But eventually what we saw, you know, is also Israel had to receive some pain. And that pain was also problematic in Israeli society because that existential anxiety that Israelis speak about now turned to an actual fear because the missiles were hitting. And slowly throughout the campaign, actually the missiles were hitting with a higher rate, so there was a higher penetration rate. and the whole idea of Israel as a refuge whether it's metaphorically in this kind of like you know Zionist ideological mantra that was raised or Israel as a refuge that also sustains itself through this multi-layered air defense system that you know the whole region participates in including american french and british military assets that exist in the region that help support you know the detection of missiles coming out of iran that gives israel all of these different uh layer defense include you know tad and hates what israel is called hates or i think i don't know i forgot what its name in english uh and then also the iran dome and other elements so imagine a society that actually lives and die by the penetration rate of iranian missiles basically that's that's a condition on which israel uh you know on some level uh exists so there was this kind of prospect like the prospect of of of facing you know uh these iranian missiles was also, I think, sobering on some level. But I think what also the Iranian campaign showed us is that Israel's power has some limits. I mean, of course, we don't know. Maybe in the future that limit can be transgressed, but it has some limits, not only because it's dependent on the West for acquiring weapons, not only because it's highly dependent even on a direct American intervention to actually get anything done objectively in Iran, and we don't even know if it actually was done or not. And that's important because the results are ambiguous at best. There's a lot of discussions around what the results were. But also because I think that on some level, despite what it showed in terms of successes, and by raising and elevating the bar of total victory, Israel is in fact only incurring measured successes, relative successes, sufficient if you want victories, even if you want to frame it in that terms. and what that means is that neither resistance has ended in the region nor the elements that compose of the resistance have completely faltered and still you have Hezbollah that could repair and reconstruct and at the same time at some point also re-engage in a different manner Israel you still have Iran you know there's no regime change until this moment in Iran In fact, the regime perhaps has become more popular after it was attacked directly. And this is something that also I think was part of the campaign's objective. But I don't think the Israelis succeeded in actually getting the Iranians to be completely off balance, that they would lose the course of action despite some of the successes that they speak about, which is targeting of some launchers. The Israelis claim they hit 50% of the launchers of ballistic missiles. They claim that they've hit some of the storage for these missiles. They claimed, of course, that they ended or they at least delayed the nuclear program. all of these things that are being claimed in terms of successes. But at the same time, Israeli fragility and vulnerability was actually exposed quite open in the current war. Specifically, the refuge, and this I take from somebody who I respect a lot, Khaled Abdullah, who recently gave a lecture, and he spoke about also, he noted, for instance, the idea that in Israeli society, there's three forms of refuge, a metaphoric one, but also the Mamad and the Miklat in Hebrew that means you know every home in Israel has to have like one room that is reinforced with concrete and has specific specifications but with the Iranian missiles these you know in in the home if you want rooms that are reinforced were also destroyed by the by the Iranian missiles so they didn't actually protect And at the same time, the Miklat, which is the outside also shelter, which is usually underground, was also hit and was also destroyed. So in many ways, this idea of safety, of normalizing the falling of rockets, of feeling that safety through these kind of process, whether it's through the offensive element of the campaign or defensive elements, which is the active defense this multi-layered air defenses or eventually this passive defense which which involves you know this sheltering this was a bit shattered in this campaign and i think that will also have some sort of uh repercussions at least in in on on the psyche of israeli society on some level of course that doesn't mean that israel is you know breaking down again what i'm saying is that in fact the narrative in israeli media mostly is one of celebration And it's one of a narrative of triumph. And it's a narrative of repairing the relationship between military and society. And of course, the military and the political leadership. Having said so, I mean, we should also remember that these internal fights are still occurring and unfolding in Israel. internal fights between different factions, internal fights around the future of Israel, the legal coup that a couple of years ago led to wide demonstrations in Israel still occurring and unfolding. So a lot of these internal contradictions are still going on, even if they were temporarily, let's say, paused. Although I wouldn't say they were paused, because they still coexisted with the war on multiple levels, and they continue there. And even after this war, you would still have the person responsible for the failures of October 7th in the Israeli mind, being still in power because it seems that this person is the only option that really Israel has, which is in this case, you know, somebody like Benjamin Netanyahu, who if he actually, you know, run for elections today, there's a good chance that he will be, you know, the prime minister of Israel once again. So all of these multiple, if you want, entry points to understanding what's happening in Israeli society, which tells us that that type of crisis, whether it's a legitimate crisis when it comes to its relationship today with publics across the world, I wouldn't say with political elites, but with publics across the world, whether it's inability to actually you know, stop and say we've succeeded enough or we've triumphed enough. Let's turn this now into a strategic rearrangement of relationship with the region and reframe our relationship also with the Palestinians in some way. But still, you know, maintaining this kind of high military budgets because we cannot really be rest assured that the threat in the region has actually really subsided. So this is the problem with this two-year war, is that Israel went for, as Benjamin Netanyahu declared it, this new independence, the regeneration of Israel. But I'm not sure that that's what Israel is actually getting. And that's what leads also perhaps to the desire for even more war, for even opening the space with more blood and more massacres and more killing, whether in Gaza or elsewhere. because of that kind of condition where you don't feel necessarily that you've actually made it outside the domain of what is actually acceptable for you. So that's a problem with Israel. It lives in these kind of structural contradictions. War sounds like an answer, but even when you use and unleash and kill and destroy, you're still losing a lot and shedding a lot of support, moral capital, diplomatic cover. You're losing a lot of that, but at the same time, the extent of the successes are suspect. And this is where the Gaza ceasefire comes and the pause there. Not only is it necessarily problematic, for Israel because it's still enunciate to some extent at least for a while the limit to what Israel has achieved thus far in Gaza despite the destruction and elsewhere even Israelis himself call it a tie with Gaza this is how they you know we've succeeded against Hezbollah in Syria we're very successful although it's always good to remember that it wasn't an Israeli success in Syria And it shouldn't be attributed as such, you know, despite what Israelis say. Of course, Israelis, you know, opened up, if you want, the space for these rebels to actually conduct their operation and offensive against the Syrian regime. But we cannot really place it centrally as an Israeli success. And now what they're, you know, advertising as a success in Iran by destroying the nuclear program or at least delaying it. um so yeah what i what i'm trying to say at least but just just to find a note what i'm trying to say is that despite that despite some space opening up the only real you know uh off-ramp that is being offered is is what form of political arrangements can be made with the arab world And here, the issue of Syria comes quite centrally because the idea and the prospect of normalization, whatever that means in the Syrian context, whether it means Syria would give up the Golan Heights or whether it will have some sort of secret but kind relationship with Israel like Qatar, for instance, or whether not so secret but not fully diplomatic recognition. or whether it will continue in this kind of ambiguous coordination between the new Syrian regime and Israel, specifically when it comes to coordinating against the reconstruction of Hezbollah in Lebanon or something along those lines. I'm not sure what's going to happen in Syria, or whether it's the potential for Saudi normalization, which could also ease some of that kind of anxiety slash fear, that void that opened up in October 7th, reinforced throughout the world in different multiple levels, and recently was also felt by Israelis. by the rockets hitting major urban centers, but also hitting a lot of the strategic targets that Iran wanted to hit and actually was able to hit.

Jared: Right on. No, I don't think Israel has the right to be the fascist genocidal growing monster on our planet. I would think if people have been watching this channel, they would understand that by now. All right. So you said a lot there. I mean, I think I just wanted to reflect a little bit because, you know, I haven't done we haven't done a live since actually our last one, which I think was June 16th. And obviously a lot has happened since then. You know, I was on vacation as the whole war with Iran. Our episode was like a day or two into the war between Iran and Israel. I have to say, I think you're laying out a lot of the important contradictions and the the questions, you know, because I think that when one of the things that's interesting to me is that once you see a narrative of success being propagated, right, you do create the ideological space for an off ramp to the war, essentially. Right. And so I found the United States involvement in the, you know, I mean, they were always involved, but the United States direct participation, the bombing of the nuclear facilities, which had already had the nuclear material taken out of them because Iran, of course, knew that that was a likely scenario. um but nonetheless there are centrifuges there are things that can't be moved in those spaces and so on right and so it's not it's not nothing that those were bombed uh we don't know as you say the scale of the destruction but the narrative that that trump sought to to propagate out of this was one of obliteration of total success of of you know shock and awe and we we came we saw we did it they didn't even see us etc right and netanyahu also jumped on board with this like know america you're our great partner and you you know you did this and i said that you would deal the death blow of this war etc and that narrative to me immediately uh seems very fake i mean it just seemed very manufactured that um you know you you would have this 12-day war you would do one bombing campaign and i don't care how you know, strong, you know, how many pounds the bunker bomb busters are and all of that. It's clearly not something that is going to dramatically reduce Iran's capabilities as a potential nuclear power in terms of the ability to develop nuclear weapons. Now, could it delay it for some period of time? Yeah, it definitely could. But it's not something where, you know, they have they have so many people who have been trained, who understand how to do nuclear engineering and so on, that there's a lot of capacity there that can be ramped back up and there's material there and so on. And I think also there's a number of countries, whether it's China, whether it's Russia, right, that will see what happened and would be willing to support Iran in whatever way that they can to help them get back on track on that front. I also think it really raises for Iran the existential nature of them developing nuclear weapons because of the way that their sovereignty was completely transgressed by Israel and by the United States that they're going to need to probably ramp up their deterrence capacity similar to how DPRK or North Korea has over the years where it's much less likely that somebody would want to engage in some kind of hot war with them because they would be afraid of the consequences of of doing so being really devastating right um so i that narrative of success to me was very interesting in terms of um obviously it led immediately to the end of of that war particularly with once there was that single attack on the you know the base in qatar that that the us holds right um And that happened quite quickly. And I think that it is very interesting that we also see a ceasefire conversation in Gaza coming on the heels of that. Now, as you say, I think there's a real problem. And what you're laying out is that You know, there can be a narrative of some success and there are successes that Israel can point to in this two years. But they, as you say, they don't have anything. They have not eliminated the Palestinian resistance and they really can't, you know, without a total genocide and ethnic cleansing. And even then, you enter a situation where the resistance may be from, you know, outside of the country as it has been in the past, more than within the territory of Palestine and, you know, 48 and so on. But I think that it raises just a difficult position where I think the more that we hear narratives of success, which will be very interesting because Netanyahu is on his way to the United States and I think should be here within the next couple of days if he's not already. And I think it'll be really telling what kind of narratives he and Trump start to propagate about, you know, their achievements, quote unquote, throughout this war. Because I think if the more you see narrative of success coming from these forces, that the more likely it is that they are looking to draw things to a close. That's just my take on that. You know, I felt like the... The bombing of the nuclear facilities by the United States seemed to me to be giving Israel an off-ramp to that struggle to say, okay, they don't want these missiles coming into, you know, Israel every day, every, you know, different parts of the day, etc., We need to have some closure where we can claim a victory and walk away, which is not to say that Iran didn't face any destruction. I mean, we've seen videos and so on. It's not to say that, but it is to say that I think the impetus to end it came from the United States and Israel not wanting to see that war continue to go on.

Abdul Jawad Omar: No, I mean, yeah, I mean, I don't necessarily disagree with, I mean, I think, yeah, narratives of success have that element, but that's the problem with Israeli narratives of success. They're always like temporary effects. And that's what I was trying to point out in my earlier reading. It's temporary effects. It's like somebody who's, you know, on drugs and, you know, they get really high, but then the next day they're like really down, you know? And that's one of the problems with Israel is that on the one hand, it's trying to find this kind of final resolution, even this kind of messianic vision on some level. And on the other level, it cannot really achieve that. And at the same time, it's still facing a lot of rot from within, a lot of internal contradictions from within. Now, these contradictions don't necessarily mean lead to Israel's dismantlement because, of course, it's contingent on whether there's global resistance to Israeli apartheid and ethosupremacism and settler colonialism and, of course, its role as an imperial forward base in the region. If there is that kind of resistance, then Israel will still be or still live within these contradictions. They will lead to problems in its budget and its finances, problems in the distribution of wealth. problems in the social makeup. Imagine if Iran now gets a nuclear bomb, for instance, if it moves towards a nuclear bomb, we don't know what Iran will do. Of course, its nuclear program just became more ambiguous. It just left the international atomic agency and it's accusing the international atomic agency of being complicit in the current campaign against it. And now the Iranian nuclear program, basically, whether its infrastructure in these known sites was destroyed or not, to what extent there was damage or not, to what extent it could preserve or actually create a weapons program. But imagine if Israel, after this war, comes out with a nuclear Iran, with a nuclear bomb. The problem is not that Iran uses that bomb or not. But imagine if you're an Israeli living in Israel and you know that Iran has a bomb. To what extent do you still want to actually live within the domain and threat of a nuclear bomb that might, as your politicians have claimed for years, if Iran gets a nuclear bomb, it seeks to erase Israel, which is not necessarily true. I don't think that Iran also has on its part a suicidal wish of going on a nuclear exchange. But that very idea, that very prospect of living within the domain of the Iranian bomb is problematic for Israeli society. Could easily even reinforce the fractures and the willingness of many Israelis to at least remain within the domain of Israel and continue to support this form of militaristic state on which it lives by the sword and perhaps will also die by the sword. So that type of orientation, if you want, that is very foundational, at least to the problems that will actually face Israel society as this war closes down. or in many ways continues, is that despite what it did in terms of hurting, you know, assassinating Rasulallah, assassinating the leadership, part of the leadership of Hezbollah, military at least leadership, you know, conducting the pager attacks, assassinating the leadership in Iran, military leadership specifically, And whether it will know, it will say to itself, look, we can still have some more operational success because we still haven't played all the cards that we have in our hands. And we should still go on in this war and conduct more operations, try to garner more opening, more space. kill more force the Palestinians outside of Gaza force the Palestinians outside of the West Bank that kind of desire to continue as a form to solve this kind of you know element of saturation in selling successes but at the same time still having hovering around you the fact that you cannot really feel a sense of existential security as you desired coming out of this war and this is because Israelis don't want to learn from you know from the fact that if you want to actually live in security in the region, you will have to reckon with your historical crimes, that you will have to reckon with what you have committed against the Palestinian people and against the people of the region. And you have to start to actually orient yourself towards another politics. But because you don't want to learn this lesson, and because you're not forced to learn this lesson by those who support you, because your role in the region is to actually continue with war and massacres and bloodshed and division, then I think that Israelis are going into this kind of recursive cycle of feeling that violence will actually rescue them when violence will only beget even more violence or at least will be met with a continuous capacity to resist within the region and within Palestine itself.

Jared: Right on. I want to shift in a minute or in a few minutes to that question of not learning lessons, because I think that's a good space to go in terms of talking about some of the different things that are going on within the Imperial Corps. I know you've written about Mamdani's primary victory, which I want to get to in a little bit. And you have not yet. Maybe you will. Maybe you won't. about Bob Villain and Palestine Action regarding the latest campaigns against them. But I do want to get to those in a minute. But before we do, Francis asked some questions which are related to something I did want to take some time for you to talk about because it's not being covered as much and it is really important, which is Kind of like what's what is going on with the West Bank right now? It seems like things are are quite bad there in many ways. Francis's questions was specifically, are there any changes regarding the people and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank related to that? When Hamas says they are consulting with other Palestinian factions, I want to know if inside and outside it is recognized that the beating heart of Palestinian politics is situated in Gaza. And finally, once again, we see again inside and outside and other scalar sources of tension that have to do with political field and conditions. Can Abdul Jawad comment on that? So, you know, Francis's question may be a little bit different than mine, which is just to sort of talk about what's what's going on in the West Bank. But maybe those are quite related as well. So, yeah, take your time to respond.

Abdul Jawad Omar: I mean, in the West Bank, I think there's nothing really new except for the intensification, what already exists. You know, we've talked about before the killing of camps in the north of the West Bank. You know, Israel is using the space that has opened up to exact a heavy price from the refugee camp, North Shams to the Karim camp, destroying them systematically, destroying some of the neighborhoods, displacing a lot of people. But of course, what we're seeing now currently happening in the West Bank is intensification of Israeli militias that roam around and attack villages in many areas, but specifically actually, of course, in the Ramallah area. And much of the campaign of ethnic cleansing vis-a-vis Palestinian Bedouin communities in what is called Area C or in Masafaryatta or in other places. But thus far, I don't think the condition in the West Bank has changed drastically, with some economic pain, of course, being felt more broadly by the Palestinian people in the West Bank now, with also Israeli banks refusing to receive the Israeli cash we use here in the West Bank and, of course, in Gaza, Israeli money, which is the Israeli shekel or the new Israeli shekel. And, of course, the banks in Israel are refusing to receive it. based on the orders of the Minister of Finance, Baclav Smotrich, as part of his campaign to also weaken our economy, but also to force Palestinians into a more surveilled exchange of money by making all exchanges become electronic rather than cash-based. But beyond that, beyond these developments, I wouldn't say that there's anything radical changing in the context of the West Bank. I think the West Bank is still in a heavy political paralysis. caught between what Palestinians in the West Bank are seeing unfolding in Gaza on the one hand On the second hand, of course, feeling a sense of wanting to do something, incapable of doing something, and at the same time, with a Palestinian Authority that is also ensuring that the capacity of Palestinians to resist is not resurrected, at least at this particular point, or that there's any effort to actually resurrect it, because it's hinging itself completely on the architecture in the region, that America leads and manages whether through the Arab states and of course through diplomatic channels and of course through Israeli interests being safeguarded through what is called the security coordination etc. So I don't think that there's any fundamental change happening also in people's attitude. We could say this is a moment not of you know flow but an ebb. You know it's not necessarily a moment for action at least on the part of the Palestinians at least thus far and I feel that you know that is not something that will change anytime soon specifically since Israel took its gloves off and this kind of brute use of violence whether in Israeli prisons where Palestinians now reside specifically from the West Bank but also from Gaza or whether in Gaza Strip itself or whether in the West Bank as well in terms of its you know the happy trigger soldiers that are using their violence much more openly at will. So at this current moment, while Palestinians have a lot of distaste towards the Palestinian Authority, this paradoxical relationship with it is that At the same time, the hope, at least secretly among many Palestinians here in the West Bank, is that that Palestinian Authority itself will at least mitigate any form of violence and disaster happening in the way that it happened in the Gaza Strip, specifically because there's no organized also resistance or a decision to resist by those who control or govern the Palestinians in the West Bank in the form of the Palestinian Authority. That's what comes to the Palestinians. The second element, I think, I don't think that the division today is inside, outside, or who's the center of Palestinian politics. Of course, Gaza is. I think Palestinians recognize that everywhere, not only in the West Bank, not only in 1948, not only in Jerusalem, but also those in the diaspora. But I think more broadly, I think the question that is hovering around the Palestinian political field is whether we can still say that we're one people based on this kind of disconnect between having one part of Palestine facing this kind of violence in its intense form, this genocidal violence that Israel unleashed on the Gaza Strip, while other parts of Palestine that were colonially divided having a hard time to actually come up with an answer to what is to be done at this current moment politically or otherwise. So that is what is hovering around in the political field, this feeling of, I wouldn't call it survival guilt, but a feeling of a sense of disappointment, on the part of people in Gaza vis-à-vis Palestinians in the West Bank. The feeling of a unity of people, something like what happened in the unity intifada in 2021 that didn't really unfold in this current moment for maybe understandable reasons, but at least that is not how the picture looks. Feeling that the pain is directed against one geography more than other geographies. although there's much pain also here. But at the same time, it's a condition where the Palestinian collective will have to reckon with. And it's one of these things that also when we spoke about Israeli contradictions, it's one of the contradictions that are also a part of the Palestinian story. This contradiction between various cries for accommodation with Israel, trying to not arouse its fury, specifically when you live within its domain and where your body and your life is basically contingent of the decision of a settler or a soldier without any form of repercussion or responsibility on the part of those who kill you or arrest you or otherwise. And when you see the world actually still supporting Israel, still deflecting from its massacres, still giving it arms, then that kind of picture hits home for many Palestinians. And the idea of resistance becomes much more, if you want, at least, vulnerable to critique internally, not only if you want externally. So that is the picture, at least, that that's what's hovering around in the Palestinian political field. The idea of what it means to be Palestinian today, whether we can speak of a Palestinian people that are united, although my diagnosis has always been that that is not necessarily the outcome of this war, that this war actually clarifies things that have already been moving on through this kind of colonial manufactured divisions that were created through the Oslo process specifically, but even longer than that, since 1948, if you want, and even before that. where divided geographies, divided forms of privileges, rights, economic conditions create different mentalities, and if you want, different ideological orientations, even among Palestinians themselves. Some feel more secure, others feel more vulnerable. In this context, it wasn't surprising that the most excluded part of the Palestinian people, the one in the Gaza Strip besieged From its outside and of course going through the cyclical wars where air force was used primarily in air power and stand or you know firepower more body was used against the bodies of the Palestinians and Gaza would be the one to actually create this moment of breach because it has an organized resistance and I kind of outlaid that before. But I think in this current context, that's what hovers. And that's what also scares a lot of Palestinians like me who look at this moment as one where we can point to some success, of course, as well on the Palestinian cause, specifically the drastic change, if you want, in people's attitudes towards Palestine. the resurgence of Palestine in people's imagination as a site also for the liberation and the potential for liberation not only of Palestinians but also of people elsewhere, the breach in Israeli psyche that occurred on October 7th, the vulnerability to which Israel was under throughout this also two years the continuous resistance in the Gaza Strip despite much of the hardship we're talking about a secluded besieged strip of land with no strategic depth that has been able to conduct you know a one of the most daring attritional form of warfare for two years against a military that has made it clear that it will not have any distinction between civilian or militant and that will you know continuously bombard people and despite some of the infiltrations that the Israelis have had still being able to safeguard the society in Gaza and not have an open rebellion against the resistance which is all part of if you want of minimal successes that you can point to in terms of the Palestinian cause but there is that question that hovers around that it's one of the questions or one of the dark matters if you want of palestinian life today where people talk about it but they don't want to confront it or reckon with it which is what it means when You know, one part of Palestine is going through this kind of intense agony. And, you know, in a place like Ramallah, you have a mall opening or, you know, life continuing as if nothing is happening. Now, I'm not saying that that's the case, but at least on the surface, that's how it looks and feels, of course.

Jared: Right on. A little bit of further clarification from Francis and another person in the chat is that it's based really around this discussion of consultation around the ceasefire, which, as I understand it, is fairly standard that they talk to other resistance factions, that they talk to a lot of different sectors of civil society and so on within Gaza, people to get their pulse on these negotiations and their way in. But I think the question also is whether that includes you know, FETA and, um, you know, and the PA and, and that sort of thing, or if, you know, so anything on the consultation that you would.

Abdul Jawad Omar: No, I mean, I'm not sure if it, I don't think that, uh, Hamas consults, uh, Mahmoud Abbas. So like, if that's the question, so, but they consult, I mean, there might be some sort of talks happening between Hamas and, uh, some personalities within the Palestinian authority over a possible, you know, arrangement happening in a, in any post-war scenario. I don't think that these type of talks have not occurred. They have occurred. But I think when Hamas refers to consultations, they generally are consultations with those who are fighting in Gaza, specifically people like in the PFLP, DFLP, Islamic Jihad, and others who have actual... you know, presence in terms of a resistance fighting force within the Gaza Strip, and actually includes some factions that don't have necessarily national representation, but are local to Gaza itself. So yeah, I mean, that's what they mean by consultations with other Palestinian groups.

Jared: Thank you. All right. Let's pivot to the Imperial Corps. So I'll save the Mamdani conversation because I'm sure we'll have more to kind of dig into there since you've written a piece on it. But I'll start with, you know, obviously another thing that happened when I was on vacation is... you know the Glastonbury Festival which is a huge music festival that takes place every year and um you know it was aired on BBC and BBC made these links to try to avoid kneecaps uh set because if folks who don't know probably do but kneecap is a an Irish from the north of Ireland uh Republican uh you know hip-hop group basically that has been under target by the UK for allegedly supporting Hezbollah and so on. But they have a tradition within kind of Irish Republican resistance to British imperialism. They have a kind of anti-Zionist stance. You know, they did put out some statements that I thought were kind of wishy-washy, but I think it was as they were trying to avoid their own prescription and potential, you know, legal consequences actually for some of the stuff that they have potentially said or done. And so they wanted to avoid them because they were afraid that they would do a bunch of pro-Palestinian, you know, chants and things like this. And they ended up putting on this kind of punk, you know, reggae punk duo, Bob Villain. and uh you know they they get this chance of uh death death to the idf which you know the the whole crowd responds to there's palestinian flags everywhere and this is live on the bbc and it causes uh you know quite a quite a stir within UK society, particularly among the mainstream media, because obviously and I think this is the point that's kind of important and it connects also to the banning of Palestine action is that, you know, the the British involvement and Elbit systems and all of these things, I think even much more than in the United States, there is a large percentage of people in the UK that are very vehemently against the support of their state and weapons manufacturers in their state of the Zionist entity and are against it. And you see the popularity of those chants, you see all those flags and so on. and you know it's this is it you see this divide right between what the mainstream media wants to to present um as as israel is our our friend and our partner and our ally in the region which is the same crap we get in the united states but um you know of what is a very mass a support for Palestinian self-determination and an opposition to genocide, certainly in opposition to what Israel has done over these last two years that has a lot of mass support within the UK. So what do you see in response? You see quite draconian measures to shut these things down, whether it's canceling of Bob Villain's visa to come tour to the United States as well as Europe. They did do shows in Greece, I believe, in the last couple of days that looked like they were huge. And there's a lot of contradictions here because also this is not a group that was well known before this happened. I mean, I'm sure people knew who they were, but most of us in the world had never heard of this group before. And now all of a sudden, they're kind of world famous, at least among people who, you know, see some support for Palestine. So I was just curious kind of how how you're reading that alongside also the prescription of of Palestine action, which, of course, is, I think, also, we should say, been the most successful of direct action campaigns, you know, going back years, even before October seven, against complicity with with Israel. So, yeah, what would you want to say about this?

Abdul Jawad Omar: Look, I think when you have criminalization, if anything, it actually points out towards some success, no? Because the more you see the state, whatever that state is, move towards criminalizing a group or trying to open the space for even more clam down against these groups legally and otherwise, trying to delegitimize these groups, it means that these groups have actually uh, have made some headway, not only in terms of public imagination, but also in disruption of, of much of the manufacturing of LB assistance, for example, in the UK. So it's not surprising that, you know, you know, the British military. Uh, slash political elites slash also the Israel lobby. And of course the historical involvement of the UK and also enabling and setting up Israel, including the Israeli. I mean, paradoxically, there's a lot of historical resonances here. I mean, many of the early officers in the United Kingdom, people like Wingate and others, they're the ones that actually taught the first Israeli units of how to actually go into a village. and, you know, kidnap and kill and maim and use these kind of, you know, like the night squads that existed pre 1948. So that long history of British bloody involvement, even, you know, placing the seeds for the rise of what we now call the Israeli Defense Forces. you know, is part and parcel of that kind of institutional, long institutional memory that the UK have. And of course, its current complicity and involvement directly in operations in the Gaza Strip and across the region in support of Israel. And we see that as some sort of consensus, even between the Labour and the Conservatives within the British establishment. So it's not surprising when you have a Palestine action group that also has a lot of backing from within British society, that also can galvanize a lot of support and mobilization within British society, that you would see the state trying to devise new techniques, whether legal or otherwise, to actually criminalize these groups and try to clam down and contain them and, of course, defeat their spirit. of course there's always a problem of excess uh when it comes to this you know states taking that type of position and to what extent that they will implement you know uh uh whatever legal direction that that gives them for instance what i heard in the case of palestine action you know that you know just supporting that group or stating that you support that group uh you know could and he could end up landing in prison for 14 years for instance something along those lines so i mean that is also part of i think a wider campaign on the part of the UK establishment or the British establishment to also attack not only Palestine action as a group that actually conducts direct actions of sabotage against you know the British military and some of the industrial infrastructure around armament that actually end up going to Israel but also I think it's an attack against the Palestine movement that is rising and of course increasing in terms of its ability to capture the imagination of the British public more broadly And this is why I think also Bob Dylan's death to the IDF came not only as a moment where you can grab attention perhaps, but at the same time on a level to actually defy directly and of course manufacture this overblown crisis. I mean, the British media has been speaking about what this duo have said in this festival for at least four or five days now. They haven't given up on talking about it and discussing it over and over again. And it shows this kind of hysteric reaction that wants to, on the one level, contain this rising support, wants to make it controversial, wants to scare people off from the Palestine movement more broadly. But I think that these are kind of desperate elements because much of the arguments being placed front of center are really nonsensical. And they're nonsensical in many ways. They don't actually really, you know, they don't have any kind of, if you want, convincing force because they defy any form of common sense, at least when people are hearing, you know, for instance, the Minister of Culture, I think, in the UK, saying that when you say death to the IDF, you're saying death to all Jews. For instance, conflating the IDF with Jewish people across the world, but not only with Jewish people, but also with all Israelis, actually making the argument that a lot of the Palestinian resistance groups have made throughout the years, that Israeli society, because it's a conscription-based army, because of the relationship between civilian sectors and military sectors are so neatly connected and because much of Israeli society actually ends up serving in the military that this idea of civilian army distinction in which Israel tries its best to actually maintain when it comes to it being targeted like we saw what happened with the Soroko hospital when one Iranian missile I think hit near it or on it in the 12-day war, as Trump called it, a lot of the Israeli politicians came out and started speaking of how hospitals are targeted, despite the fact they were also targeting hospitals in Iran, but also destroyed the entire healthcare system, including the assassination of one of the heads of the hospitals in Gaza two or three days ago as well. So, I mean, these type of distinctions, I mean, she was actually making the argument that you know much of the palestinians have made throughout the years that the civilian army distinction in israel is problematic to say the least and and needs to be looked with a skeptical view because of the conscription model because israeli economy is so entrenched within the military economy Because of, you know, Israeli bases are so well, are very embedded within the civilian structure within Israel itself, because and because and because. And they were making that argument, but making it as a defensive argument in a way that, you know, calling for the death of the IDF metaphorically or materially. I don't know what the attention of the singers were, was, you know, in any way, was actually a call for some sort of genocide against, you know, the entire Israeli population, but not only the Israeli population, also the Jews across the world, which I think is an anti-Semitic trope in itself, a form of mutilated anti-Semitism, of course. So this is the nonsense that comes out of these moments. When somebody speaks something and then you have all these hysteric nonsensical responses to it, an excessive treatment by the media, an excessive controversy that everybody needs to state some opinion on and take a position on. And I think to some extent, this is a manufacturer's crisis. It's one that tries to make instill fear across this rising sentiment. And I don't think it's a rising sentiment only within pro-Palestinian groups that are leading some sort of movement, but a larger and wider audience of younger, more attuned people who are watching the social media, who are looking at what's happening in Gaza, who are seeing in their eyes, for instance, how Israeli soldiers are killing people when they're trying to get aid, for instance. And at the same time, they're they're they're they're told if you criticize that or say something uh against that or if you call for the death of the military machine that actually enables that and and and unfold this form of unleashment and violence that you're you're you know you're in in some way some controversial you're anti-semitic but it doesn't matter for that type of manufacture crisis You want to go hysteric. You want to create the controversy to attempt at least to break down that rising support and make people more timid in their criticisms, etc. At least that's the orientation. But I think this is only momentary. And this is, I think, something that will backfire because I think it touches upon what I say in my article on Mamdani. The part of what is being lost at this current moment is a displacement of Israel's central position in the political imagination, for instance, in the US. But at the same time, what we're seeing is this excessive machine that wants to articulate everything in terms of antisemitism, that the more it becomes, the more it runs, the more excessive it becomes, it actually uh breaks down because of its own excess not in spite of it because it doesn't choose strategically its battles it goes all in for instance let's take you know bob villain's uh mantra of uh death death to the idf it actually made for instance free Palestine or from the river to the sea Palestine will be less controversial so now you you you know you're pushing the yard you make a controversy over something but still you know the you know the the controversy over other mantras have actually been lessened nobody's mentioning for instance the free Palestine mantra as part of that as part of that backlash. So the more the establishment becomes hysteric, the more it's excessive. I think the more, at least in the medium run, it will lose this fight. And it actually will lose it because people get tired and sick and disgusted by being told to unsee what they saw to not realize what they realize, to belied their own eyes and truth that are rising and being told repeatedly that doesn't matter. You need to cover up ideologically because we need to maintain support for Israel, for whatever fantasy or strategic reasons that we have.

Jared: 100%. I totally agree. And I think that, yeah, I mean, this is the point I think that you make in the Mamdani piece. that i really agree with um you know i shout out to my my friends over on struggle session uh some of my fellow tanky group therapy uh you know folks adnan hussein who hosted a session and they talked a little bit about your piece uh on mom donnie but they didn't i didn't feel like they really for the most part addressed the arguments that you're making in that piece uh and i think you know unfortunately You know, I disagree with the title of the piece. So the piece is titled Zohran Mamdani's Victory Marks the End of Israel's Central Place in US Politics, which Adnan said would be a controversial thesis. And I think it is quite a controversial thesis, but I don't actually think that's the thesis of your piece. I think, you know, as we both know, People who write articles don't usually get to determine what the title of the article is. And in this case, I think that the title might be one that catches people's attention, but it's not really directly related to what you're talking about in the piece, which really is this kind of exhaustion on multiple levels. And, you know, I don't think that that's all that's what's represented by Mamdani's victory, nor, as folks know who have watched my show for years, do I have much of a belief that in the kind of social democratic electoral strategy within the United States as a vehicle to enact political change, I don't think that it usually does that. And to the extent that these campaigns operate within the Democratic Party, I well, they throw up all kinds of contradictions and we'll talk about the contradictions that they throw up, which I think are interesting in and of themselves. You know, it it seems often to produce a sort of left politics that is constantly kind of de-radicalizing. And we can talk about that a little bit in terms of what I think are some of maybe the negative effects that could happen with the Mamdani campaign and what those might look like. But what I would say is that where I think what you're laying out in the piece is important. And in that case, it's also important in terms of what Mamdani, his campaign represents. is how the establishment responds to Mamdani and the fact that those responses are excessive and that they're not successful and what that lack of success of those responses means about where people are via these, you know, these charges that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic, that You know, that we must disavow everything related to Palestine in order to enter into politics. And that I don't think that those things, that most people take that shit seriously anymore, to be quite honest and excuse my French. But anyway, say a little bit about what you're looking at in that piece and how you read the importance of that race.

Abdul Jawad Omar: Look, my piece was not a call for electoral theory of change for people who want radical change. I wasn't writing it from that perspective. That's just one element that should be just mentioned earlier. And I agree. think you know the title i didn't put it myself it was the editors and i think it's it's more to also attract you know a traffic uh for people to read it but beyond throwing my editors under the bus um i think that on multiple shout out by the way shout out to mondo weiss because yes i think that i'm glad that they published so much of your work i think they do a lot of other great stuff so i don't mean to throw them under the bus although i do disagree with the title Yeah, of course. I mean, no, I'm just like, you're just making it. I think what is important is that when we go through periods of discursive symbolic changes, you know, it's not necessarily that we see, you know, people move from one side of the equation to another, although that happens as well. You know, like if we look at, for instance, much of the polls that are coming out, specifically among Democrats in the US, they show a radical change of you know, position on Israel from, you know, being a party that a majority of which supports Israel to being a party that actually now much of democratic base perhaps is more sympathetic as many of these polls of the Palestinians. But I think the first question comes to mind would have Zohran Mamdani's campaign, specifically this person who has a history of pro-Palestinian, you know, setting up SJP, working in the pro-Palestinian movement, would have this person been able to actually advance a campaign in New York City if it weren't for the past two years? of much more awareness of what happens in Palestine, of people being engaged in conversation, debates, of witnessing the bombardment and genocide that is happening in the Gaza Strip, would have this campaign been possible? I'm not sure. I don't think that that that this type of campaign would have been possible with this type of person. Perhaps somebody else who doesn't have that history could have talked about affordability and been successful as a democratic socialist running in in New York, and I don't want to say that this is a singular reason why Zohran Mamdani was successful, but I think there is something on which we can also point towards that has shifted in relation to how people orient themselves towards people, for instance, working in pro-palacy and politics and still advancing themselves electorally on a more wider scale where there's many contradiction and many people with different orientations different politics uh different element you know depth of knowledge around issues uh different social backgrounds uh whatever their experience might be in the context of a place like new york city for instance so there's one element of that that i don't think that would have been possible it's something similar to what i've also argued when i spoke about why I think Gaza played an important role in the defeat of the Democrats in the presidential election and Kamala Harris's campaign of joy that didn't resonate even with its own base because of also the support of genocide that the Democratic establishment, including Biden and Kamala Harris, actually perpetuated throughout the campaign itself. That there is a link. I mean, it doesn't mean that it's the central component, but it has something to do with people looking at this campaign and looking at the dissonance specifically for those more well-informed more politically engaged that might engage in terms of organizing bringing people out for you know elections engaging in forms of electorism that were not inspired by that campaign of course there's a lot of other reasons why Kamala Harris also lost and while her message felt short her personality whatever it is but there's also that politics of deafness to what's happening in Palestine that many people wanted at least a position to be taken that is much more morally clear, much more persistent and consistent instead of being evasive and noncommittal. So I think that there is something that has been going on in the past two years and we should point to words because what is the point of doing, you know, live streams like what the Electronic Intifada does or writing for MandaWise or you know engaging in these intellectual and political debates or coming if there's if we cannot assess at least that something has changed that there's more awareness that perhaps more consciousness but i think what is more significant to me and this is why perhaps even at a fault you know like one of the things that you know i don't actually credit the profile sign movement with this is that i credit the zionists themselves and their excess and their blindness and hysteria as part and parcel of how Israel's place is being displaced in the American, if you want, symbolic fabric. And by being displaced, I don't mean that Israel will not remain important for the empire. and for the imperial managers, but in terms of its symbolic place in American, if you want, life. And I think that is what is highly important in this, because I think once people see what they see, look and witness what's occurring and unfolding in Palestine, engage in conversations, perhaps get more aware through also a lot of these alternative media networks around issues that relate to Palestine, debates around the history. And maybe that's not, of course, the 300 million Americans that live in America, but a big contingency of Americans that are following up, becoming more aware. And once they are forming these positions, whether they're young or a bit older, and they see this hysteric political machine that wants to accuse every protest of being anti-semitic that wants to attribute motivations that a lot of people don't really have uh of hatred towards you know a specific group of people or of a blindness uh or ideological bias against i don't know uh jews or otherwise uh you know of being you know of tasting that kind of exhausting machine that is always pointing out things even when nobody's asked. I remember this clip where there's a lot of language misunderstanding, but a football fan talking about a game that happened between the Israeli national team and Mali, and he was saying Israel played well. And then these Israeli couple come and interfere and say, Israel, Israel. And at some point, you know, the guy gets kind of provoked because I was just saying something very neutral about, you know, the football game. And at one point he starts just to scream, free, free Palestine. There's something, I mean, this is very incidental, you know, but there's something about that type of dynamic that is also happening at this current moment. That dynamic where, you know, you're forcing me, into a position while i'm seeing something else you're forcing me to not speak when i think that there's something that should be spoken for you're forcing me to look at my politicians in a different way which is that they're hypocritical that they don't have moral consistency to the institutions that pretend to for instance to uphold liberal education but it instead actually facilitate the deportation or the attempt to deport some of their students and facilitate so there's that kind of you know breakdown of trust in the relationship between institutions and people and politicians and people. But I think on some level also this disgust and exhaustion by hearing pro-Israeli political lines that are excessive, that are always around the corner, that sometimes speak when nobody's asking, and they want to interject themselves into, for instance, a mayoral campaign, like what happened with the Mamdani campaign. when the question of Israel, which shouldn't be necessarily that relevant, is being placed on the center.

Jared: It's New York City. Like, who gives a shit?

Abdul Jawad Omar: Yeah. You want to talk about sanitation. You might want to talk about rent. You want to talk about, I don't know, whatever agenda you want to talk about in terms of the city. But you're still forcing this issue of Israel front and center as part of the strategy to delegitimize Mamdani. And then it fails. That's the point. It failed. It didn't actually resonate, at least in the primaries. It didn't actually resonate. And it didn't actually induce a revolt against Mamdani or actually eject him from politics. So this is, I think, this is fundamental about, you know, that moment of speaking how the symbolic fabric, which is, you know, maybe three years ago or four years ago if mamdani was running this campaign and somebody accused him of being anti-israel that that would have fold uh or landed differently in the minds of people and how they would hear that and how israel would be seen as part of also kind of a moral litmus test among much of you know uh the people perhaps that you know reside in new york or have a relationship with Israel on some level or have been, you know, for years living within this kind of Zionist hegemony where Israel is viewed in positive light. But now I think that's falling on deaf ears. And I think at least if we want to take the position that, you know, most people are not necessarily pro-Palestinian, but seem to not really understand why somebody's position on Israel should matter to their own daily lives, for example, in New York City or otherwise. And I think that's something that we're going to see more of. The idea that Israel's, you know, Israel's a litmus test, Israel as a, you know, a an arbiter or some sort of, you know, something you hold to signal some sort of moral or religious values. You know, like Ted Cruz with Tucker Carlson when he spoke of how he went to Congress because he wanted to be the foremost defender of Israel because the Bible tells him that he should support Israel and at the same time accuses the Iranian government of being you know some sort of religious fanatic government you know of course the world that these people live in sometimes and the contradictions and you know I just don't understand it but in many ways it's beyond my ability to explain but in many ways the idea that you know Israel is or kissing the ring, or you have to support Israel as an entry to politics, I think that will be problematic going forward. And I think, look, no matter what you think of electoral politics as a theory of change, I think there will be more of Mamdani-type campaigns coming forward within the Democratic Party. There will be more candidates that might have a different position on Israel than Mamdani or others. And I think that that opens the space as politicians test this, as it becomes clear that that is not an issue that they actually will fall or die by. But at the same time, maybe even will actually standing with the Palestinians will actually garner you support. I think that that will create some change in the political scene in America. I'm not saying that it will change imperial policies. This is important to note. I'm not saying that even if you have more pro-Palestine, if you want, congressmen and congresswomen or senators, that something of a major change will happen or a drastic radical change in American foreign policy will occur or unfold because there's a lot of institutional interest in what happens. There's a lot of different policies that go into it. But I think what happens is that these contradictions within the system will be amplified even more. that the politics of incorporation, of silencing people, of containing that kind of a flood of support for the Palestinians will be more problematic by the day. And even with attempts to criminalization, like what's happening in the United Kingdom, and also in the context of the America with, you know, these type of, you know, conflation, I wouldn't say conflation, but this kind of Trump, Stephen Miller policy of deportation, and also folding the Palestine movement within this kind of anti-immigrant stance more broadly, or using the Palestine movement as an entryway to expand the powers of deportation of immigrants in the United States. I think that that will backfire in many ways, that access will also find some of its limits. And I don't see it only happening on the left. Unfortunately, it's also happening on the right. And I say unfortunately, because I think on the right, you actually have real anti-Semites that are also using this space to enter into the public domain and, of course, use that kind of Israel or having this kind of anti, if you want, Jewish bias or anti-Semitic bias and, of course, using critique of Israel as a way to, to hammer it down if you want. But even within the right, this idea of America first that excludes Israel is becoming much more potent. Specifically, as a sign of that, we saw that in the 12-day war where Trump was pressured by his own, if you want, one of the camps or the sects, I think, I don't know. I see Trump like having different, I don't know, factions and, you know, and he's managing these factions. He reminds me a bit of Yasser Arafat on some level of having factions like the Zionist and, you know, the right wing, America First, people like Steve Bannon and, you know, all of these different factions that maybe align with Elon Musk and the billionaires that have different interests at play. But of course, maybe I'm wrong in my assessment of that kind of factionalism within his own MAGA movement. coming up and trying to push back against an American direct intervention or an American war where you would see American boots on the ground or Americans being harmed and trying to accuse Israel of being the one that is facilitating yet another perpetual war in the Middle East. So this, I think, will just increase. in terms of tempo and intensity, and it opens up a political space. It could be dispensed on electoral politics, it could be dispensed elsewhere as well because it also provisions those who actually want a politics outside of also electoral politics to point out the distance between institutions and their responsiveness, their moral bankruptcy, and hypocrisy and try to actually figure a different form of politics that is more radical. And of course, a Mamdani's campaign can come in and disrupt that because it re-energizes people around electoral politics. And even if we read it some typologically as some sort of displacement of the Zionist hegemony, or at least if you want Zionist of displacement of Zionist support within the United States, But still, I think that one of the things that I've always spoke about here is that Palestine is more than itself, and Palestine actually reveals an unconcealed truth elsewhere. And it opens up the space for forms of radical politics. Maybe this space is not wide, maybe it's small, maybe it's not big enough, but I think it opens up that space to point out a lot of different problems with institutions, whether academic, political, media, or otherwise, and their inability to actually respond this moment or hear their own electoral base. And at the same time, opens up, if you want, alongside other fights that are happening and occurring and unfolding, like, for instance, the anti-deportation fight that is also unfolding in the United States. And we saw signs of that in Los Angeles and California more intensely than other places, at least for the moment. But it opens up the space for a different radical reorientation of politics, even outside the electoral system itself.

Jared: Much appreciated. I mean, I think there's so many different places that I would love to go with you on discussing some of this and maybe some of it we'll save for another time, but I will dig in on a couple of points. I mean, I think, you know, the Mamdani thing is interesting. I think it's, I don't want to diminish its significance at all because I think winning that primary says multiple things. I think it says that people, you know, i think are fed up with the old democratic party establishment leadership which i do think is significant that they are completely unable um i think uh nina farnia said this in that uh struggle session discussion about how within the heart of finance capital the Democratic Party wasn't able to feel the candidate that anyone wanted to vote for. And so Zoran Mamdani is able to come in as this young person with some social democratic reforms that he's proposing, whether or not we think that any of those could actually come to pass within the heart of finance capital. People vote for them along with not being derailed by the constant attempts to paint him as, you know, a Palestinian insurgent, basically, just because he co-founded a SJP chapter years ago and has been, you know, somewhat involved in the Palestine movement for years now. And then you also see all the slurs of he's a communist, of course, from the right and so on, right? Because they find some interview where he talks about the means of production and so on. and that those attacks will only continue to escalate and you know we'll see how that goes i do think you know i mean you also have the right talking about whether they can deport him you know which is another interesting thing and so again it throws up all of these things of of these excesses of the responses that you read that mostly are just racist right like most of this stuff is just islamophobia You know, and so on. And we see that over and over again. And then, you know, of course, there is the strong anti-communist, anti-radical current, which comes out even in something as like we want a state grocery store in one in each borough, which in itself is. And that's cool. I would love to have a state grocery store in my township, but it's not in itself some kind of radical change that finance capital couldn't incorporate and have and not have any sort of threat to it. But they can't, you know, it's similar in those respects, the kind of anti-radicalism, anti-communism within the United States and the anti-Palestinian sentiment in that they don't feel that they can make any sort of concessions or allow for any kind of small reform or change that would you know, pose any kind of ideological alternative to just total neoliberal capitalism, you know, just total free market, the rule of the market. And I think that in that sense, it does also present an opportunity, which is something I see from my friends that live in New York, of them looking to use this opportunity to have conversations to engage politically with their peers and so on even if they're not you know dsa members or necessarily uh hugely believing in mamdani as a candidate they see a way to use his campaign uh in their own organizing and so i that my only hope coming out of it is sort of those those organizing efforts, because I think that what's going to happen is a full scale assault on this guy. And then if he does get elected, his ability to actually enact any of his political agenda, I think will not actually I don't see how he would be able to. But maybe I'm wrong on that, but we'll see. But the other part of it, too, that's challenging, and I'll just say this, I don't necessarily want to get into a big discussion about this, but because he modulates his own rhetoric, maybe we could talk about this briefly, because he modulates his own rhetoric around Palestine, right? Like, he's not willing to say... One of the interesting things is he won't condemn statements that others have made, for instance, globalize the Intifada. That has been something that for some reason the media has glommed on to, to say like, well, we must force him to condemn this thing that he never said himself, or at least there's no record of it. And, you know, so they try to force him to condemn, condemn, condemn, and he won't do that, although saying it's not something I would say. And then he does actually affirm the right of Israel to exist, which is something that I think a lot of us within, you know, pro-Palestine spaces would not want to affirm as some kind of right, since it's not something that exists within international law and so on. But he says he caveats by saying it has to have equal rights for all people living there, which would include Palestinians, which in itself is this way of introducing a concept that Zionists are incapable of accepting usually, except for maybe the most, quote unquote, liberal or progressive of them. So, you know, that's the one thing I think is that and then there's also the aspect within DSA, which I would say, which is that DSA has a variance of positions, people who are much more radical politically than Mamdani, who do have to sort of be silenced often during campaigns like this because they don't want things that more radical elements of the DSA say to derail the political aspirations of someone like Mamdani. And I think that is one of the things that's probably most frustrating by some people within the pro-Palestine movement is that there are more radical expressions of solidarity with Palestinians in the United States, but they feel whether they are told to or not, they kind of feel like any criticism that they make of Mamdani's statements gets branded as ultra leftism or you're not a serious person or so on. And I think that's one of the dynamics that I don't like personally about putting a lot of eggs in a basket of a campaign like this. So I don't know if you have thoughts on that element of things.

Abdul Jawad Omar: Look, I mean, I don't have much of thoughts on how Americans in America should think of their own you know, politics, you know, like, cause I, first of all, I'm distant. So, you know, you don't really understand the local political dynamics of what happens on an everyday basis and people's orientations, contradictions, factionalism, you know, that, you know, arises and, and, and, you know, I'm wary of being, you know, in a position to lecture people elsewhere and, on how to think or act politically and i think that that is quite problematic uh specifically coming from a place of that type of distance in terms of people's daily struggle and what they would prioritize etc um having said that i think like with mamdani that type of you know being on the one hand not really apologetic about his past And at the same time, advancing some sort of charm offensive that would lessen, if you want, or contain some of the Zionist pushback against him. Specifically among segments, perhaps, of what he sees important electorally to be able to be successful in a mayoral campaign in New York. So he's probably thinking of some fears within elements of the Jewish population within New York City, specifically those oriented towards Zionism, but at the same time have liberal orientation. So he wants to at least ease some of perhaps their concerns and anxieties. And it does seem on some level, that he would condemn violence, speak on the level of empathy towards Israeli captive families, speak to Israel's right to exist in this kind of equal terms. So he had this kind of charm offensive that I think was politically calculated as meant to ease, provide empathy, and to make him less of this kind of radical figure that would scare off, if you want, some of the Zionist liberals. that might exist in New York or have this kind of Zionist liberal orientation more broadly. So I think that was part of the offensive there. What I thought was interesting is also that he didn't apologize for his past. He didn't condemn his past. So there's this kind of in-betweenness about this type of moment, not really emphasizing whatever politics he had in terms of relationship Uh, uh, to Gaza, but also speaking sometimes like in the beginning of the campaign with Maddie Hassan on like, you know, I'll arrest him to me. I'll home. He's a war criminal. You know, so like speaking in this kind of talking points that are also, if you want to take the American context and American politics, were never really spoken before in these kind of direct, in a direct way. So I think he's interplaying within these two domains. And I think that's part of the electoral strategy or whatever advisors are around him or he has devised in order to ensure that People would not reject him vehemently as they would if he would be this kind of unrepentant anti-Zionist centering Palestine as part of his campaign or going all out on it. So I think that is the interesting part. I think he didn't really want to speak about Palestine that much in the campaign. But at the same time, he was insistently asked to speak about it from those who are antagonistic towards Palestine and any form of pro-Palestinian sentiment, whether in the debates or elsewhere. So I think that's his disposition. I mean, Mamdani is walking through that kind of tightrope. But I think what is important is that you know, without an active organized pro-Palestine campaign that raises the bar, of course, these politicians, and would also pressure these politicians, no matter how much they're grounded or not grounded in pro-policy and politics historically, of course, it's easy for them to get incorporated within the system and sell out and become a shadow of their former selves, if you want to put it in light terms. So I think that that's an element of also pushing forward towards a moral consensus where a position on Palestine is also a, you know, a litmus, a moral litmus test for those who enunciate it. So if you're against Palestinian rights and freedom, it tells us something about your politics and orientation and perhaps slightly about some sort of racist hierarchy that you have, about some sort of value that you have in terms of who you value as a human and who you don't, some sort of anti-Islamic perhaps bias or anti-whatever bias, and whether you stand with Palestine that actually enunciates a different form of politics orientation in terms of values and otherwise. And I think that's slowly also becoming more and more expansive, that Palestine is not necessarily now a moral consensus, but slowly and slowly it's a place of dissensus and contradiction and heated, if you want, argument and debate, but increasingly one where the Palestinian argument is making, if you want, a sway, but also the excess of the Israel argument is creating a lot of exhaustion and disgust with it. So I think these two coupled together are fundamental. This is why I think Mamdani's campaign is significant, because also it's New York City, because it's the biggest actual city with Jewish population in the world. I mean, people, of course, talk about Tel Aviv, but when they mention Tel Aviv, they actually mention Ghosh Dan area, which is a much bigger area. But it's actually the biggest city with Jews in the world. So it is significant. It has an element of success, at least for not disqualifying someone for being grounding in pro-Palestinian politics, for the politician himself not completely disowning his past as part of that process. Of course, interplaying still and trying to ease some anxieties and fears that maybe are not grounded, but that Mamdani has chosen to actually go through, but also grounding his campaign in this kind of international law, human rights framework, which in my opinion, takes off a lot of the radical edge of what it means to support Palestine as well. I mean, I'm not, you know, my piece wasn't like celebratory of Mamdani or his politics. So like if people read it like that, I mean, I probably didn't read it. I don't think that that's where I was standing on it, but I was just reading it symptomatically of what it means and where we are in terms of assessing public sentiment, opinions, etc. Maybe if it wasn't a mayoral campaign, maybe if it was a foreign, if it's a presidential campaign or senatorial campaign people would be more concerned about foreign policy issues and therefore Palestine and Israel would come to the front for you know to the forefront and therefore you know you will have um much more pushback for instance who knows I mean I don't want to also like say that this campaign tells us something completely generalizable over the entire uh uh landscape of American politics more broadly. But I think there are elements that are important. And I think, again, the excessive ideological overproduction by the Zionist and its ability to exhaust people, its ability to create a sense of disgust, specifically when the split image of that is dismembered bodies and shattered brains and destruction of wholesale cities and soldiers wearing lingerie and celebrating killing Palestinians in multiple ways. That's a split image that creates that kind of dissonance and creates an exhaustion and also disgust with the moral bankruptcy of much of the political elites. Now, on socialist politics, a lot of people pointed out America is weird because know unlike for example even places like israel where you have socialized healthcare for instance it still doesn't have socialized healthcare it doesn't have uh you know uh even you know some of these concessions of having some sort of welfare state uh uh elements uh uh you know some people point out to roosevelt as setting up elements of that some social security net etc But it seems that the American political landscape was never able to really enforce even these type of concessions where you would have a wider social safety net for working class peoples like exists elsewhere in Europe. And even in the context of Israel that America finances, a lot of these socialized elements actually also exist. So there is that kind of push by people like Mamdani to implement some sort of policies like free buses, et cetera. Maybe they're unrealistic. I mean, I haven't really looked at the pragmatic side of the policies and whether they're realizable or not. Beyond the fact that I think within the U.S., within the capitalist fight, or I would say the class conflict in the U.S., I think the capitalist class is so well organized that it doesn't want to give an inch and would see any concession on that front as a concession that would lead to more concessions and therefore they usually organize in a way that actually tries to dismantle any form of socialized policy more broadly, whatever it is, even if it's minimal or not really... one that would actually dent or do a dent in the redistribution of wealth more bodily but there's that kind of organized class effort which is so strong that you can sense from outside because you can't really explain you know the dissonance even between America and other parts of the world including places like Canada, where there are elements of socialized systems, specifically in healthcare and schooling and other places and other sectors, if you want, that don't exist in the United States of America as well. So that is one of the elements, at least, that also Mamdani is trying to push. I'm not sure. You're better than me in assessing whether that will be successful or not. But I think at least what it tells us is that you know his message of affordability of you know rent control of free bus i think it resonated i mean that that's at least a problem there is a space perhaps for a form of socialized uh or social democratic, if you want, policy prescriptions that runs against people like Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, who are working on, for example, this abundance agenda and cutting the bureaucracy, some sort of new version of neoliberalism, but pragmatic policy stance that wants America to be competitive on the world stage like China. So they're kind of like taking elements from Chinese efficiency and implanting it in the US. But at the same time, it's all about abundance and we can all live happily ever after. in this abundance world of their construction. But my take is that there's also a lot of room and a lot of resonance among wide segments of American society, perhaps specifically working class around issues that relate to their redistribution of income around socialized medicine around, you know, socialized infrastructure of movement like buses and, you know, metros around health, childcare and healthcare, schooling and education. So there's a room for that. Of course, it's a question of this kind of class conflict where it seems to me the capitalists always in the U.S. find a way to contain, incorporate, or kill any form of rising working class movement. Even if it gives identity politics concessions, or some civil if you want rights for instance in some of like you know the past struggles around rights around you know race in the US or elements like that when it comes to economic or social rights you see a much more you know ideologically oriented where we shouldn't give an inch and we shouldn't expand or even give more space for this type of concession if you want between you know socialism and capitalism which is still capitalist which is like the welfare uh form of state that exists in europe and elsewhere and of course it's being fought you know and and also reduced in much of the european states as well yeah appreciate it and i think that um

Jared: The point I guess that I would make, and I think this is a mistake that a lot of people within the United States make, is thinking that they can vote these reforms in, right? And that it will just be something that's going to happen I go to the polls and I vote for Mamdani or I vote for some initiative and that that's going to make the change when the forces of capital are so well organized to fight these things, right? And so, look, I'm not an expert to tell anybody how they should organize, but I think that the important thing is that people do organize en masse and in you know different forms because i think to be able to even if if it is to get the free buses or to be able to get uh you know free child care or i think you know pre-k something like that right that he's also working to get uh which again is just a reform that ultimately probably helps capital right because it it provides child care so people can work right so people can go you know, give their labor up to somebody to have profits made for companies and so on. That any of that requires an incredible fight, right? And I think that's just my push for people is to just not fall into thinking that any of these things, first of all, I'm reticent to say how much of this, you know, certainly there are capitalist countries, as you say, the United States is uniquely bad around having any kind of social safety net. And we're just seeing this You know, Trump's bill that just was passed, right, is further gutting this. And so we're going the wrong way and have been since like the 1940s, basically, in terms of the social safety net in these countries and certainly since the 60s. But that. So you can have those things under capitalism. But within the United States, even that requires just a monumental organizing effort to achieve. And so that would be my main thing for people is just not to assume that because you elect somebody who promises these things that they will come to pass. It would take so much more than that to actually actualize that. Having said that, again, I think the fact that people are voting for those things is meaningful. because it means that they want to see changes, that they understand that their lives are not livable in the way that they're currently constructed, and that they want things that will make their lives more livable, which I think is a good sign in general, and one that we haven't always had within you know, American politics, unfortunately, mainly because these parties are so controlled by finance capital, which, again, I think is part of what is interesting about Mamdani is that he managed to win this primary, which obviously none of the elites within New York wanted to be the case. And so there's also significance of that. Um, as we, I think I'll do one more and then we can, we can pivot out of this or not pivot out, but close up this conversation because we've been talking for quite a while. But, um, I wanted to go to, uh, a tweet from Amal Saad, who is somebody that I have a lot of respect for. And I want to read what she had to say about, I think it's predominantly about Palestine action. Let me read it here. And we could talk about it a little bit. So Amal writes, the criminalization of solidarity with Palestine. Let me see, how does that look? I'll try to make it bigger. isn't just about silencing dissent. It's part of a wider strategy to depoliticize the Palestinian struggle by turning the fight for freedom into a humanitarian crisis and a call for justice into a plea for survival. sorry i'm trying to get this to there we go um the strategy marks one of the most devastating victories of zionism pro-palestine voices have been forced into a defensive posture where even protesting the most basic crimes such as genocide is now treated as a radical position The lowering of the bar is a form of discursive containment where the parameters of acceptable speech are so drastically narrowed that even condemning the systemic killing of children, doctors, and people queuing up for food becomes a subversive act subject to criminalization. If calling for the end of that which kills and maims is considered criminal, the chant death, death to the IDF, then longstanding claims such as the right to self-determination, liberation, and dignity are rendered unspeakable and beyond the pale of acceptable discourse. So I share this in part because, well, again, with all due respect to Professor Saad, I do actually disagree with this sentiment. I don't... I see it, I think, and I pose this to you, I read this again as the excess of the kind of Zionist policy, lawfare, etc., at its most extreme. I agree with her that it is a tactic that is a part of a larger strategy, which has been going on for many years by Israel and through its policy networks and lobbying firms and so on to totally criminalize any support for Palestine and to equate any criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism and to connect that to hate speech and hate crimes and these sort of things. So I do think that she's correct in understanding it as a part of a kind of strategic initiative. However, and I'll just give a couple of examples. I mean, I was in Southern Oregon. That's where I went on vacation, went home back to where I grew up. You know, I talked to a couple of people who are not political folks, folks that I've known for many years. I mean, not that they totally ignore politics, but that their version of politics would be sort of like, you know, who are we voting for in the presidential election? Not like, you know, a history of caring about Palestine, right, as a particular issue. And unprovoked from me, and they don't watch the show, so it's not like they're saying this because of that. They were just brought up like, well, don't mention, you know, God forbid you mention Palestine right now, you know? And it was fascinating to me because... again like they're not folks that have spent a lot of time you know studying this or so on and and one of them also mentioned mamdani's uh victory which was interesting to me um primary victory we should caveat but I guess what I'm saying is that both the Glastonbury piece and the Palestine Action piece and Mamdani's victory, and as you said, you referenced the Tucker Carlson-Ted Cruz debate, which... You know, I kind of wanted to do like a hate watch party of with folks because I found it fascinating for all of its contradictions and, you know, certainly not agreeing at all politically with either of them. And certainly they agreed totally on U.S. imperialism. But that there is, as you say, like this. I think there's quite a widespread disgust right now with the US's support of this genocide. And I think that these these acts of totally criminalizing, of looking to deport people for writing op eds in the United States or, you know, looking to charge people with potentially 14 years for just saying we support Palestine action or not. Sorry. Imprison people potentially for 14 years that all of this shows, you know, it's just it's naked repression and repeal of basic civil liberties and sort of liberal rights that most people think that they just have and have had for a long time. And that people really don't like that. Now, that really not liking something obviously doesn't necessarily translate into any kind of victory, right? You know, we could all be against things or for things, and it doesn't mean that they're going to happen if we don't have the power to make them happen. But I do think that we are in this moment where those extremes are really... frustrating people to an extent where people are some folks are coming out and speaking about this issue not out of a deep ideological commitment but just because they're like you're not gonna tell me that I have to sit and watch this or as you said to to look at the the the opposite end of the spectrum right which is these you know babies and men and women and children in gaza that are being starved that are being bombed that you know and have to watch this for so long and that i can't say anything about it you know i think that that that level of um ideological and political censorship that is going on right now um i think is is an overplay and i think is part of what is and i think this is part of your point is accelerating actually a kind of disavowal of support for Israel and also some people wanting to say, you know what, I am pro-Palestine. Like, you know, I may not know that much, but this is ridiculous what's going on. So, yeah, I just was curious if you had thoughts on Amal Saad's comments there or how you're reading these things further.

Abdul Jawad Omar: Well, look, Amal is right on some level, which is that, you know, The vision that Israel has, or even the core, imperial core itself, is one of increasing fascism, repression, and of course shrinking of the space for free speech and democratic engagement. That's the vision that Israel wants. I mean, this is what Netanyahu even says himself that know eventually the west will catch up with us in terms of you know the use of violence or force in ways that we have seen unfolding gaza or if you want i mean who comes before trump you know uh and before the rise of this kind of new right wing that we have seen you know slowly but assuredly taking over levers of power in many Western countries. I mean, people like Berlusconi and Netanyahu were the first among many. So you would see that Israel on the front lines of trying to shrink the space. And that's part of at least the Israeli vision in the near future. Criminalize, exclude Palestine from speech, but at the same time, shrink the space, help support an expansive security state that can, for instance, deport millions, help ensure that, you know, speech can be more regulated, that surveillance can be more enacted across wide areas of, you know, that is the vision. I mean, and I've warned that of that a lot of times. And I don't think, again, this only has to do with speech, you know, against Palestinian or pro-Palestinian elements think that this type of system that you know prescribes for instance in the UK Palestine action as a terrorist group could be easily applied to any other group slowly but suddenly no not only extreme right-wing or you know whatever it is slowly but suddenly to many domestic groups whatever their orientation or otherwise of course each domestic plane has a different You know, the UK is a bit different from the US, Canada, etc. And everybody has his own way of managing these things. But I think that is the vision that is being, you know, slowly but assuredly being supported if you want but also one that hinges or Israel hinges some of its future on because if less public support more uh disgust exhaustion uh much more willingness to hear the Palestinian point of view and narrative and not only that much more willingness to take it up by new generations etc that means that Israel doesn't have a lot of time on its clock eventually. Because on some level that means that slowly but assuredly you will have a slow but steady break in the relationship between Israel and much of the Western countries of which now new generations will come, new sentiments will rise, new moral center will be enacted. and eventually that will lead i mean even even something like the crusades historically also for instance subsided when there was less support coming from for instance uh europe towards the crusaders themselves as as part of that uh program so that means that israel also needs to find new allies these new allies are in the right wing are fascist a lot of them are anti-semitic as well And this is what Israel views as its natural allies now in the West. And it's also an expansive bureaucratic surveillance-oriented state that tries to manage speech and clamps down more broadly, using incarceration more heavily. That is the vision that at least Israel needs to also have slowly but assuredly. being part and parcel of societies like in the United States and elsewhere to ensure that it remains viable at least for the long term in our region here as it was implanted. Now, having said that, I'm not saying that Israel alone is pushing for that, of course. this is not you shouldn't be complaining I'm just saying that Israel that's how it views or hinges now its future on in terms of how it sees its natural solid form of alliances that it wants to actually entrench increase and forge through and we can see it through policies and otherwise because I think that there are in all of these societies like the UK, like the United States, like Canada, like whatever it is, France, et cetera, you see domestic elements also from within the right wing, also nationalists, also populists that also share elements of that vision and wants to implement it more forcibly. So that's also part of how the future contested world that we're speaking of. On the one hand, For instance, we can see a shift in the Democratic Party. Remember when we talked about Mamdani, he's in a Democratic primary. And in New York City, large liberal state and a liberal city as well, although that also could be challenged at least I'm not sure what is liberal and not liberal these days. But on many instances, I would just say that this is a particular case, but it doesn't mean that there's no ideological, political, and systematic fight that is facing also a lot of people. in the UK and the US, not only particularly against whether to voice something around Palestine or not, or the excess of Zionism, but what this means for the future of this kind of contradiction that is playing out in Western politics more broadly between different visions. but specifically with this rising right-wing fascist vision that is taking hold over the collective imagination of what is permissible. Of course, it's meeting some resistance, some pushback. It's also creating distance between elements of the working class and elements of the capitalist class. It has its own internal... If you want elements of implosion and contradictions as well, it's not a unified homogeneous force. But there is that kind of rising tide that Israel is also on some level hinging itself on and saying that that's a future of our alliance system with these elements within Western societies that will continue to support us for multiple reasons. One of them is this kind of shared interest in a larger bureaucratic control and surveillance society, including the larger criminalization of dissent and the clamoring down on free speech within countries like the UK or elsewhere. So I think, you know, Ahmad is right on that point, that there is that risk and it should be taken seriously. That is one element of it because they could triumph. I'll just say this because I've lived in the context of the West Bank where people's opinions don't necessarily have to do something with a terror regime that chooses who to arrest and not to arrest, that criminalizes acts of dissent, protests, et cetera. And slowly that sedimented form of violence does have an impact on people's orientation subjectivities and how they view themselves and relate to the world. So we should, I mean, I'm not, you know, I don't come from a fairy, fairy land of freedom. So like, I understand how, when you have a terror regime that can arbitrarily choose to arrest people because they support some sort of freedom for people or they gather because they want to raise the Palestinian flag. That creates fear. Fear, of course, at some level sometimes creates pushback. Other times, it makes people tired, exhausted, maybe more concerned about their daily lives. maybe slowly giving up on the dream of doing something or changing anything so criminalization also have that dual effect it has that potential if you want of being i'm more hopeful like if we go back to the conversation that i see that access is backfiring but i can't be faithful to the analysis if we don't also take seriously that criminalization expansion of the ability to incarcerate people, imprison them, not only in relation to Palestine, but also more bodily deportations, et cetera, does create a paralysis and it sometimes also changes people orientation. If you have to choose between saying something, for instance, among Palestinian citizens of Israel, for instance, saying something against the genocide in Gaza, within the domain of living in Israeli society and knowing very well that the next day the police will knock on your door and arrest you for voicing objection or for criticizing policy or for Like what happened, for instance, even with Knesset members being actually, you know, ejected from the Knesset, Arab Knesset members like Ayman Audi and others. But also in the beginning of war where clamoring down on speech was part of and parcel of the strategy of how Israel went out to enact a total closure. It was, you know, anybody speaking anything or sharing anything about Gaza reported by other Israeli citizens. So if you're a Palestinian from 1948 and you have, I don't know, Jewish colleagues who are on your Instagram and they saw a picture, they would sometimes themselves report you to the police and then you would be arrested or censured or whatever it is that would happen to you legally, creating this kind of atmosphere of fear where people don't speak. So I come from that context. I know that that's not your context in the US thus far. But with more criminalization, with more expansive state power, with more ability to arbitrarily arrest people, to deport them, to take them from New York to Louisiana, to come undercover agents that don't show their faces, like happened with Mahmoud Khalil. The more you have these scenes, I mean, that also bodes quite problematic because sometimes that form of you know, fear and terror also has, if you want, some sort of success. I don't think it's always a permanent success, but it has some success in shutting down things and in breaking down through people's will to continue and, you know, in offering them, okay, go on into your consumerist life and your safety without speaking about politics. The more that happens, that should worry us. So, you know, I do agree with Amal on that point, but But not to the extent to which I think she's a bit more pessimistic in terms of the discursive downgrade of Palestine. I don't think so. I think here she might be true. on some level that, uh, whether, instead of speaking of Palestinian liberation, we're speaking of death to death to the IDF, although on, on some level, death, death to the IDF is even more subversive than, you know, uh, uh, as speaking on. Palestinian freedom in these kind of general abstract terms that have no content. Uh, uh, but there is, there is, I think there is something around even you know, the musical, um, uh, genre itself, like having this musical festival, the controversy of musical festivals historically. that went alongside a lot of the political movements in the past, whether, you know, in the 60s or the 70s or 80s in the UK and the US and other places. And with this moment as well, where you see these festivals turn into a big demonstration for Palestine. I think that is, that is, of course, scary for the establishment. And that's, of course, creating a lot of hysteria and raising the bar towards, you chanting free Palestine and of course seeing elements of the establishment wanted to use police force to manage that you know this kind of zone that we live in between criminalization suppression and at the same time dispersed and even more radical chance I think it's something about how we live in a moment where the more excess we see from the part of the state and its ideological justifiers, its echoes within the media, the more you would see Palestine being a subversive issue that people will speak to in different ways and manners. And I think this is where we have a lot of potential for success, not only generationally, but also, I think, on some level, at least creating problems for the system itself. creating the senses creating contradictions and tensions creating a nonsensical politician that doesn't make sense creating an institution that belies its own proclaimed values creating these moments where these institutions you know falter implode etc or at least slowly you know lose uh their ability to to incite the imagination of those who have built historically a relationship with them. And I think that is something that is unfolding and occurring. And I think that at this moment, I don't see the repression being that successful, but it should worry us. It should worry us if we don't push back. It's a struggle. It should worry us because it could lead through accumulation, through arresting people 14 years and 12 years for whatever they say and don't say, for whatever they do or don't do, even if they're non-violent and doing disruptions and sabotage and other forms of direct action like the Palestine Action was undertaking in the UK. If that accumulates, of course, that type of societies, if you want, of control and fear, you know, are a different domain than, you know, the type of society that, you know, is now perhaps that opens up at least a space for speech in a way that it will have to now close. And, you know, as somebody from the West Bank, you know, yeah, fear also works.

Jared: I appreciate that. Yeah, because I think that's the important part in all of this for us to always remember is that there's nothing inevitable here and that certainly, you know, Israel could be successful. And it's not just Israel. The United States, for instance, is doing all that it can to increase its own oppressive forces and apparatus. The bill that passed also was a big increase in funding for ICE, which is the immigration forces domestically and so on. Yeah, I mean, all of it requires us to organize, to resist, to speak out, to do all of these things. And I think that that is very, very important. I guess the part that I think you nailed the part that bothered me a little bit was one, I'm not sure that the chant of death, death to the IDF is some sort of ideological retreat. Actually, I think that always would have been a more among the media establishment in these countries, I think that chant would always be seen even more problematically than, you know, from the river to the sea or, you know, free Palestine or so on, even as they also have been very busy trying to brand those terms as hate speech or anti-Semitic or whatever else. I think that the the naming of the, you know, Israeli occupation force as something that, you know, we should want eradicated, right? That that is, you know, it really does put a clarity to that. the bourgeois media just would not be at all comfortable with. And as you talked about earlier, it is also connected to them making those same arguments around Israeli society and everyone in Israel basically being a part of the military apparatus and so on. Anyway, thank you so much for this discussion again today, Abdul Jawad. I know that we had a lot to cover and we covered a lot. Apologies if we didn't get to any questions that you all had in the chat. You know, we'll have more to talk about soon, I'm sure. You know, hopefully there is a ceasefire, certainly for people in Gaza. I hope that and I hope that um more aid can flow in and all of that and you know a free palestine also although i know that that is a longer term you know fight at this point but um appreciate you as always taking the time to talk to us today thanks thanks jared