Office Hours 17-Iran: Society under Sanctions w/David Yaghoubian

Adnan Hussain: Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim Salam. Hello. Peace to you all. Welcome to Office Hours. We are back. I'm Adnan Hussain. And it has been a while since our last meeting of these regular, usually weekly Office Hour chats and sessions. I've been traveling a lot during the month of December. dealing with some health issues upon my return but we are back because there is just so much to discuss and to understand about what's going on in the world in particular what's been happening in Iran and before I introduce my topic and guests today I just want to remind you all to please like the stream so that it gets on to other people's feeds share it on your social media so other people can join this very important and timely discussion. It's streaming also not only on YouTube, but also on X, so you can retweet the stream if you're watching there. And of course, subscribe to the channel so that you're apprised of upcoming programs, which include... the return of the Struggle Session. Struggle Session 7 is coming this Sunday at its usual time, more or less. It might be 3.30 rather than 3, but watch for postings this Sunday, January 18th. And I'll be having Nina Farnia, Lara Shihai, and possibly a third mystery guest. You know, I don't want to promise anything, but it would be very exciting if they can attend. But in any case, if it's just me, Nina and Lara, that's going to be a great discussion with two fantastic panelists. So join us then. And also you can support this program with my gratitude and also the gratitude of all those who benefit from the programs and the live streams, but can't afford to contribute financially during these very difficult times. economic conditions. And you can do so by becoming a patron at patreon.com slash Adnan Hussein, or make a one-time contribution through buymeacoffee.com slash Adnan Hussein. But in any case, without further ado, joining me today is a returning guest for a vital and timely conversation on Iran, society under sanctions, my friend and colleague, Professor David Yaghoubian of Cal State San Bernardino. And this is his third appearance on the show. Dave, it's so great to see you. Welcome.

David Yaghoubian: Thanks for having me, Adnan. Great to be here. Looking forward to our discussion.

Adnan Hussain: Well, absolutely. And of course, we've been discussing because, you know, we talked, I think it was in August after the 12 day war about rumors and predictions that had come up about an imminent attack on Iran that were expected maybe early in the fall. And Trita Parsi, who, you know, was the voice kind of making these public kind of predictions about imminent attack. And, you know, partly because the end of the 12 day war had been left without evidence. uh kind of decisive resolution other than you know the fact that the islamic republic of iran was not about to be uh destroyed by you know attempts to uh bring the country down and that it could also retaliate and cause a great deal of damage so we had started having discussions um to discuss the situation then in the fall, because there were expectations that would happen either imminently at that, at that point, or certainly according to Trita by December. Okay. And we ourselves, you know, we're in Tehran in Iran in December and, And I thought it would be better, of course, there's so much to talk about what's been happening in the last three weeks and we will, but I thought it's better in some ways to put things into some context. Both of us are historians and also this recent history is important to cover because we were there and we had impressions that might help normalize Iran as a society while also talking about the challenges and the difficulties under sanctions. that I wanted to kind of start there and just say, how would you characterize the situation over the course of the fall, both politically, economically, socially, and then let's talk about just our trip and what it was like being there and how regular people were experiencing the situation.

David Yaghoubian: I think we discussed this a little bit in August as this was beginning to take shape. But in the wake of the 12-day war, there was really an outpouring of Iranian nationalism reflected through – uh gatherings uh speeches uh art uh statuary uh music which uh in especially in the wake of the 12-day war uh is sort of omnipresent throughout tehran and that's one of the things that uh on our recent trip there that uh we we got to experience uh so the the having survived the war uh having uh uh demonstrated the unity of the society through the process of, I think, realizing that, and it was a little nuanced, but realizing that a majority of the society really came together during that period. So in that sense, the with with the allowances for, let's say, personal interpretation of the hijab laws, which, you know, we experienced there and saw on our trip where I'd say roughly about 50 percent of women are are still wearing hijab. There seemed to be, and this is from my take having been there in May just before the war, and then through my observations and conversations with Iranians both in Iran and outside of Iran over the summer, that there there really was, if you will, an increased relaxation in the relationship between the public and the state. I hope that that makes sense, but that again, having survived the war, having demonstrated unity, and that unity being demonstrated not only by the traditional, typical supporters of the government, but also, for example, you know, videos that went wild on social media of women without a job stating, you know, very adamantly their support for the government and and their anger over the murders of nuclear scientists, over members of the security apparatus, that this enabled the government in turn to embrace the more diverse, say, elements of Iranian society relative to the standard supporters who, you know, of course, will always come out and who can always be counted on. And so in this context, things seemed to be, and this was my interpretation going in in December, and on our trip, I feel that this was sustained. Things seemed to be, at least socially sustained. very relaxed. In fact, I don't know that I, in my 25 years of regular travel to Iran annually, had experienced such a level of societal relaxation. And I hope that that's not too vague of an explanation for viewers. But in terms of relaxation, just with the music, with the change in the dress that is very stark, to behold, especially after 25 years of regular travel there, things seem to be very calm. And in terms of my general observations of sort of retail and commerce, things seemed to be booming. Now, with that said, You know, despite the fact you've got music in the streets, Iranians of all walks of life seemingly going about their day, like, you know, enjoying their urban existence and I'll let you weigh in on your take, having just experienced that and I'd say participated in it, but One thing that is sort of ever present, irrespective of kind of the social vibe, if you will, is the constant complaints, which are fully legitimate, about particularly inflation. As we might get into details regarding how sanctions impact societies, there are many other elements to sanctions that hurt people especially like the middle and lower class but the inflation is something that impacts uh all iranians so you know whether you are lower class lower middle class middle class you know all the way up um inflation is something that uh impacts all iranians and that is is something that you constantly hear complaints complaints regarding now when we showed up in uh in december I was genuinely shocked at the level of inflation because when I was there in May and later on, I might go into a sort of history of how the currency has devolved or rather the level of inflation. It was about 850,000 reals to the dollar when I was there in May. This was shocking to me, just 850,000. And again, I could go through the rapidity with which over the last few years, it has just increasingly doubled the level of inflation. But at 850,000, I was shocked. When we were there in, you know, just in December, we got a sort of black market rate of about one point two five million to the dollar. I was so shocked by that myself that if you remember, I was asking as many questions as I could from different people that we were hanging out with meeting with, you know, about that. this inflation and how this was impacting them, you know, with mulatto asking, you know, for, for business owners, like how do you deal with this mid month when you suddenly have this, you know, radical inflation? Um, so I guess my point here is that whereas, uh, things in the wake of the 12 day war seemed to be, uh, uh, very calm in, in Tehran based on my, you know, basically South to central Tehran, uh, zone that I, that I hang out in, uh, uh, the inflation is, again, ever present and was something that we heard, of course, people talking about and complaining about. But during our short trip of just a little bit over a week, of course, nothing specifically related to the inflation had emerged or come to a head. There had recently been a strike in the South Pars gas field of gas workers. that was unequivocally against foreign intrusion, foreign support, but that was nevertheless expressing the needs of the South Pars gas workers for better conditions. And it wasn't just in terms of pay. It was an array of different issues. So my point is that labor... complaints and strikes had been going on in the wake of the 12-day war. Of course, very careful to state the sort of support for the government, along with criticism of certain policies. So yes, indeed, also, we were aware that not everyone was content, certainly, with their economic circumstances. But As far as I could tell, there was no sign of brewing protest, sort of nothing kind of under the surface bubbling that one could sense was about to blow or pop or emerge. And again, even though I tend to kind of annoy people with my repeated questions about how the sanctions are affecting the inflation, how they deal with it as... say, retirees or, you know, retired veterans of, you know, workers at hotels or, you know, middle class business owners. But I didn't get much. And so relative, again, to to the shocking level of inflation that had occurred just since May over six months, again, from eight hundred and fifty thousand to one point two five million. Clearly, this had had an impact on the protests that immediately emerged. That is, after our trip, we had the I believe it was on December 28th. I could be wrong about that. But the Tehran shopkeepers strike, which was a peaceful protest. protest, which was something that the government didn't even respond to. There weren't really security there within the frames, within the scene. But it's at this point that I believe that the plan for hybrid war regime change was implemented. And say, stemming from those initial peaceful, legal shopkeeper strike, we had the outpouring of street violence, you know, the burning of mosques, the burning of ambulances and fire engines, the murder of civilians, as well as security personnel. So this, I was, you know, watching the alternative media along with everyone else, seeing how it unfolded. And I'll just say the violence, the intensity of these protests, that is after the very calm protest of the shopkeepers, um was was uh uh relative to what we were experiencing in tehran and and my sort of uh expectations or understanding of the the level of say uh economic malaise and how that was impacting people um i i found this to be just completely inordinate and and not like within balance relative to to what we saw and experienced so um i guess i'll say again and i'm happy to elaborate on this uh I fully understand and can talk about individuals and their personal experiences and their specific complaints. Why Iranians would take to the street to protest the economic circumstances, even knowing that a majority of the economic pain is being caused by sanctions. There are, the role of the government is also critical as sanctions impact various levels and elements of the society. So there are certainly reasons why Iranians would take to the streets to express their disconsent, say with the Pesachian administration's approach to inflation and and to the sanctions but um this uh is in like i guess to be an understatement say in very stark contrast to uh what we saw with people getting out the machetes and the sort of like medieval clubs and and ak-47s um and beginning to you know burn burn their cities

Adnan Hussain: Yeah, yeah. We'll have to definitely talk about, you know, the metamorphosis of the initial economic protests by merchants, Bazaari class, and the spreading of those two much more dramatic and confrontational movements. violent kind of forms. But, you know, just coming back to the situation, you know, before the outbreak of, you know, protests and just, you know, talking about the brief time that we were there in December right ahead of the start of these, because there's so many, you know, portrayals and imaginings of, you know, what the situation is like, it's important to kind of emphasize that for me as somebody who, you know, studies the region, but had never visited Iran before, this was my first visit to Iran. It was a very surprising kind of visit because even, you know, what I would have expected as somebody who, you know, doesn't necessarily buy a lot of the Western propaganda and characterizations, but not having visited Iran Of course, one had an impression that, you know, it was surprising for me, for example, that I saw one turbaned mullah with robes in the street during my week long visit in the streets of Tehran. OK, we did visit, of course, shrines. And there there were a few a couple of people who were clearly from Tehran. what one would call the mullah or clerical class. But it's not like it's very present socially in the capital city, for example. Maybe if you're in Qom, which is where all of the seminaries that train, you know, most of the seminaries that train this religious class there, of course, there would be a larger kind of more public presence there. in the population, but it's not like, you know, the rule by Mullahs is something that you experience as a direct social kind of experience. As you mentioned during at least this period, and I don't know how it compares with what you witnessed in May and in the previous visit, a very substantial portion of women were not wearing hijab, and there really wasn't a lot of social tension around it, I think is the important point, that even though these laws hadn't been themselves repealed, it was very publicly kind of acknowledged and understood that in the wake of adjustments because of popular protest in earlier years, like the Women, Life, Freedom era movement that had taken place just a few years earlier, that the government was no longer going to be so committed to trying to enforce these and nor were Other social groupings in society, you know, like there weren't vigilantes trying to, you know, put pressure on people. That just seems to be something that is no longer going to necessarily be a necessary characteristic of social life under. Islamic Republic at this point or at this stage. There was not a lot of police presence in general, like I hardly ever saw policemen. And certainly they weren't, you know, if you go to lots of other countries in the region, you will see, you know, armed with like, you know, machine guns, you know, Police presences in all of the major kind of central squares where a lot of traffic. Yeah, it didn't really seem like that. And these are things that are not what I would have expected, even as somebody who was, you know, familiar with. You know, the history of Iran and, you know, critical and suspicious of the kinds of impressions that are given in Western media that contribute to a sense that or assumption that people are constantly under attack. kind of direct repressive. There is, of course, obviously, you know, every society we're seeing isn't as committed to, you know, democratic values. But, you know, protest is tolerated there. So that's another thing that you were mentioning about some of the gas workers in the southwestern part of the country, which is where the oil and gas industries are most located, that there has been labor organizing. certain kinds of strikes or protests and demands being made and that these have to be done very carefully in the atmosphere uh of uh you know to distinguish between um you know, economic and social grievances and protests on behalf of those in order to prevent them from being, you know, manipulated by or or conservative forces using, you know, the fact that they are under pressure from the U.S. and Israel to delegitimize like that has to be done very kind of consciously and carefully. But it is happening and it has had been happening, which is why the initial economic strike and closure of the businesses in the Grand Bazaar of Tehran was actually um you know maybe people you know people entrusted with the economic management of the society were probably not pleased that people were upset and protesting but they you know the leader president all said okay these are genuine grievances that are legitimate and that it's okay to protest. And in fact, actually, that we will try to do something about it as it spread and became more widespread that people were expressing the economic discontent. We saw that there were responses by the government. In fact, actually, it's probably worth talking a little bit about some of the initial economic adjustments were made before we start talking about what's happened subsequently So my understanding, and perhaps you can help me understand a little bit more, is that the initial protests started with a very rapid change. So you mentioned that it was like 1.25 million to a dollar, real to a dollar. the exchange rate. That obviously isn't the official rate. That's really what it was like, you know, when you actually, you know, exchange outside the banks and so on. But that it was like suddenly 1.4, I think, like the 28th. And this is what, you know, really is a dramatic increase percentage wise. There had been over the last the previous six eight months you know from 850 to 1.2 but then this was a big jump and it really you know uh caused a response you know by its merchants um um but that the government basically you know removed some of the people who were you know in various uh you know ministries for the economy they put in place it seems some kind of like direct subsidy program rather than it being subsidized for a consumer so maybe like a ration system i'm not sure i don't i haven't seen any details exactly but some somebody described it who's in iran uh described it um as like a kind of basic you know ubi type sort of thing for certain uh for certain kinds of expenses um but that um you know there were there were some you know kinds of adjustments um as a result and this is exactly you know, what you would see is that protests, mass mobilizations have in fact in the past caused change. Like they've either led to reformist governments or abandoning enforcement of the hijab laws, or in this case, you know, government responses to change some of the economic policies, giving tax relief for merchants for a year from certain, like a tax holiday from certain things. As I said, replacing economic officials, you know, and so on so you know how would you analyze those and i don't know if you have any information about what some of these economic changes have been even as the government has said that they can't necessarily solve all of the economic problems um given you know the sanctions and um the fact that uh you know they don't have the full range of tools that they could you know use really to change change the situation

David Yaghoubian: Yeah, you know, I don't really want to use the analogy, but I guess I'm about to state it. But rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic in an economy under this level of sanctions, primary, secondary, extraterritorial, despite the fact that Iran still has allies that it can trade with, makes it extremely difficult for the government to stave off ongoing inflation of the currency. As you mentioned, the Pzeskian came out, fired a few ministers, actually replaced them with ones that had been previously fired for similar reasons, right? Again, in terms of rearranging chairs. But this issue of... the subsidies links right back into the issue of inflation because the government, uh, has been since the early 1980s providing subsidies to, uh, elements of the society, especially like the lower class, lower middle class for, for certain items, goods, um, as well as, uh, uh, certain, uh, uh, uh, industries. Okay. And, and like, so for example, like industries just saw before we came on today, a picture of some beautifully, uh, you know, uh, hot off the press, literally, uh, truck tires and that the Iranian government is going to give Iranian truck truck drivers free tires. And I think it was some extra gas allowance. Um, and so this is, this is one form of subsidy for truckers. The government was very proud that Iranian truckers didn't heed the call from Reza Pahlavi to stop trucking, right? So here's a handout for the truckers. You guys are doing good work. Here's tires. Here's gas. This might help the truckers. It will in the short term. This does not enable the government to effectively deal with the inflation when it essentially doesn't work exactly like this, but it is printing money to cover these subsidies. So it is it is the the Subsidies are one of the issues that has maligned the real since the mid 1980s when and we could go into that history. But when the United States put Iran on the list of states that support terrorism and put Iran on the list, took Iraq off the list at the same time so that it could provide dual use technology to to the. And this is when the inflation really started to grow much more rapidly, right around 1984, 1985. So government subsidies since that time have have been provided so that the. say most vulnerable elements of the society don't suffer inordinately through sanctions. But again, what is what is inordinate? I'll just say, you know, Mike Pompeo once said, if Iranians want to eat, they'll listen to my 12 point plan. it's not about eating. Iranians are going to eat. No one is going to starve or go hungry in the country. Um, but what you can eat to sustain yourself and the cost of that and the cost of that relative to other things that you need in your life. Um, this makes, makes a life for, uh, ordinary Iranians. Uh, and I types of middle class Iranians in different situations. But this just makes it extremely difficult for everyone. So subsidies just, I'm just saying that this isn't, it's not like Pozeshkin sitting on a big pile of money and he can decide, you know, should we give this to the military industrial complex or should we help out? needy Iranians, the funds just simply aren't there. Furthermore, and I'll just mention this in this context, when Iran needs to buy stuff from abroad, and even though it has a very robust, resilient economy where it makes whatever it can domestically, including those truck tires, it still needs to use, if you will, hard currency to purchase those items, unless it has some sort of currency swap deal. And those are sort of new in the making. So to the extent that the government does have funds, it's not just a matter of, well, where do we wanna apply them? There are very limited funds for a great host of needs from the military and defense all the way down to subsidizing bread for poor Iranians. So I understand the necessity for the government to say, hey, we're going to do these things and we've got a new idea. But think about it. Iran has been under these sanctions, well, really for about 40 years, but the intensive sanctions and maximum pressure since 2018, they've been trying a lot of things. They've been shuffling a lot of cards and shells. And at a certain point, the inflation is just going to be inevitable. If you continue to print money, you continue to provide subsidies. One other thing I'll just throw in here, anytime Iran makes a new bill, Millions, if not billions of them flood in from the borders in the form of counterfeit bills. This is just one of the ways that Iran's enemies seek to further destabilize the real. So this is also just another thing that the Iranian government has. has to deal with. And, and so as there's new inflation and people don't want to have to carry around giant stacks of bills, they'll print new bills. And within days, uh, counterfeit bills, uh, are, are, uh, are noted and found and pulled out of circulation by banks. But there's just, this is one other thing, um, that, that also feeds into inflation. So, and again, I'm happy to talk about, you know, other elements of that, but just subsidies, uh, subsidies, uh, can be a temporary salve for some people because, okay, the truckers, you know, they can breathe a slight sigh of relief for, you know, a few weeks maybe because they got some new tires and they got some gas. But overall, when they're facing – You know what? And just as you said, just another what would that be? I'm really bad on math. Almost 20 percent rise over just a few weeks on top of of already just just shocking inflation. It's understandable that that Iranians took to the street to to protest. Again, the peaceful protest regarding economic circumstances is completely different than the violence that we saw unfold after especially, like, say, the third day.

Adnan Hussain: Right, right. You know, I mean, that's probably where we should turn to. But I just did want to say one last thing about sanctions is that, you know, typically we've, you know, there have been a lot of studies now about, you know, the consequences of sanctions. long-term, unilateral, and let's admit it, illegal. These are illegal sanctions that are imposed. The devastating consequences that they have on overall health, the hollowing out of a middle class, those are the people, the middle class and the more vulnerable are the ones who are you know, most subject to the devastating consequences and effects, whereas, you know, black marketeers and, you know, elites in the society managed to survive. And in fact, there is a whole economy that develops that you could call a corrupt, you know, you know, control over rare, you know, goods and smuggling and so on. And so it does create, you know, its own kind of social and economic problems of enhancing inequality. It doesn't, you know, actually really tend to really have big consequences for the political or economic elites who actually can, not only survive those circumstances well, but often even profit, you know, I just want to jump in there.

David Yaghoubian: Cause if, if we aren't able to come back to it, I just want to say that this is the one grievance that I've heard from, from many different people, all like, I guess you could say in and around the middle class, but, um, understanding that the country is under maximum pressure, knowing that, knowing that it's not easy for anyone, the knowledge, and this is on, I'm speaking for the people who have told me about this, that it unfortunately, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite the rhetoric of the voice of the voiceless and the mostazafin, the oppressed, it's still oftentimes in business has to do with who you know, who's your daddy, who you're connected to. And it's not just, I'm an Iranian citizen and I'm, you know, or even, you know, I'm a Persian Shia Muslim and, you know, this is my country and we have a merit-based republic where we have an even playing field. What I have heard from patriotic Iranians, who the last thing they want is to see their government overthrown or come under the control of the United States, but that, hey, man, I'm a patriot and I'm going to the map for this country and those, and I won't use the expletives, but they will curse and say they're giving the contracts to their friends, they're giving the contracts to their kids, It's still who you know. And this runs from Tehran, the megalopolis, down to smaller cities and towns. And I would say it's especially in the smaller cities and towns where people are aware of of who got the contract instead of them, or who got the shipment of whatever, some bulk commodity from India at a certain price that they weren't able to get, that therefore completely undercut them, and damn it, that's not fair. So this, if viewers are wondering, well, if people understand that it's the sanctions that lead to the inflation, Where would some of this anger towards the establishment come from? And this is where, at least in my experience in talking to people, I've had some conversation with people like like really pissed off trying to explain this to me, like basically, dude, this whole voice of the voiceless, you know, that's for press TV. That's it. You know, sure. They'll show somebody's economic protest in like Bolivia. But when we are pissed off about the fact that it's still who you know, who you're connected to, not how devout you are as a Muslim having nothing to do with that, just being connected. And this, for many, is extremely frustrating. So now, is Iran any different than many other societies in that regard? Certainly not. But under maximum pressure sanctions when everyone's supposed to be taking one for the team and dealing with this and and you know hunkering down and to your point one can see that segments of the society are actually profiting from this and you know the government doesn't stop people hey if you can afford a new mercedes and you can import it go ahead you remember man we were we were in a cab do you remember we saw that brand new mercedes being delivered to someone on a flatbed so This is the kind of thing that I know real Iranian patriots get super pissed off about. And so I just wanted to throw that in there. It's not just the inflation. Maybe they can even understand the inflation. And what I just said regarding, okay, subsidies are sort of, you're chasing your tail with that. But when this system that proclaims itself to be a meritocracy and to be rooted in Islamic values is seems to them to be very similar to former regimes from Zamana past, if you will, from a past era. This is really angering. And so I would just say, clearly, not everyone who took to the streets over the last couple of weeks was a paid Mossad informant, no matter what Mike Pompeo might lead you to believe by way of his tweets. But, you know, in terms of those engaging in just obscene violence, you know, smashing in human beings' faces and beheadings, I think we could we could probably take Mike Pompeo and Jerusalem Post's word that those were indeed, you know, Mossad paid, pled, trained elements. But just just wanted to make sure that viewers understood that that that I'm cognizant of the reasons why many Iranians would still, despite their patriotism, their support for the government, protest in hopes that the government can do even better or can do much better than it has been doing, irrespective of the clear challenges that it faces relative to maximum pressure sanctions.

Adnan Hussain: Right. And, you know, we only did that context to say that you have to look at the larger structural framework, you know, but that that also that structural framework is, in fact, actually designed to create those structures. destabilizing conditions i mean the whole theory of sanctions is to create economic dislocation and misery so that the idea is people will be so miserable and upset with their uh government that they will rise up i mean that is the reason why it's done um it isn't done to punish the sort of like you know elite it is to try and um create the conditions um you know of dissatisfaction And the legitimate experience grievances that come from the legitimate experience of people who are suffering. But to have that undermine, you know, the government and to be able to create, you know, the conditions for exactly the sorts of protests that, you know, then might bring down, you know, and they don't mind, you know, just as they didn't in Iraq. They don't mind, you know, subjecting the population as a whole to violence. Such difficulty. I mean, you know, it wasn't it Madeleine Albright who said that, you know, when, you know, it was documented in a U.N. report that 500000 Iraqi children had died over the course of a decade of unilateral U.S. sanctions, you know, upon Iraq. presumably to punish the kind of Saddam Hussein and the elite, those who were governing the society. But in fact, it led to devastating health outcomes and effects that led to excess deaths, prenatal children, 500,000. She said, well, it's worth it. So they're not concerned about how the people of Iran may be suffering under the sanctions. In fact, it's actually part of the theory that in order to achieve by other means than direct invasion or assault to actually try and create a change in of undermining the government and forcing a change in its policies. so that it cannot defend its own sovereignty is actually subject the population to this kind of misery um so that they will rebel and and and replace the government so that's kind of what leads us you know to the moment where once the protest started even though the government acknowledged you know legitimacy of the economic grievances these did turn as you were pointing out into a much more kind of um You know they weren't they didn't remain peaceful for for very long right, and so we have to sort of talk about that, and you know what is the explanation and understanding. You know, one way of looking at it, of course, is to see it as a continuation through other means of the 12 day war, and that is in fact actually. you know, you know, sanctions are meant to be. So even the manipulation, if that was in fact what caused the sudden dramatic depreciation of the real, um, you know, over the course of about a couple of days where it lost maybe 15, 20% of its value that led to the initial, um, you know, economic strike of business, business people is that, you know, that it is, it is meant to, um, you know, lead to sort of chaos in the society. But if you look at it as maybe a kind of continuation of the war by other means, which is what sanctions are, in fact, there's a great book called Sanctions as War. And we did actually on guerrilla history, there are a number of case studies, including the study of sanctions in Iran, but a whole bunch of other countries. You know, if you realize that, you know, about 20 to 30% of the world's population are living under some form of unilateral u.s imperial sanctions i thought it was over 50 actually but but you know i mean they keep expanding and but they're losing some of their uh effect and consequence as you know new mechanisms are developed you know other financial mechanisms uh but in any case uh the point is is that so how did these turn so violent and um How were they being used to try and justify a kind of military strike or military intervention? How did they become such violent attacks on public infrastructure, banks, mosques, public transport, buses? Medical services and ambulances were attacked and destroyed. And of course, a great number of police and other law enforcement people have been killed, as well as some number also of those who were carrying out these violent attacks. So how do you understand? And it seems like it lasted mainly for like two, three days at an intense sort of level. but that when the government suspended internet service and also used various new technologies and techniques for identifying these mobile Starlink satellite internet servers and so on, there was then a kind of petering out of the violent protests. So what does this sort of tell us about what was going on and how these economic discontent that was being expressed turned into something much more disruptive and destructive?

David Yaghoubian: I mean, I definitely don't think that we can separate the 12 day war and the continued economic pressure that the United States has been placing on Iran from this uprising. Although, of course, there or, you know, whatever you want to call it, this this are current circumstances that could potentially lead to to another war. the thing that really struck me about this round, this effort, and again, I under, without the cues and without the statements of Mike Pompeo and, you know, Israeli security, I would have already been aware that they were behind the flood of weapons, certainly the guns, you to fight against Iranian security forces. So their involvement, their support basically in the wake of the 12 day war and something like this would be a given. However, and whether or not this has to do with the inability for them to actually shape and guide things on the ground the way that they would want. And again, I just say in the wake of the unsuccessful 12 day war and with the wrap up of many of their agents and spies during that time, perhaps this was just the best that they could do. But the point that I want to make is I was struck that I didn't see really any elements of, uh, or many elements of the traditional sort of color revolution approach, uh, uh, whereby, uh, even, even, you know, color revolution. Well, what was the color? Who was the, who is the individual that we're following here? Some might've said it just by default became Reza Pahlavi. Um, but, uh, In terms of a message, in terms of a chant, in terms of an ask, this was essentially turned straight into just mass violence against not only, and this will help me make the point, not only the security services, say police stations, but uh, fire engines and ambulances and mosques and apartment buildings and businesses. We saw banks, we saw, uh, stores, just, just people's common stores. There was a guy the next day out there crying saying, Hey, like, I understand things are difficult, but who's going to help me with my store now? It's all burned down. So, uh, I, uh, interpreted this, and I've been listening to many, many talking heads myself over the last few days trying to put things together. And it seems as though if there was a guided effort this time, not only to engage in violence against security services, it was geared more towards a civil war and the dissolution of Iran as a sovereign nation more than it was just simply regime change. And so in this context, we can see Reza Pahlavi as sort of the useful idiot for Trump who already came out and said, hey, you know, I don't know if the guys got enough support within the country, but simply to enable the rioters to push the security situation over the edge to the point where, say, regional groups such as in Balochistan, in Kurdistan, potentially up in Azerbaijan, down in in Khuzestan would similarly engage in mass violence. And thus you could see that the country essentially split up into component parts, which is exactly what the United States and Israel would want at this point. So I guess just again, in some, it's just, I was struck by the lack of a guided, concerted, uniform message, one that would resonate with Iranians, one that would bring millions of people out into the streets like we saw on Monday when millions of people actually came into the streets of Tehran to demonstrate their support for the Islamic Republic, had the rioters or initial protesters utilized, say, phrases, songs, targets that appealed to masses of Iranians, we might have seen a different outcome. But you are not going to appeal to a majority of Iranians. Iranian citizens, and I will make this generalization by burning mosques and Husaynias. That is just certainly, and Ali Ali Zadeh was on with Max Blumenthal yesterday, excellent conversation. And he himself, he was kind of admitting, yeah, you know, there's probably a good 10 20% of Iranians who are very, you know, secular, maybe atheist, hate Islam. Yeah, and some of those people would come out and maybe gleefully burn down a mosque or a Hussainia, but this is not going to appeal to the majority of Iranian society for which acts are horrific and shocking. So, uh, it, it, this round, uh, this, this, uh, in, in, in very stark contrast, of course, to 2022, which kind of spilled over a little bit in 2023, but women, life, freedom, whatever you want to call it. Um, of course the, the, uh, the, the, the ask from women, life, freedom, uh, was, was, uh, uh, much more clear and, and one, uh, could, could, uh, interpret that in some ways, uh, that movement, uh, was successful in obtaining some of, of, of its ask. Uh, The ask here is just mass violence, death to members of the Iranian government and its security services, and essentially chaos for the Islamic Republic of Iran and civil war. So that's what really struck me. And certainly other commentators who have been speaking over the last few days about this, just the... I don't know if it was the expectation that just this level of obscene violence would somehow appeal to more and more Iranians. But I really think that this worked against Iran. Bringing out greater support for for the writers and irrespective of the the fact that the the the Internet was taken down that Starlink was shut down. I just believe that that the the overall approach, both through this level of heinous violence as well through the targets of the fires, of the rioters worked against the possibility that the movement would continue to grow in strength. And so this for the Iranian government, I mean, with the Monday rallies in support, and it wasn't just in Tehran where there were millions of people. I mean, in every city where We saw footage of the violent protesters, you know, killing Basiji, smashing people with street signs and with shovels. There were tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of Iranians in the streets of these smaller cities. And so... The approach of the, I guess, the supporters of this round of violence, which I would place it firmly in the hands of the United States and Israel, was wildly unsuccessful. And I won't belabor the point because perhaps it's obvious, but Reza Pahlavi just is not an appealing figure to your average Iranian. There are there maybe I don't know, 15, 20 percent. You got royalists in Iran still. I have heard people say and I love the Shah and he is my Shah. I've heard that from a guy and I was like, oh, cool, man. Great. You know, like knock yourself out. That's the kind of guy who might have taken to the streets this time. And like, you know, Reza Pahlavi is going to come and like save us and make everything great again, like it was in the memes, you know, everything before that. Iranian revolution. So, you know, those people exist, but the vast majority of Iranians, he's just kind of a weird joke. Like the idea that this guy that's never worked a day in his life, the Silver Spoon kid, who is just... So... I would say it's not that a mass of Iranians are like, oh, like he is a Zionist and he is in the hands of, you know, he's just not relevant. This is from a bygone era in terms of like a viable political figure to lead the country. It's not Reza Pahlavi. And then furthermore, you've got, you know, Maryam Rajavi, the MEK, they've got even, I mean, far less even like, you know, Pahlavi's got infinitely more of a chance than the MEK, right? Yeah. kind of interesting to see them like duking it out in the streets of Los Angeles, but I won't go there. That is the Royalists and the MEK. But so this, again, just kind of echoing my point that in terms of classic kind of color revolution tactics, hybrid war, this one seemed geared towards really just fragmentation of Iran, internal strife and civil war, potentially to enable the united states to legitimate a military strike during you know government responses to to such uh to such uprisings

Adnan Hussain: right i mean you know it is important to remember i mean historically speaking that um it was a republican revolution you know that did take place you know i mean regardless of whether there are divisions about you know the islamic character of the state that ended up being established under the the constitution that replaced the Pahlavi state. I mean, it was a Republican revolution and that was pretty popular. So there doesn't seem to be you know, a genuine appetite and he doesn't have like on the ground, you know, organizing capacity or support. And in fact, actually, that's actually a very important and interesting point is that, you know, the demands were very unclear as you were pointing out, like the first demands of the economically distressed, you know, I mean, they're very clear. We want this inflation to stop. We need, you know, some kind of regulation so that the currency doesn't go into complete freefall and then we can't afford basic necessities. I mean, that's a kind of clear, you know, popular demand that would resonate with a lot of people. But once it became just this kind of destructive, you know, the regime must fall kind of thing or it's illegitimate. I mean, what we're discovering is that while there is like a portion of the population that would regard the Islamic Republic as anathema to how they want to see the country is that by and large, people do regard the government as legitimate. There was a Republican revolution. There isn't in fact, actually a very clear kind of alternative that anybody could crystallize around or has been actually put forward in any of these, because as you're pointing out, they're not actually perhaps based on a popular organized opposition developing in response to genuine kind of material and social criticisms. They are instead, you know, in some ways inspired by groups that either want to break away, you know, or break apart, you know, the country. And what it reminds me very much of, which is why I'm so surprised, How many people haven't recognized the pattern? I mean, is that this just reminds me so much of like what we saw a year ago, you know, in Syria. You know, it's like it's like I mean, how how many times do you have to see these attempts, you know, to try and overthrow ISIS? Any sovereign nation in the Middle East that rejects, you know, a settler colonial expansionist aggressive regime, you know, in Israel or wants to be able to follow its own path of sovereign, you know, economic and social and economic. foreign policies that they immediately become enemies of the United States and of Israel. And, you know, we saw this with Syria. We've seen it with Iraq 20, more than 20 years ago. We saw it with Libya. You know, like it's... it's a little astonishing to me how people refuse to see that there is a kind of pattern, which doesn't mean that there isn't discontent. Of course we know, you know, and in fact, actually look at any country is any government in the world's really that popular. I mean, the West, you know, in, you know, lots of other parts of the world. I mean, this is an endemic problem because what we have is on a global level, we have, you know, You know, the consequences of imperial capitalism that creates a huge divide, a huge wealth inequality. You know, I mean, in the United States, is the government popular? No, there's all kinds of discontent. That in itself doesn't delegitimize a government. Right. Like that's I think the assumption that a lot of people are making is that because there is some corruption or mismanagement and there is inability to, you know, in a society under sanctions to actually provide, you know, economic sustenance for the people on a kind of level that people would be satisfied with. That doesn't itself matter. you know, delegitimize the system, what it means is that there are critiques and that there are social and economic struggles to be waged. And we haven't seen that those themselves have been anathematized. They may not be, you know, appreciated by officials of the government. But, you know, on the other hand, they have been acknowledged as real and genuine concerns. There's a big difference between what we witnessed You know, in the later stages of these violent sort of protests and, you know, those others, as we've been saying, and it's really just a question, you know, really of sovereignty that is unacceptable to Western hegemony. And so that's very hard to see why it is that, you know, It isn't clearer in some ways that there is a pattern that this is falling, you know, into. But in any case, it seems that even Trump, you know, could understand. I mean, it's always hard to predict, but even he could understand that Pahlavi, you know, is not really a viable political option. He sort of made some distance. But. What's interesting is all of these threats and the military threats. And earlier in the week, you know, we had already planned to have this on, you know, this Friday office hours. It looked like, you know, earlier in the week that there might be a military attack. I know that there was a kind of national security attack. meeting chaired by, I think it's Vice President Vance, about policy and the options. And we've been seeing some very interesting kind of responses in US circles, in Israeli circles about pulling back in some ways from an attack or an intervention. And in some ways, it seems that the kind of violence and even announcing, you know, that Mossad agents are, you know, running, running wild was meant in some ways to try and polarize and make more extreme government response in order to justify the, you know, military, you know, some kind of military intervention and so on. So I'm wondering, how do you see the, because you actually in August, you know, we started this conversation with, know what had been predictions being circulated late in the summer about an imminent military attack upon uh iran and you came out very clearly you know at that point saying you didn't think there would be and that the outcomes and consequences of the 12-day war suggested that there was enough of a deterrent effect That it wouldn't be contemplatable for a while. And it's in part actually your confidence in that that, you know, made me willing to go in December. I said, OK, just I hope Dave is right. I think we are right. Yeah. Exactly. You know, I mean, at the time, I also said the counterpoint was that there are some ideological groups that are extreme enough that they are willing just to cause so chaos and destruction and they don't, you know, kind of mind, you know, in some ways there isn't a kind of apocalyptic sort of imagination, you know, at work here in this supremacist sort of kind of perspective. So, you know, it was unclear why. whether there might be people who were um not willing to be rational actors in the balance of deterrence but because of ideological reasons you know might so kind of uh chaos in the region through military attack or inter intervention But at this point, maybe it seems like your predictions and your analysis, are they holding up? Do you think that this is genuinely a pullback because they actually made an attempt here to sponsor and foment internal kind of chaos that would allow for intervention to be successful, but now after... the big counter kind of protests, the suspension of the internet and the, you know, fact that these, you know, there may continue to be, you know, protests about the economic kind of questions, but it seems that the destruction of mosques and the attacks on public institutions and the killing, you know, of, you know, citizens and police and and so on that seems to have subsided more or less the last four or five days so what's your analysis of the situation now and the prospects and possibilities of you know some kind of military strike or what is the US and Israeli kind of approach going to be

David Yaghoubian: I think irrespective of anything that is going on on the ground in Iran or that has gone on on the ground in Iran, if the United States and Israel together believe that they could kinetically attack Iran and achieve their goals of either regime change or just spinning the country into total chaos, they would do that in a hot second. And so my prediction after the 12 day war, that there would not be this coming strike that many, including Trita were saying, oh, it's gonna be in August or now it's gonna be, if you remember, it was gonna be in autumn. And then Alistair Crook was like, oh, we got a weather window, they're gonna have to do it now. And I was kind of calling BS on all those, simply because I didn't see the relative American and Israeli strength to successfully pull that off in light of what happened during the 12-day war. So ultimately, you know, Trita was like, oh, it might happen in December or early in the year. I guess we'll find out if that prediction of his was accurate. But relative to where we're at right this minute in terms of how am I feeling about this, well, I'll be honest, going on at 2 o'clock, at least my time, Pacific time, on a Friday, I was honestly, and still am, I haven't checked my telegram, so concerned that if Trump was going to kick something off, this is when he would do it relative to stock markets and how he likes to, you know, where his priorities and concerns are. So, you know, right now, I don't have some solid adamant take that I'm going to argue here that, you know, like I was arguing in August that, no, absolutely, they're not going to attack again. This is, you know, just forget about it. And this is my calculation. Applying the logic that I was applying when I spoke to you and when there was really great feedback from the audience and Benji was warning me, hey, don't ever apply logic or reason to these freaks, to these warmongers. But basically, with my understanding of the capacity of the Iranian military to continue to pummel Israel and to destroy any and all American facilities in the Persian Gulf region, that stuff that wasn't even broken out during the 12-day war, I would still argue that it would be essentially suicidal. And I'm saying in terms of its imperial standing, suicidal for the United States to go to war with the Islamic Republic of Iran now or even in a week or even in two weeks. Go ahead and bring the aircraft carriers up. Those are basically large floating coffins these days with the march of military technology. But based on the last six months of complete insanity from the Trump administration, including its domestic policies, which I won't even go there. Everybody knows what I'm talking about. the idea that the empire will go to war in Iran irrespective of the risk of it turning into essentially the quagmire that Trump would like to avoid, making Iraq and Afghanistan and Syria just like a joke, just not even comparable. I no longer have that confidence that That somewhere in the back room, there is someone who's saying, yeah, yeah, yeah, Lindsay, yes, we know, but we can't do it because the math just doesn't work. We won't win. We're going to actually lose. I don't know who has Trump's ear at any given minute, what advice he is being given. And and of course, you know what the assessment is of Zionist and American military planners relative to what they think they would like to accomplish in Iran. I'll just put this out there. This idea that, oh, well, they don't have a plan for after and they don't have even, as I was saying, a good color revolution set up going so much. what about just indiscriminately bombing infrastructure and continuing to just make life miserable for Iranians? I'm just saying I would not have hypothesized that. I would not have predicted this before. But at this stage today, Friday, January 16, 2026, I really just don't know. So I would just say to provide an answer based on my my reasoning from the late June of 2026 up until now, I don't believe that the United States will make this mistake and actually attack Iran in a way that would lead to an actual open exchange. maybe develop another tit for tat thing. I could see that Iran would buy another six months if they could just do another, we'll hit this and you'll hit that. No one will die. And Trump can proclaim victory and everybody can proclaim victory. They would do that if, if the option was presented, I believe in my interpretation. But Iran absolutely will not accept being struck by the United States or Israel without massive retaliation. And, and, Iran has made this clear. This could potentially be why, if the stories that we've read are true, that, you know, the Israelis and the Arab states said, hey, you know, cool your heels. But I'm not believing any of that. I don't think any of your viewers are going to be. believing any of that. It really just comes down to whether the empire believes that through the application of kinetic force against the Islamic Republic of Iran, it can get its way and get its way in the short term, because Trump likes things kind of in on the short term. So this is where we're at. I'm, you know, flipping telegram as fast as I can with everybody else, trying to read the tea leaves to determine. And it just comes with so many other points of analysis. Who's got a NOTAM? Who's got, what do the radars say? Where are tankers at this minute? Where are aircraft carriers? All of these dynamics, it's just impossible to tell. But based on my logic and reasoning, over the last few years, it's not feasible for the United States to go to war with Iran in the American style of war that it wages. I'll just leave it at that. And I don't see preparations for that American style of war being brought to bear even right now. So just moving up an aircraft carrier doesn't do it. So It's just very, very difficult to tell in the context of the Trump administration, which is just to say it's unpredictable is a vast understatement.

Adnan Hussain: Yeah, certainly at the very least, you know, and I've seen articles characterizing that basically Trump is buying time. You know, if there is an intention to make a strike or an attack, it certainly isn't going to be to protect, you know, the so-called, you know, peaceful protests, which, of course, haven't been since, you know. really January 8th, where they turned much more kind of violent. It's not going to be for that, even if that's the kind of framework that he's used. It may be because it takes a long time to actually redeploy and position forces. And so this is an important and interesting point to kind of observe that the Venezuela buildup in the Caribbean you know, that had been taking place over the course of the whole fall means that the U.S. military, despite the fact that it has 800 bases around the world, is not in a position either because of armaments or because of forces, because of like, you know, the the you know, the naval capacity, et cetera, to really mount a very significant and intense military attack on Iran. It could maybe do something that would be like what they did when they destroyed all of Iran's nuclear facilities, which was the kind of mantra that had to be maintained to create a way of de-escalating and ending and rescuing Israel really from the consequences of its failed attempt to, you know, overthrow Iran's government. You know, so as a result, you know, there are some kinds of limits and limitations. And even if, you know, they plan to do something, you know, later on, it's going to, it would take time. This isn't the, you know, aren't the current circumstances. And it's important to kind of recognize that, you know, You know, just as, you know, in some ways, I would argue that the Iraq war and the U.S. imperial, you know, embroilment in Afghanistan and Iraq and those major commitments helped, in fact, in some ways, allow the spread of the Bolivarian movement. revolution and the so-called pink tide in latin and south america because the us was really occupied and stretched and it allowed other places for anti-imperialist sovereignty and development to take place in a different way that likewise you know this uh you know build up around venezuela means that it is very hard to contemplate the u.s maintaining you know, the kinetic capabilities on all fronts everywhere and that the empire is being stretched. So that's at least, you know, perhaps hopeful and confirms the kind of analysis that you've been making. But it is quite noteworthy the way in which I mean, I don't know what you think about the reports that came out of Israeli or at least were sourced as Israeli concerns, as well as like Gulf and neighboring countries concerns. that it wasn't the opportune time and moment to do it. And I think it's basically as a response to the fact that the couple of weeks of protests hadn't destabilized the government to the extent that it would be possible to really make a successful attack that would have political consequences. I mean, you might be able to bomb some targets, but not actually affect the political sorts of change.

David Yaghoubian: I mean, logic would dictate that Israel would ask, with its depletion of its air defense missiles that have not been resupplied, at least in totality, with the configuration of or lack thereof right now of American forces in the Gulf, it would be logical for the Israelis to ask Israel, Trump to hold off, I would expect that that would mean hold off until you can bring all of your assets into the region and get everything set up to then go to war with Iran for as long as it takes. But of course, you know, this would be the ultimate fantasy of Zionists would be that the United States and Iran are finally locked into their, you know, the big one, the actual real war, not last year's mutual obliteration, but an actual war. So if there is any validity to these statements and reports that members of the Israeli establishment had asked Trump to stave off. It would only be to enable a better configuration of American forces. Now, with that said, again, Israel will be facing at least the same type of onslaught from Iranian missiles that it received during the 12-day war. So, again, it's impossible to tell, but But it seems logical that the Israelis would have asked, hey, let's not like rush into this and let's make sure that we have all of our ducks in a row before getting into it. But that would not be requesting that, you know, the United States eventually does not go to war with Iran or does not, you know, bomb, begin bombing again, because ultimately that that is what Netanyahu wants. visited in Mar-a-Lago with Trump. This was just a few weeks ago. It was all about Iran. It was all about attempting to get Trump to start another war with Iran. And it wasn't this time based on, I mean, explicitly Trump, excuse me, Netanyahu explicitly, it wasn't about Iran's nuclear program. Oh, you completely obliterated that Trump. Now it was about Iran's ballistic missiles, which- oh, they're reconstituting their program. And as well, other reports that, oh, Iran's finally going to get those SU-35s by 2027. Therefore, we've got this window, if you will, to do this. So Netanyahu was already attempting to motivate Trump to take a hard line on Iran and to potentially go back to war with Iran. The Protests in the bazaar that led to the opportunity for Mossad to, you know, bust out the Starlink and the guns and to really get things going propelled us to this moment where now the United States, it seems, needs to make its choice. Go to war with Iran in the next like minute to two, three weeks or not. engage in the same type of BSing and shenanigans and charade and back off the imminent military strike, but to maintain all elements of the hybrid warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which to come full circle, we know do bear on its stability. It bears on its security. This is a reality. So irrespective of whether the government can show hard evidence that these violent riots were supported and motivated from without, it doesn't change the fact of the, the price of the real and, and people looking at their own lives or, or as, as some of my friends have explained is just, you know, in tears that their kids, that their, their child's future, their education, their, this, the, the, with the economic circumstances, the way that they are, it's just incredibly difficult, uh, on, on the population. So, so I What I'm saying is the Iranian military strength and unity might stave off an imminent American military attack. But nevertheless, the Zionists and the Americans and the sanctions aren't going away. They're chomping at the bit to destroy the Islamic Republic, to break it up into as many constituent parts as possible. And so we're certainly not out of any woods. The question just is whether or not there will be a war. Whether I should add or not, I'll just say I'm even on the fence regarding that one. Not that I, from the comfort of my Zoom studio, standing up to the Zionists and the American empire, but as I have heard from so many Iranians and so many different statements and interviews over the last few years, but especially over the last week, constantly being bullied, constantly being sanctioned, being, okay, so Iranians aren't starving, but what about women who die because they don't have breast cancer meds that have been denied by the United States of America? At a certain point, and if anyone in the audience have had experience being bullied, I got bullied for being Iranian in junior high and for being overweight. So I know what it was like to get bullied by some super evil people. But at a certain point in the bullying, you get you get, it's the end of it. And, and you, there's a certain empowered feeling when you realize that you're not going to take the bullying anymore and that you're, excuse me, you're going to stand up to this. You're finally going to take matters into your own hand. And you're in this, this provides agency sometimes short lived and sometimes at the expense of one's own like circumstances and health. But, but, um, the bullying of an entire society and the deprivation that sanctions and this maximum pressure regime has enabled isn't something that can also be sustained forever against a proud nation like Iran with its thousands of years of history. So I guess I'm just closing in saying I don't know whether tearing off the Band-Aid now wouldn't be favorable to waiting until the Zionists and Americans have their favorable force configuration to then go ahead and engage in the violence that they're already planning to engage in. I don't believe that Iran will do a preemptive strike. I don't believe that's within the doctrine. That's not within the culture. That's not really within the effective playing cards that Iran has. But I just don't I don't necessarily think that all members of the Iranian establishment are are hoping that this one blows over this time because this might be the time to go. Relative to what I said about Israeli defense, air defense strength, American configuration, this might actually be the time to go.

Adnan Hussain: I mean, interestingly, because I did hear Ali Zadeh recently, maybe was on Max Blumenthal's Grey Zone show or elsewhere. He's been on a few places or even on his own Jadal English channel, where he said there are some people who analyze the situation and think that... Iran made a strategic error in agreeing to end the 12-day war, but that, in fact, actually it had the upper hand and it really perhaps needed to press the advantage when it had it. And then this is another kind of component of U.S. and perhaps, I'm not sure, Israeli, could they possibly be involved? you know, fantasizing and self-deluding, you know, after what they experienced during the 12-day war over the summer, to think that Iran has been weakened. This is like the way in which, you know, this was framed as like, this is the chance because, you know, Iran is rebuilding its missiles and its air defenses, and we should do it now while it's been weakened. Both know itself militarily economically and so on which of course economically it has been we can we can certainly say that but also regionally you know that there's been rollbacks of you know uh iran's allies and so on and what you were saying about it's not in the culture well we of course have become very used to understanding the strategic patience doctrine really of That like, you know, it's kind of perspective is a long term one that if it can sustain itself through these periods of crises, it ultimately is going to develop and become strong. It's a nation of nearly 100 million. I mean, you know, it's a highly educated population. There's a lot of potential. It is obviously growing. You know, could be the regionally dominant country if it wasn't being suppressed by these unilateral sanctions and constantly being undermined and so forth. It has that as its long term kind of sense that it just needs to outlast this failing project of settler colonial imperial disruption. that is based on a very small and highly dependent, you know, relationship with the imperial West that is itself, of course, also, you know, you know, having its problems. So that's what we've come to be aware of as the general Iranian doctrine. But Ali Alizadeh said something interesting as well, is that if you turn the situation from that kind of a calculation into, you know, uh the you know leaders of the islamic republic the leaders of the irgc the people who are most dedicated to the islamic republic's um you know kind of continuance if they feel that this is an existential threat then their strategic calculations and subsequently tactics may change and they may be you know if they feel that there is absolutely no way you can continue to negotiate and that there is no comparative advantage to the doctrine of strategic patients under these current circumstances, then they might have a very different calculation. And that's something that he was, you know, kind of putting out there is that the miscalculation of the mis perception that somehow Iran has actually been very substantially degraded in terms of its strategic capabilities, its military capacities and so on, that that's actually a miscalculation and it could be a very dangerous one if they put the leadership of the Islamic Republic in the position of feeling that it is facing an existential threat, right? So I'm wondering what you think about that as one of the contexts in which to think about going forward what we might see.

David Yaghoubian: Well, I can't get into, obviously, Bibi Netanyahu's head, but with his desperation, both individually with his legal circumstances and then his concern for the Zionist project, I wouldn't put it past him. And this would be, in a way, like brilliant, kind of Dr. Evil level brilliant, but to... foment a situation whereby Israel was getting pummeled so hard by Iran that the only option that could be presented logically at that point by Israel to Trump or from Israel would be, we got to use a tactical nuke. We thought we could handle them with conventionals, but oh my God, the Iranians have this huge arsenal that we didn't know about, and now we're getting pummeled. What are we going to do? Because Netanyahu, his back is against the wall. He's in the corner. It's just amazing that he's still standing as a politician, but he is still standing and is desperate to... have his reputation solidified in the mantle of having defended and enabled Zionism to persist in the 21st century, he absolutely must foment a war against Iran. This is his destiny. And so uh, relative to the conventional strength of the, uh, Iranian aerospace forces, uh, uh, certainly running ground force. We didn't even need to talk about that because nobody's even talking about invading, um, uh, the, the, It just doesn't add up, and that's why I'm making this point. Iran has the conventional capacity to completely destroy the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf and much of Israel's military and also industrial facilities. It maintains that capacity. It does not, as far as we know, maintain a nuclear weapons capacity. That, of course, is something that the United States and Israel maintain. And this would be based on some of the admonitions that I received from your audience the last time that I was pretty confidently stating that they're not going to attack Iran. Again, you know, don't underestimate the batshit, pardon me, but insanity of Zionists and American imperialists. And so kind of jumping here in this framework, but just think about what Trump is doing. Think about... What Trump is doing relative, if you will, on the global and domestic stage relative to international law and the Constitution, the the discussion for the last really two, three decades, even since since the fall of the Soviet Union. Well, maybe we can use tactical nukes. Maybe we should. Maybe we should bust out a Mighty Mike. Come on. You know, yeah. Under Hegseth, the Department of War, I'm just saying. So this is when I myself rethink my own confident statements regarding, you know, the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the face of American and Israeli aggression, because this could also be designed to lead to. a one-way nuclear exchange that would, I guess, in the hopes of the Zionists then somehow bring an end to Iranian military strength and Iran is a threat to Zionist expansion. I just focus because nothing else has changed at non nothing, nothing. I mean, based on the three moving points of analysis that I was talking about last time, American soft and hard power relative to what you were explaining about Venezuela in the Middle East, much less than than in June, soft power. the world watching Americans getting shot in the face by a masked Gestapo and Trump's reaction. I'm just saying the American soft and hard power since our last conversation greatly diminished. I would say Israeli soft and hard power as well, still slipping downward. Iran, the idea was in the wake of these you know, awesome riots that are going to weaken the Republic and show everyone how much Iranians hate their government, this might have been an opportunity for some sort of exchange. I don't believe that... I think they were just wanting the Iranians to get the job done. I don't believe that this was supposed to culminate on like day seven with a Zionist and American military strike. But having failed... They go for plan B, which is, oh, I guess we should save the protesters or something. And then we start talking about the renewal of warfare. Unless they're planning on, or at least Bibi is planning in the back of his mind on this leading to a nuclear exchange, I'm just not seeing it again because it doesn't work out for the United States or Israel militarily.

Adnan Hussain: Well, and some of that consciousness, you know, is, you know, despite the fact that the Trump administration seems to have adopted the neocon agenda, you know, of a hook, line and sinker here, that there are, you know, other forces, even within Republican Party that are not too. keen on u.s uh imperial intervention in the u.s you know that is something that it seems that enough people have started to question you know across the spectrum of american public opinion these like uh you know, kind of costly and difficult and illegitimate wars abroad. And, you know, that might be one of the constraints is that not only is there materially very little capacity with an overstretched declining empire, but also there is even less kind of ideological kind of compulsion, you know, with, or it's just not the, you know, I was complaining, have people not been paying attention since Iraq's, you know, do they not remember, but it's really the sort of kind of liberal left that is dedicated to these kind of humanitarian interventions who seem to be compelled or persuaded. But in fact, actually, a lot of people don't really have an interest in it in the same way and don't kind of think of the United States as this kind of, you know, progressive power to shape a better world. Like, you know, that is no longer really, you know, at the forefront of people's ideological consciousness about the place of the United States in the world. I think too much has happened historically that even if you're not paying that much attention, it's just not as compelling and persuasive. You know, it's really, however, you know, know interesting you've been talking a little bit about you know the audience i've noticed that there's quite a lot of new people uh you know in the comments and um you know with a range of views and i've only uh had to ban you know one person for you know making um you know explicit threats against uh my guest but it's been interesting to watch i've left those comments there because you You know, in some ways, this is what's happening. And it's good for people to see the, you know, kinds of views that, you know, some people are still, you know, perpetuating despite everything that we would hope history, recent events would teach us. And so, you know, I believe in, you know, open dialogue. So I've left a lot of those there and people have been responding and reacting in this discussion. And I think that's been very healthy. But I hope that those who have come to troll and, you know, represent imperialist sorts of perspectives, sometimes out of, you know, sometimes they're bots, I'm sure. And we know that there is an massive like operation in social media that's taking place. There's a huge infrastructure of diasporic pro kind of Shah or at least anti Islamic Republic media out there. This is a huge industry as well. But if you've come, perhaps you've maybe heard at least some analysis and facts that will give you a different perspective And you're always welcome to come back because perhaps you might agree at least, you know, that Palestinians deserve freedom. Venezuelans should have their sovereignty. And maybe then you can start to apply a similar sort of logic to other Palestinians. you know, theaters of the world. This is, I think, what it really boils down to is do we respect the principle of sovereignty, you know, in the world? And, you know, it's hard and very difficult, it seems, for even the Western left to give up on the kind of hegemonic and, you know, post-colonial ideas of supremacist, The perspective and the ideas that we have in the West need to be imposed upon the rest of the world rather than allowing people to have sovereignty. If they're going to make change, they will make it in their own sort of way. There is legitimate grievances that people have because of the economic situation. That has to be understood, of course, within the larger structural perspective of U.S. illegal unilateral sanctions upon Iran. But in any case, I've really enjoyed very much this conversation with you, Dave. And I think many people in the audience really appreciate and have benefited from the very sober analysis, the facts. And also even, you know, I don't do a lot of the kind of like military stuff, but I know you keep up a lot more on this kind of strategic and military things. And it's been very useful and helpful for us to have that perspective. So before people leave the stream, I just want to say, you know, you can still like it and share it and people can watch it back. I want to thank everybody who's been coming to these consistently. It's really wonderful to come back. It's been a little over a month since we've had these office hours. We'll be getting them back in a regular sort of fashion with great guests like Dave Yagoubian, scholars, historians, academics, activists. analysts journalists and people like that and always come back and post your questions we really appreciate the community that we've developed here i'm sorry that it's been so long since we've had one of these but we will be more regular again so i want to thank you all again and thank dave it's been great to have you back on thank you thank you and peace and solidarity to you all Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim