John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt - The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy

Wendy Pearlman: Welcome to Cambridge Forum with John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt discussing the Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy. I'm Wendy Pearlman, a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. In March 2006, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published an article entitled The Israel Lobby: in the London Review of Books. It ignited a storm of controversy. They argued that a group of pro-Israel activists was manipulating U.S. foreign policy to benefit the state of Israel at the expense of the national interests of the United States. Publication of a book-length study developing their proposition has done little to calm the rhetoric of their critics Or their defenders. What evidence do Mearsheimer and Walt point to in backing up their claim that the Israel lobby is guiding policy decisions in Washington? What changes do they recommend to align U.S. Middle East policy with the nation's genuine interests? These are questions that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt address as they discuss their controversial book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Jon Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the codirector of the Program on International Security at the University of Chicago. Among his previous books is The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Stephen Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He's the author of Taming American Power: The Global Response, among other books. Welcome to Cambridge Forum, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.

Stephen Walt: Thank you, Wendy, for that very nice introduction. Good evening, everyone, and thank you all for coming this evening. If our topic tonight were America's energy policy, you'd expect me to discuss the political activities of oil companies. If the subject was gun control, it would not be controversial for me to examine the role of the National Rifle Association. But if the topic is Middle East policy and you mention— and you bring up the Israel lobby, you're grabbing the third rail with both hands.

John Mearsheimer: Yes.

Stephen Walt: Now this is partly because some pro-Israel groups are quick to attack anyone who questions the policies that they advocate. But it's also because this entire discussion takes place in the shadow of centuries of anti-Semitism and that history shapes how people think about this issue. If you talk about a powerful interest group that is mostly, though by no means exclusively, comprised of Jewish Americans, or if you point out that media coverage in the United States tends to favor Israel, or if you mention the impact of campaign contributions by pro-Israel political action committees, it reminds some people of bizarre conspiracy theories like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. In our book, Jon and I explicitly reject all these anti-Semitic canards. For us, the Israel lobby is just an interest group like lots of other interest groups in the United States. And most of its activities are as American as apple pie. We don't question Israel's legitimacy or its right to exist. In fact, we believe the United States should come to its aid if its survival is ever in jeopardy. But we also think the lobby's influence on U.S. foreign policy is a subject that reasonable people ought to be able to discuss openly, the same way we would discuss any other groups who are trying to influence American policy. Foreign or domestic. Now, this subject is important because the special relationship between the United States and Israel affects all of us. Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. economic and military aid, getting about $500 per year for each Israeli citizen, even though it is now a prosperous country with a per capita income that is 29th in the world. Moreover, it gets this aid even when it does things that the United States opposes and that tend to generate anti-American sentiment, like building settlements in the occupied territories. Israel gets consistent diplomatic support from the United States, and it's rarely criticized by American officials, and certainly not by anyone who's running for high office. The question's why. Now, the usual answer is that Israel is a strategic asset and a democracy that shares our values. But those arguments can't explain why we give it so much help And with so few strings attached. Israel may have been a strategic asset during the Cold War, but the Cold War is now over. Today, providing unconditional support is not making the United States more popular or making American citizens more secure. So the strategic argument isn't convincing. It's true that Israel's a vibrant democracy, but the status of its own Arab citizens and its 40-year campaign to colonize the West Bank is sharply at odds with American values. My point, by the way, is not that Israel acts worse than other countries, only that it doesn't act significantly better. And so one cannot justify unconditional support by saying that Israel's behavior is somehow exemplary. There is, in our view, a strong moral case for Israel's existence based on the long history of anti-Semitism. But past crimes against the Jewish people do not justify giving Israel a blank check So what really explains Israel's privileged position? In our view, it's primarily due to the Israel lobby. The lobby is a loose coalition of groups and individuals that works openly to influence American foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. It includes organizations like AIPAC, the Anti-Defamation League, Christian groups like Christians United for Israel, think tanks like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Publications like the Weekly Standard or the New Republic. And this is a broad definition. But if you think about it, most interest groups in the United States have lots of different components to them. The environmental movement isn't just Greenpeace or the Sierra Club. It also includes think tanks, sympathetic academics, and journalists. Just like the pro-Israel movement does. Like other interest groups, the Israel lobby is not a cabal or a conspiracy. And the groups and individuals in it don't agree on every issue. But they do agree on wanting to preserve the special relationship. Final point here. The lobby is not synonymous with Jewish Americans. Many Jewish Americans don't support the lobby's positions. And groups like the so-called Christian Zionists aren't Jewish. The lobby is defined by its political agenda, not by ethnicity or religion. Like other special interest groups, the lobby works in 2 main ways. First, groups like AIPAC exert influence inside the Beltway by helping get allies appointed to key positions in the government and by giving politicians clear incentives to adopt positions that they favor. For example, by steering campaign contributions towards pro-Israel candidates and away from candidates who aren't. The lobby's influence, of course, is no secret. AIPAC was ranked the 2nd most powerful lobby in Washington in a 2003 survey of congressmen and their staffs. And Bill Clinton said it was, quote, better than anybody else lobbying in this town. Newt Gingrich called it the most effective general interest group across the entire planet. And former Congressman Lee Hamilton, who served for 34 years, said there's no group that matches it. they're in a class by themselves. Former Senator Fritz Hollings said as he was leaving office, you can't have an Israel policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here. And that's why Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said AIPAC was, quote, the greatest supporter and friend we have in the whole world. And Jeffrey Goldberg of The New Yorker called it a leviathan among lobbies. Now, of course, it's not just AIPAC, but it's also a number of other groups and individuals, including, as I've mentioned, a subset of the Christian evangelical movement. The second strategy is to try and shape public discourse and American perceptions so that Israel is viewed favorably by most Americans. Pro-Israel think tanks and commentators produce a steady diet of op-eds, articles, books, and media appearances intended to shape these perceptions and influence policy. Media commentary in the United States tends to be pro-Israel. And there's simply no equivalent in the United States to Israeli journalists like Akiva Elder, Gideon Levy, or Amira Haas, who are frequently critical of Israeli policy. My point is not that these critics are always right and that pro-Israel pundits are always wrong. My point is that voices like theirs are almost entirely absent from mainstream media in the United States. But even so, various pro-Israel watchdog groups monitor media coverage, organize boycotts and demonstrations against news agencies that publish or broadcast anything critical of Israel. And there's numerous examples of this taking place. Finally, last but not least, efforts to stifle criticism often include smearing critics by accusing them of being anti-Semitic. After former President Jimmy Carter published his book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid last year. Martin Peretz of The New Republic said, Carter will go down in history as a Jew-hater. A critic in The Washington Post compared Carter's views to those of David Duke's. Needless to say, such charges were routinely leveled at us after our article was published, even though there's not the slightest shred of evidence to support them. Pro-Israel groups use these smear tactics for 3 main reasons. First, to distract people from the real issue, which is American policy. Second, to deter people from criticizing Israel or criticizing the lobby itself. No sensible person wants to be labeled an anti-Semite, so some people just keep quiet. And finally, this tactic marginalizes people in the public arena. After all, what politician would want to associate with someone who's been accused even falsely, of being anti-Semitic. This works especially well in the foreign policy community where being critical of Israel will almost certainly get you into trouble professionally. What's the result of all of this? On this one issue, there's little serious debate in the United States. Little serious debate about support for Israel, especially in Congress, even when it's obvious that American Middle East policy has gone badly off the rails And in ways that are harmful to the United States and to Israel alike. To illustrate that point, Jon is now going to describe the lobby's contribution to the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq. Thank you very much.

John Mearsheimer: Steve has made the case that there is a powerful lobby out there and that it influences U.S.-Middle East policy in profound ways. I will take that analysis a step further and argue that its influence has been largely negative. In a nutshell, our argument is that the lobby, working with Israel itself, has pushed U.S.-Middle East policy in ways that are not in the American national interest. And I might add, not in Israel's interest either. I will focus on one case, the role of Israel and the lobby in the run-up to the Iraq War. There are 4 other cases that we cover in the book, but which I will not deal with because of time considerations. Number one is U.S. policy towards Israel's policies in the occupied territories; 2, U.S. policy towards Iran; 3, U.S. policy towards Syria; and 4, U.S. policy during the Lebanon War in the summer of 2006. Let me now turn to Iraq. It is manifestly clear to most Americans that the Iraq War is one of the greatest strategic blunders in American history. Our argument is that Israel, and especially the lobby, were 2 of the main driving forces behind the decision to invade Iraq. It is hard to imagine that war happening in their absence. To start with Israel, it was the only country, besides Kuwait, where both the government and a majority of the population favored the war. The Israeli government, to include Prime Minister Sharon, pushed the Bush administration hard to make sure that it did not lose its nerve in the months before the invasion. Other influential Israelis, like former prime ministers Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu, also implored the United States to take down Saddam. In fact, Israel was pushing so hard for war that its allies in the United States warned Israeli officials—

Speaker 6: Don't do it.

John Mearsheimer: to damp down their rhetoric, lest it be seen as a war for Israel. I might also add that President Clinton said in 2006 that every Israeli politician I knew thought that Saddam was so great a threat that he should be removed, even if he did not have WMD. The Israeli public was also solidly behind the war. According to a February 2003 poll, That's one month before the war started. 77.5% of Israelis said that they wanted the United States to attack Iraq. One sometimes hears the argument, as I'm sure many of you have, that Israel opposed the Iraq War and actually favored attacking Iran instead. There's no question that in early 2002, when the Israelis got wind that the Bush administration was thinking about attacking Iraq, that key Israeli officials went to Washington and made it clear that they thought that Iran was the greater enemy and that the Bush administration should focus on Tehran, not on Baghdad. It is important to emphasize, however, that Israel was not opposed to the US toppling regimes in Iraq or Syria, 2 countries that Jerusalem considers mortal enemies. Israel simply wanted the United States to deal with Iran first. But once the Israelis realized that the war party intended to deal with Iran after it finished the job in Iraq, the Israelis enthusiastically embrace the idea of invading Iraq. Thus, between early 2002 and March 2003, the Israelis put significant pressure on the Bush administration to make sure it chose war over diplomacy with Iraq, while reminding Washington at various points along the way not to forget that Iran must come After Iraq. I might add that there is no evidence that Israel warned the United States that Iraq would turn into a quagmire. Indeed, the Israelis thought that Iraq would be a cakewalk, which is why they were confident that the U.S. would be free to go after Iran right after it finished the job in Iraq. Of course, they were wrong.

Speaker 6: Thank you.

John Mearsheimer: Turning now to the lobby, there is no question that the neoconservatives, one of the core constituencies in the lobby, were the main driving force behind the war. But they were supported by key organizations in the lobby, like AIPAC. Now that the war has gone south, it is commonplace to hear Israel's supporters say that the main organizations in the lobby did not push for war. But that is not true. This point is made clear in a May 2004 editorial that appeared in The Forward, a weekly Jewish newspaper based in New York. Reading from the editorial in The Forward: As President Bush attempted to sell the war in Iraq, America's most important Jewish organizations rallied as one to his defense. In statement after statement, community leaders stressed the need to rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Concern for Israel's safety rightfully factored into the deliberations of the main Jewish groups. One sometimes hears the claim that AIPAC took no position on the Iraq War. and certainly did not advocate it. This is not true, either. First of all, this claim fails the common-sense test, as AIPAC usually supports what Israel wants, and Israel certainly wanted a war against Iraq. Second, there is hard evidence that AIPAC lobbied for the war. For example, AIPAC's executive director, Howard Kohr, told The New York Sun in January 2003— Excuse me? that one of AIPAC's successes over the past year was, quote, quietly lobbying Congress to approve the use of force in Iraq, end of quote. The neoconservatives, of course, were the main driving force behind the war. They initiated the idea of using force to topple Saddam in 2 letters written to President Clinton in early 1998. One was addressed to President Clinton, Over the next 5 years, and especially after 9/11, they pushed relentlessly for a war against Iraq. No other group or institution in the United States was seriously committed to invading Iraq over that 5-year period. Indeed, there was significant opposition to attacking Iraq, even after 9/11, within the State Department the intelligence community and the uniformed military. I might add that there is hardly any evidence that the oil companies and the oil-producing states were pushing for war with Iraq. The neoconservatives are, by their own admission, deeply committed to Israel. In fact, many of them are connected with key organizations in the lobby, like the Washington Institute for— Near East Peace, and the American Enterprise Institute. Our argument here, it should be emphasized, is not that the neoconservatives or the leaders of the lobby were pushing a war that was in Israel's interest but not in America's national interest. On the contrary, they believed that invading Iraq was good for both America and Israel. For the neoconservatives, and the lobby more generally, what is good for Israel is good for the United States, and vice versa. Although the neoconservatives were deeply committed to a war with Iraq, they could not make it happen by themselves. They failed to convince Clinton to go to Baghdad, and they had little luck selling the war in the first 8 months of of the Bush administration. It was the events of 9/11 that created the circumstances where they could help convince President Bush and Vice President Cheney that invading Iraq was a good idea. But without Bush and Cheney on board, there would not have been a war. I might add that Steve and I believe that if Al Gore had been elected president in 2000, there would not have been and Iraq War. All of this is to say that the neoconservatives were necessary to have the war, but by themselves they could not make it happen. One final point is in order about Iraq. We are sometimes accused of saying that Iraq was a Jewish war. Nothing could be further from the truth. We pointed out in the book, as we did in the article, that polls taken before the war Show that American Jews were 10% less supportive of the war than the general American public. Our argument is that the war was due in large part— not exclusively, it was due in large part— to the influence of the Israel lobby, especially the neoconservatives within it. It's not the American Jewish community. And as Steve emphasized, the lobby is defined by its political agenda.

Michael Brower: Right.

John Mearsheimer: not ethnicity or religion. Let me conclude with a brief word about what we think the U.S.-Israeli relationship should look like. To start, the United States should end its special relationship with Israel and treat it like a normal country. It should treat Israel the way it treats other democracies around the world, like Britain, France, Germany, Italy and India. In practice, this means that when Israel is acting in ways that are consistent with the American national interest, Washington should back the Jewish state. But when Israel is acting in ways that harm U.S. interests, Washington should distance itself and use its considerable leverage to get Israel to change its behavior, the way it would do with any other country that was acting in ways that might hurt the United States. Regarding Israel's conflict with the Palestinians, the United States should act as an honest broker. In other words, Washington should pursue an even-handed policy towards the 2 sides. In particular, the United States should make it clear to Israel that it must abandon the occupied territories and allow for the creation of a viable Palestinian state on those lands. Jerusalem should be told that the United States will oppose, not tolerate, Israel's colonial expansion in the West Bank. None of this is to say that the United States should abandon Israel. On the contrary, the United States should defend Israel's right to exist within its pre-1967 borders, with some minor modifications. And most importantly, if Israel's survival is threatened, the United States should come to its aid. Thank you.

Speaker 8: Thank you.

Wendy Pearlman: You're joining us at Cambridge Forum listening to Jon Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt discussing the Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy. So I get to ask the first question. And in the book you talk quite a bit about dual loyalty, so I'll ask 2 questions based on my own dual loyalties. And one is as a student of Middle East studies, and the other is as a student of political science. So, as a student of Middle East studies, you discuss quite a bit in the book and in your talk as well about anti-Semitism and also about anti-Americanism as one harmful outcome of our own country's policies in the Middle East. What you don't mention is anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiment.

Speaker 9: Yes.

Wendy Pearlman: That's so prevalent at these times in our country, especially after 9/11. Can you discuss how this anti-Arab, anti-Muslim sentiment relates to the Israel lobby, either how it allows it to operate or how people perceive the lobby or any of the themes that you discuss in the book related to public discourse on Middle East politics and public decision-making? So that's the first question. The second question, which is more about the politics of it is there's a tension in the book between what you discuss as the legitimate means of the lobby, and we currently say the legitimate means of interest group politics, as Steve said, is American pie, is as American as American pie, between these legitimate means and the destructive outcomes. So, looking more largely at American politics, are you saying that there's something gone awry with this American pie, there's something deeply wrong with with American politics, in terms of the role of money in politics, the failure of separation of powers, the ability of small groups to dictate policy that harms the interests of the majority. Students of political science, this is a classic question of the problem of collective action, that what is rational for individual American politicians obliging the lobby in order to get in office and stay there is at odds with— The interests of the majority. with what is best for the United States as a whole. So how can these two be reconciled without some major overhaul of the American political system and the role of special interests in determining political policy?

Stephen Walt: This is Steve Walt. I'm going to take the first question, and Jon will handle the second. Thank you, Wendy, for asking such easy questions. With respect to the first one on sort of the role of anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic sentiment Arab attitudes in the United States, which when you think about it aren't particularly surprising in the wake of September 11th, despite the efforts that many people have made to try and dampen those down. Let me just say a few things about it. One is I think it's important to recognize that the Muslim world is quite heterogeneous, and the Muslim population in every country that I'm familiar with is quite heterogeneous, in much the same way that I would argue that Pro-Israel groups in the United States are also somewhat heterogeneous. Some of them say favoring a 2-state solution, some of them being adamantly opposed. And it's important to recognize that heterogeneity. That said, I do think that some groups in the Israel lobby have encouraged— or some individuals have encouraged us to take a much more hostile view of the Muslim world than is warranted. People like Norman Podhoretz, who appear to be obsessed with Islamofascism. Islamofascism. It seems to me, are encouraging us to see the entire Islamic world as fundamentally hostile to us, asking us to treat the entire Muslim world as though it is all just like and in full agreement with its worst, most extreme, most violent elements, with people like Osama bin Laden. You see this also in those who argue that anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic world is driven by some great cultural clash, that it's sort of what we are, what we stand for, rather than a reaction to American policy. This flies in the face of numerous public opinion surveys that show that anti-Americanism in every part of the world, but especially in the Arab and Islamic world, is driven not so much by cultural differences, but, again, by reactions to what they regard as unjust or oppressive. Or conflictive American policies. Just one final point is, what we have to recognize here in the United States is that many of these reactions and these conflicts that we have, even with countries in those regions, is not based on some deep and irrational hatred of the United States. Again, it's based on what they regard as a real conflict of interest. For example, we now have a serious conflict with Iran.

Michael Brower: Yes.

Stephen Walt: Over Iran's nuclear ambitions, but Iran is not seeking control of the nuclear fuel cycle and possibly seeking to get nuclear weapons because it has some deep religious or cultural conflict with the United States or even with the West. If any of us, it seems to me, were in Iran's position, we would be thinking seriously about wanting to have a nuclear deterrent, because after all, the world's most powerful country has declared that it wants regime change in that.

Speaker 6: Right.

Stephen Walt: In that country. If I were Iran, I would be worrying about my own security, and I'd be thinking about getting a nuclear capability, too. I should just add, I think Iran's nuclear ambitions are a problem, and a problem we ought to be addressing, but we ought to be addressing it by seeing it as a conflict of interest, not by assuming that the Muslim world is fundamentally hostile to us, not by assuming that there is some deep cultural clash, not by assuming that they hate us for what we are. Rather, it's much more what we do.

John Mearsheimer: This is Jon Elmer, and I will take Wendy's second question. She pointed out that it seems to be the case that small groups using legitimate political means seem to have the ability to sometimes produce bad policy outcomes. I think that's true, and I think it's endemic to the American political system, as she hinted in her question. As most of you know, interest group politics have been at the heart of the American political system since the founding of this country. And in any political system where interest groups punch above their weight, what you're going to discover is that small groups of smart and well-organized and well-funded individuals can have an influence on policy that leads to outcomes that would not be the outcome of the body politic at large if it could vote. Let's just take the National Rifle Association and put aside the Israel lobby. If the American people could vote on gun control, there's no question that we'd have serious gun control legislation in this country. The reason that we don't have serious gun control legislation is because of the power of the National Rifle Association, which is a small and very powerful interest group. And the NRA, by the way, acts in legitimate ways. There's nothing conspiratorial about the NRA. It's not an organization that is acting in an unlawful way. It's playing the game of American politics in the same way that The AARP, the farm lobby, the Israel lobby, and the Cuban lobby play the game. But I would argue, and I know Steve agrees with me, that the gun control legislation that we don't have in this country is a bad policy outcome. I would argue that the farm policy that we have in this country is a bad outcome, and it's due in large part to the effect of these special interest groups. And Steve and I are basically arguing the same thing about the Israel lobby.

Mark Sarnaki: Yes.

John Mearsheimer: It is pushing policies that we believe are not in America's interest or not in Israel's interest. But it's not because they're behaving like a cabal or a conspiracy or any of this kind of nonsense. It's because they're operating in a political system where sometimes interest groups produce outcomes that are not in the interest of the body politic as a whole.

Wendy Pearlman: So what can be done about it?

John Mearsheimer: Oh, that's exactly— that was my last point. You hit the nail— this is Jon Elmer again. Wendy hit the nail right on the head again. Nothing can be done about it unless we fundamentally alter the nature of the political system, which is not going to happen. The only thing that would matter on the margins, I think, is campaign finance reform. If we were to publicly fund all elections, it would take some of the power away from all of these interest groups. But I don't think that's going to happen either. So this is going to be the story of the game for the foreseeable future, whether you're talking about The NRA, the AARP, or the Cuban lobby.

Stephen Walt: This is Steve Walt. I would just add to what John said, that we do think, and sometimes you can correct policies that aren't optimal by getting a more open discussion of them in the body politic, and that's why we wrote this book.

Wendy Pearlman: Welcome to Cambridge Forum. As we continue our discussion with John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of the Kennedy School of Government, At Harvard University discussing the Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy. At this point in the program, we'll take questions from the audience. Please line up, as many of you already have, at the microphone. No speeches, please. No long comments. Please be concise in respect for the many other people who also have questions.

Speaker 6: Thank you for this program. Can you come a little closer to the microphone? Winston Churchill said that Britain does not have permanent enemies or friends, only permanent interests. So the question is, is this the interest of so-called, quote unquote, empire? Of course it's not. This is the interest of Israel that is pushed upon United States, that if you follow us, we are going to get rid of, you know, everyone said otherwise. So what is their policy? I think it should be clearly said that people don't be confused. For example, this slogan of no blood for oil, I think, is totally wrong, and the emphasis is totally wrong, because what they have—

Wendy Pearlman: Answer the question, please.

Speaker 6: The interest is— I have to explain a little bit. Israel wants to To divide, to draw the map of the Middle East. And the first thing is that Iran, as you said, they really, they have in mind is Iran, that divide—

Wendy Pearlman: You can move into a question now, please.

Speaker 6: Excuse me. I mean, this is— what's the purpose of that?

Speaker 11: No, no, no.

Wendy Pearlman: It's time for question and answers.

Zinovi Beeman: Okay.

Speaker 6: So American people must be strong and stay opposed to this policy and ask the government To discard this policy and do not wage another war. This is the interest of Israel, the state of Israel.

Wendy Pearlman: OK. No, please, will you ask your question?

Speaker 6: Interest of the Israeli on American expense, OK?

Michael Brower: OK.

Speaker 6: So, and also by this policy—

Wendy Pearlman: No, I'm afraid—

Stephen Walt: Look at all the people behind you.

Wendy Pearlman: No, I'm—

Speaker 6: I'm—

Stephen Walt: There's lots of people behind you.

John Mearsheimer: Come on.

Speaker 6: I'm sorry. I mean, you have to be—

John Mearsheimer: No, it's not— it's not fair.

Speaker 13: No, well, thank you—

John Mearsheimer: It's not fair. Let's not answer the question.

Speaker 6: Let's just say next question. Please, please.

Wendy Pearlman: No, well, thank you. Thank you for your comments. We'll ask Jon Mershheimer and Stephen Walt to comment now on the comments you made.

John Mearsheimer: Thank you.

Wendy Pearlman: Jon and Steve, would you like to comment at all on—

John Mearsheimer: No, I think we should go to the next question.

Wendy Pearlman: OK, terrific.

John Mearsheimer: My question ends in a question mark. In George Washington's farewell address, he devoted, I think, 5 paragraphs to admonishing the young country about entering into entangled alliances, saying that we would end up abandoning our own values, like maybe civil rights, we would adopt the enemies of a country that we have no natural quarrel with. And so my question really is, are we there yet? Is this an example of, in your view as academics, of what he was predicting? Thank you.

Stephen Walt: Yeah, I think that there's— the question referred to George Washington's Farewell Address and his concern that we might become too heavily tied to any single country. And I think that this is a case where Not only has the United States adopted a special relationship towards Israel that's no longer in our interests, but rather one where we would be better allies for Israel if, in fact, we had a more normal relationship. At the conclusion of the book, we actually talk explicitly about having a more normal relationship that was more conditional. And when you think about it, right, that's what a friend does for its friends. You don't support your friends unconditionally when you think your friends are doing something that's not in your interest and not in their own interest, you tell them so and you try to persuade them to behave differently. Right now, because in our view the political influence of these various pro-Israel groups, it's become virtually impossible for American politicians to criticize Israel, to put any meaningful pressure on Israel, or even for foreign policy elites to have much of an open discussion of this subject. This is not good for the United States, but more importantly, it's not good for Israel, because we're not able to be a good ally that can occasionally tell the Israelis when they're doing something that's not smart for them either.

John Mearsheimer: Just one very quick addition to this, tying my comment back to Wendy's original question about interest groups. Not only is America a country where interest groups have been embedded in the political process from the beginning, but it's an immigrant culture. And what we have coming into the country over time are large numbers of different immigrant groups. And those immigrant groups invariably, when they get to the United States, form interest groups and weigh in in the political process. And one of the most interesting stories that's been in the newspapers recently— I'm sure many of you have seen this— is how the Indian American lobby is beginning to imitate AIPAC and push the United States in a pro-India direction in ways that AIPAC pushes the United States in a pro-Israel direction. So again, Wendy, I don't think this process is going to end anytime soon.

Speaker 11: Thank you for your book. I have 2 questions. First one is, much of your analysis has been true for some decades. So my question is, why now are you writing this book? I mean, I understand that it's in overdrive now, the pro-Israel lobby's impact. So that's my first question. My second question is, How do you factor into your thinking the arms manufacturers and military and security-related industries and corporate interests that profit so much from ongoing violence and conflict in the Middle East and their influence on our foreign policy?

Stephen Walt: This is Steve Walt. I'll take the first one. Jon gets the easy question. We didn't write the book 20 or 30 years ago because we're not that old. But more importantly, we began thinking about America's position in the Middle East, like many other Americans, in the aftermath of September 11th. Both of us had written on Middle East topics at various points in the past, but we began to focus a great deal on it. And one of the things we realized pretty quickly was that our policy was being heavily driven by the power of groups like AIPAC and others, and that we were not going to be able to have a more effective Middle East policy that might attenuate some of the problems we were facing if we didn't start to address that. And we decided that we would write this because we were in positions where we thought we could do so and actually get a reasonably fair hearing. So that's why we did it. And that's why we did it now.

John Mearsheimer: With regard to the influence of arms merchants, or what's sometimes called the military-industrial complex, and corporate interests— and here we're talking about oil— It seems intuitively plausible when you think about U.S. foreign policy in general and U.S. Middle East policy in particular that the military-industrial complex and the oil companies and the oil-producing states must be driving the policy. It's hard to believe that they're not at least as powerful as Israel and the Israel lobby, if not more powerful. If you look at the general policy of the United States in the region, it's very hard to see where the oil companies are influencing it in major ways, as hard as that may be to believe. And, in fact, I think you could make an argument that if the oil companies and the oil-producing states were driving U.S. Middle East policy, we would have a A fundamentally different set of policies. First of all, we would not have invaded Iraq, because, as you know, the oil companies want to jump in bed with Saddam Hussein and make money. The oil-producing states, save for maybe Kuwait, were not pushing for this war at all. In fact, they were trying to discourage the Bush administration from going to war. With regard to Iran, the oil companies are not clamoring for us to use military force against Iran. They're not. Again, they just want to make money, and if anything, they'd be calling for ending sanctions against Iran. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I think if you could take away the Israel lobby and put the oil-producing states and the oil companies in charge of American foreign policy, you would see that we'd do a 180-degree switch on our policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So I just don't see much interest there.

Speaker 13: Okay.

John Mearsheimer: My final point on this is that both Steve and I are realists, and we've developed all these theories over the years which are consistent with the argument that American foreign policy is based on geostrategic considerations like oil. So we have a vested interest in believing that oil and economic considerations and geopolitical considerations of a broader sort are driving this. Yes, not the Israel lobby. But the fact of the matter is, when you look at the Iraq War, as I said in my formal presentation, and when you look more generally at U.S. Middle East policy, it's just very hard to see that corporate interests and the military-industrial complex have much influence.

Speaker 14: My question has to do with what may be a contradiction in what you said in ignoring certain You have stated— you, I mean both of you, or one of you— you have stated that United States should come to the aid of Israel if Israel was in danger. But to the credit of both current and the past president of Iran, they were telling the truth. They were not like Hitler, which are unfairly accused, because Hitler tried to conceal what he intended to do, both presidents of Iran stated very clearly and honestly, to their credit, that Israel should be destroyed. Moreover, there was a clear statement that they are willing to sacrifice 20 million Muslims to destroy Israel. You ignored that question, 'cause you said if Israel's in danger. Moreover, they stated one bomb will finish off Israel, probably 3 bombs.

Speaker 11: Yes.

Speaker 14: But anyway—

Wendy Pearlman: Your question, sir, please.

Speaker 14: Yes. So my question is, do you see the contradiction between you saying America should come to Israel's help and this? And I also have a question about the Congress, which you treat as pushovers of the lobby, as a bunch of idiots or corrupt people who sell America's Israel to a small—

Speaker 6: to a lobby.

Speaker 11: Thank you.

John Mearsheimer: I'll take the second one.

Stephen Walt: With respect to the first question, is Israel really in jeopardy? First, I would remind everybody that Israel has the strongest conventional army in the Middle East, and it has several hundred nuclear weapons of its own. This famous statement by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which is frequently mistranslated as wiping Israel off the map, what he actually said— and this is an allusion to an old speech by Khomeini— was that Israel should be erased from the page of time, a nice poetic way of saying that the Jewish state in Israel should go out of existence the same way that, say, the Soviet Union went out of existence as a political regime, or the same way that the Shah's regime fell. It was not saying that Iran was going to attack Israel. It's not saying that Iran was going to attack Israel with nuclear weapons if Iran ever gets Nuclear weapons. Now, I find Ahmadinejad's statement objectionable in the extreme. I find his Holocaust denial even more bizarre and objectionable. But we ought to be clear on what he was saying. He was saying he thinks the state should go out of existence and be replaced by some other kind of government there, not that the— he was not calling for the physical destruction of Israel. And by the way, I have seen no evidence that any Iranian Even if they had nuclear weapons, wants the entire Iranian society to commit suicide, which is what an attack on Israel would entail, given Israel's own nuclear deterrent and given the fact that we are allied with Israel and we have thousands of nuclear weapons of our own. So I do not believe Israel's security and survival is in jeopardy. Like all countries, Israel has some security problems, but they are, I think, completely manageable.

Speaker 15: Thank you.

Stephen Walt: Completely manageable security problems, and if Israel's survival is ever in jeopardy, as Jon and I already said, then the United States should come to its aid. None of those things, by the way, mean giving Israel unconditional support for everything it wants to do.

John Mearsheimer: With regard to your second question about us essentially saying that Congress is a bunch of idiots or pushovers or they're corrupt, that's, I think, I think that's not an accurate statement of what we were saying. Our argument is that in a system that privileges interest group politics, you're often going to find cases where powerful interest groups force legislators on Capitol Hill to sign on to policies that they otherwise would not sign on to.

Speaker 15: Hello. I have been in print and in speech highly critical of Israel policy. So I would like that to be known so that later on after I'm done with my question, you don't assume that I'm part of the Israel lobby speaking here. But I would— I'm speaking as a journalist and as somebody, let's say, who's involved in observing political science. And I'm amazed by the— I have no other way of putting this— very sloppy process of research and analysis that you have employed both in your book and here tonight, which skips over volumes and volumes of research and analysis to connect the war in Iraq with a $100 million lobby that supports a $4 billion investment on part of U.S. government in Israel.

Zinovi Beeman: Per year.

Speaker 15: Per year, instead of, let's say, the oil interest, which happens to be the single biggest business in the world, or the military-industry— industry-military— sorry, military-industrial complex in the United States, and you simply ignore that right before we went to war in Iraq, we went to war in Afghanistan, which was awarded I didn't see in your book or in this speech tonight you connecting with the Israel lobby at all. And my second question— I'm sorry— which is very related, is that don't you feel that by so haphazardly connecting a war that has many, many influences and many, many repercussions for the American people, so haphazardly connecting it with Israel, you're very irresponsibly placing the entire blame on Israel and therefore contributing to anti-Israeli and subsequently anti-Semitic feelings in this country?

John Mearsheimer: This is Jon Elmer. I'll take this question. First of all, on the business of sloppy research, it's one of the charges that's often leveled at us. And Steve and I have each written 3 books and countless articles, and nobody Who has read any of those books or articles has ever accused us of sloppy scholarship. Do you really think that when we decided to, as Steve put it, grab the third rail with both hands, that we decided at that point to let our guard down and do sloppy research? Second, do you think that Farrar, Straus and Giroux, which is our publisher and is one of the most distinguished publishing houses in the United States, would allow us to produce a sloppy book? Don't you think that when we were producing that book, Steve, me, and the folks at Farrar, Straus and Giroux, that we went to enormous lengths to get the story right because we knew we'd be accused of sloppy scholarship? This is not to say there's not a mistake or two in the book. No two human beings can write a book of that length and not make a mistake or two. But I think that the argument that this is sloppy scholarship does not hold water. And I think if you look carefully at the reviews of the book, nobody has made, in a systematic and fair-minded way, the case that it is sloppy research. That's not to say you have to agree with our conclusions, but it's not sloppy. With regard to the oil interests and the military-industrial complex, as I said before, there's just not any evidence, or there's just not much evidence out there, that they drive U.S.-Middle East policy. policy, as hard as that may be to believe. And I would invite those who doubt what I have to say to go out and research the subject yourself. And if you can convince me otherwise, I'm certainly willing to buy your argument, 'cause it'll support my previous scholarship. With regard to Afghanistan, we did not argue, as the questioner pointed out, that Afghanistan was caused in any way by the Israel lobby. That's not true. Not every war in American history was caused by the Israel lobby. We would not be foolish enough to make any such argument. And furthermore, we're not making the argument with regard to Iraq, to use the questioner's rhetoric, that the entire blame for that war rests on the lobby and on Israel. Our argument was that that the lobby by itself could not make the war happen. President Bush and Vice President Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, 3 individuals who were not in the Israel lobby, were necessary to make that war happen. I want to be perfectly clear on it. Our argument is that nevertheless, the lobby, especially the neoconservatives, were a main driving force.

Wendy Pearlman: Right.

John Mearsheimer: They were a necessary but not sufficient condition. And again, look at the book if you have any doubts about this. There is a lot of evidence to this effect. And a good number of people, including people like Philip Zelikow, who has worked for Condoleezza Rice, and Wesley Clark and former Senator Hollings, have said that the war was due in large part to the CIA. And I think that's a very important point. the efforts of the Israel lobby. This is not that controversial an argument. And when you take into account that most Americans, especially those who were pushing for the war, like the neoconservatives, thought this was a cakewalk, it's not hard to understand why that's the case.

Michael Brower: My name is Michael Brower. I love to be a critic. I'm sorry I haven't yet read your book, so I have to be Addressing your speeches tonight. And I sat there, and unfortunately I couldn't find anything to disagree with or to criticize or to question except your language. And what I object to, and I want you to start thinking seriously about changing your language in one respect, over and over again you use the phrase neoconservatives and neocons, which is their own choice of language to put respectability on what they do, that inner group of 25 you spoke of. I submit— you don't have to buy my language, but please think of your own separate language— they're not conservatives, they're not neocons, they're reactionaries. They're radical reactionaries. And worse, they're imperialists.

Mark Sarnaki: They're imperialists.

Michael Brower: So my own term for them is incompetent imperialists— —and radical reactionaries.

Mark Sarnaki: Thank you.

Michael Brower: There's very little we can do, you say, given the interest group politics in the United States. Well, one thing we can do is get our language straight and not get sucked in by them. One last point is, why do you say Colin Powell didn't support this war? I sat and I watched his magnificent speech to the UN, and he almost convinced me. Thank you.

Stephen Walt: You want to take Poland-Belgium? I'm not sure what to say. This is Steve Walt. I'm not sure how to respond to that. I'm not— I don't think I'm going to abandon the label neoconservative, even though I accept the fact that they are not conservative, they're radicals. But certainly the track record of the foreign policy they have produced to date validates the use of the term incompetent. And the most amazing thing is, given the track record, the results they have achieved over the last 5 or 6 years, what I find truly remarkable is that anyone is taking their advice seriously on other things, like what to do about Iran.

John Mearsheimer: Just very quickly on Colin Powell— this is Jon Mearsheimer speaking— he clearly thought the war was a bad idea. But once President Bush, who was his boss, decided for war in early January and told him that a war was in effect going to happen, he went along as a good soldier. One can argue that that's right or wrong, but I think that's effectively what happened.

Zinovi Beeman: Hi, my name is Zinovi Beeman. I know, and it's written in many books, that every people, every country deserves their government, especially here in this country, which is an elected government in the independent democracy of the United States. By the way, Israel is not an independent democracy. So are you planning, or have you done, asking American government. It's a mammoth project, but you can ask the members of the government, did the Israeli lobby, as you outline in your book, was instrumental in their decision to go into war? It's one question.

Wendy Pearlman: Quickly, sir, please.

Zinovi Beeman: Walter once wrote, if Jews would have their state, ever get their state, They would sell it. So, it's— you say that you are not anti-Israel and you are not anti-Jewish, you claim. But why do all anti-Semites and all anti-Israel bigots are in favor of your book?

Wendy Pearlman: Okay, thank you.

Zinovi Beeman: Thank you.

John Mearsheimer: I'll do the second.

Stephen Walt: Okay. I'm not sure I understood the first question, but I'll give it a shot. We did talk to a number of people in Washington about this. Needless to say, there is a methodological issue. If you go to any politician in Washington and say, did you support the war of Iraq because of pressure from a domestic special interest group, you're not going to find very many people who will say out loud, yes, I did. I thought it was a bad idea, but I caved I was just misled. So you're not always going to find that kind of smoking gun evidence when you interview people. There are a few cases where you do find it, and we include those in the book. But you're not going to find that many cases. Nonetheless, I think there was considerable evidence we were able to present showing both the positions of people who were advocating for it and the effects had on the policymaking process. And I think people are simply going to have to read the book. And I would just emphasize, by the way, you don't want to just read the Iraq chapter. There's lots of other cases in there that illustrate the same sorts of things that we were talking about. I will let Jon take the second question, but if he misses anything, I'll come back.

John Mearsheimer: Yeah. The second question had to do with why to— Repeat the questioner's rhetoric. All anti-Israel bigots love our book. First of all, I don't know how many anti-Israel bigots are out there, and I don't know that they all love our book. I think the good news is that there is not much anti-Semitism in the United States. There are not many, many David Dukes out there. But I want to be very clear that Steve and I condemn those anti-Semites, and we are troubled by the fact that they like our book. But the fact is, is anybody here who has written a book or an article knows you don't have any control over who likes your book or who dislikes your book. But I think that it is possible that many of these anti-Semites like our book, not because they've been reading our book, but because they've been reading the reviews of our book, which misrepresent the book. See, it's very important to understand that all sorts of reviewers of our book— these are by and large people closely associated with the Israel lobby— say that we are accusing Jews in America of conducting a conspiracy or a cabal. Now, as Steve and I have made it perfectly clear, we are saying no such thing. But for some reason, our critics keep repeating that foolish argument. I can't understand why. I think that these people are just having real trouble reading the book. But nevertheless, you could understand how someone like David Duke, when he reads Abe Foxman's comments on our book, comes to the conclusion that we're making the sorts of arguments that David Duke loves to hear. But it's very important that you go away tonight realizing that we do not make any such arguments, and indeed we condemn the David Dukes of the world who make those foolish arguments about conspiracies and cabals. Thank you.

Wendy Pearlman: We have just about 15 minutes left, so—

Speaker 8: It's been noted elsewhere on more than one occasion that the reaction to your book comes as much not only from what you said, but perhaps even more from the fact that you said it. It's one of these rare occasions where someone from within the establishment is saying things that many outside the establishment have been saying all along for many years. I noticed here tonight that you keep repeating that these policies are bad for the United States and Israel, but you never mentioned that they're even better or worse for Palestinians.

John Mearsheimer: That's correct.

Speaker 8: So it makes me wonder whether the doubts that are starting to creep into certain sectors of the establishment are based more on tactical considerations than they are on moral considerations. And what does this say not only about the moral turpitude of American foreign policy over the last half century in the Middle East, but of American foreign policy in general?

Wendy Pearlman: Thank you.

Stephen Walt: Thank you. Yeah, I'll take a swing at that. I mean, Jon and I, as he's already indicated, are thought of as realists, and we're pretty comfortable talking about strategic interests. That's what we were trained to do. I am not a moral philosopher, so I don't consider myself to have— excuse me, let me finish. All right. Now, that— so I don't consider myself to have any enormous expertise. That said, I think it's clear if you read our book that we are deeply troubled by actions both by the United States and by Israel and by some of Israel's adversaries that we regard as patently immoral, that we think the way the Palestinians have been treated is reprehensible. We think if Israel is entitled to its own state, Then the Palestinians are entitled to their own state, as well. And they certainly don't deserve 40 years of occupation, often involving quite brutal treatment. We think that that's a policy that's indefensible for the United States to be backing. And we tried to make that clear, as well. I'd have to think a little bit longer about whether or not I wanted to sort of cast a grand moral condemnation on all of American foreign policy. Right. Foreign policy. But I'll just say the following. I think all countries, including all great powers, have done pretty horrible things, because I think we're all flawed as human beings, and the leaders of great countries make big mistakes sometimes. And sometimes those mistakes are deeply immoral. And Americans are not immune to that problem either. So, again, I'm not going to say that we're worse. I think in some respects, by the standards of great powers, the United States Has done reasonably well, but we're by no means perfect.

John Mearsheimer: Can I just say a word or two? 'Cause— this is John Mearsheimer— 'cause it is an excellent question. As a realist, I believe that sometimes moral and strategic considerations are at odds. And in those cases, states invariably pursue what's in their strategic interests. In other words, strategic interests Trump moral considerations. And there are plenty of examples of that in American foreign policy over time, which would be grist for your mill. But what's very interesting, in my opinion, about this particular case— and here we're talking about American policy towards Israel and the Palestinians— is that it is a beautiful case where strategic imperatives and moral imperatives are lined up. It's in America's strategic interest And Steve and I also believe it's in Israel's strategic interests to end the occupation and create a viable Palestinian state. It is also, as you alluded to, the morally correct thing to do, both for the United States and for Israel. This occupation is a strategic and moral disaster for Israel, even more so for Israel than it is for the United States. So this is a case— I'm sorry. Yeah, I was going to get to that. You're 100% correct. You're 100% correct on that.

Wendy Pearlman: Thank you.

Speaker 13: Yes, I just want to say that if I were you, I wouldn't be talking about what's in Israel's interests, because that sounds a bit condescending. And for myself, I don't really care what's in Israel's interests. I care what's in America's interests. Thank you, Chris. And the thing is that why are we concerned about Iran now? I mean, why not just let Israel be concerned about Iran? They're the one— they claim that Iran is a threat to them. Why should we have any concern for that? Why should we have any concern for ensuring Israel's existence? I don't see why that's any of the United States' business or why it helps the United States to ensure Israel's existence. And do you favor withdrawing funding for Israel so we have more money here for our own domestic needs?

John Mearsheimer: Thank you.

Stephen Walt: I'll take part of that question. This is Steve Walt, and Jon will take the parts I leave out. I think I'm going to leave the Iran question here. We, in our book, focus primarily on the American national interest, but we talk at times about these policies not being in Israel's interest, because we recognize That many Americans do have a strong attachment to Israel. And as an immigrant society, as Jon alluded to a while back, many Americans have attachments to countries, other countries, in addition to the United States. It doesn't mean they're disloyal. It just means that for various different reasons, they also feel strongly about some other country. And that's perfectly fine. It's perfectly fine to manifest that kind of an attachment in politics. And what we want people who are ardently —attached to Israel, as well as being loyal to the United States, to think about is whether or not the policies that some of them have been advocating have been good for Israel. Right? We can make the arguments they've not been good for us, but we also believe that they've not been good for Israel as well. And we want to plant that thought in people's minds and, again, make that part of the conversation as well. On the question of American support for Israel, I think it ought to be conditional on Israeli politics.

Michael Brower: Right.

Stephen Walt: They don't need the support nearly as much as they might once have needed it. And one could argue how much it was ever needed. But as I indicated in my remarks, Israel is now a relatively prosperous country, and it will be even more prosperous once it has a final peace settlement with the Palestinians and with the rest of its neighbors. So it no longer, I think, needs the $3 to $4 billion a year that it gets as aid.

Speaker 6: Thank you.

Stephen Walt: as aid from the American taxpayer, and I would like to see that gradually decline, you know, not cut it off instantly, but I would like to see it gradually decline over a period of years as part of, you know, again, a final peace settlement there.

John Mearsheimer: This is Jon Meersheimer. With regard to the question on Iran, the United States would care about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons even if there was no state of Israel. And there are 2 reasons for that. One is that we care greatly about nuclear proliferation. In particular, we care greatly about limiting nuclear proliferation. You all remember in May 1998, when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, the United States effectively went bonkers. We did not like this at all. So the fact that we care about nuclear proliferation means that we would worry about what Iran is up to, regardless of whether or not there was a state of Israel in the system. Secondly, we would care because the Middle East, or the Persian Gulf, is an area of great strategic interest to the United States, and the United States cares greatly about the balance of power in that region. And there's one state that we worry about more than any other one, and that's Iran, because it is— —the most powerful state in the region. The only state in the Gulf that has the potential to become a regional hegemon, and the United States does not want that to happen. And if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and no other state in the Gulf had nuclear weapons, that would matter in terms of the local balance of power. So we would care anyway. Where Israel really comes into play on the Iranian nuclear issue is that both the state of Israel itself And large portions of the lobby are the main driving forces behind using military force to deal with the Iranian nuclear problem. This is a situation that's somewhat analogous to what we saw in the run-up to the Iraq War. It's basically the same cast of characters who were pushing for going to war against Iran, who were pushing for going to war— —against Iraq. against Iraq. And I believe that if you could take Israeli pressure and pressure from the lobby, especially the neoconservatives, out of the equation, there would be very little talk in the United States today about using military force against Iran. And that would certainly be all for the good.

Mark Sarnaki: My name is Mark Sarnaki. I'm from Norwood. I'm a naturalized American citizen. And the reason I reached out for your book is that my son was in Iraq in 2003, and I and my wife spent many sleepless, agonizing nights, you know, just thinking, you know, why he could die. He didn't die. He's now out of military. So thank you for this book, gentlemen. But I have one practical question. I'm an engineer, by the way. In your conclusions, you ask a fundamental question. What needs to be done. And I'm asking you as a citizen, how should I vote? Because if I have to choose between Rudy Giuliani and Norman Podhoretz and Hillary Clinton, I see it's hopeless. It's hopeless. Our country— What do you think they're going to do? Our country— I don't want to make a statement, but our country is losing moral compass, you know. If we look at these atrocities which were committed, you know, and we see what's going on, Tell me, tell me, please. How should I vote?

Stephen Walt: Thank you. Thank you.

Mark Sarnaki: Um, I let everybody know that we can use writings, right? We can use writings. We don't have to choose candidates which are like in my previous communist countries were given to me. We have writings. We can write George Washington, Jefferson.

Wendy Pearlman: Thank you.

Speaker 6: The question is.

Stephen Walt: Yeah. I'm tempted, given some of the reactions to our book, to endorse the candidate I want not to win and hope that that gets that particular candidate in trouble. I'm actually not going to endorse a candidate. I don't know if Jon's going to want to or not. But I think if you— if the argument of our book is basically right, It's not going to matter which of the, let's call them mainstream candidates, wins. That American Middle East policy will continue to be heavily shaped by these institutions and organizations until we get a broader range of opinion represented on these subjects and until some of these organizations get a little less influence. Or, and this is what we say in the conclusion of the book, we remind everybody that what we think of as the Israel lobby is a heterogeneous group of organizations. They agree on wanting to maintain the special relationship, but they don't agree on everything. One of the big problems now is that many of the policies that the most influential and powerful organizations in the lobby are pushing are some of the more hardline and extreme ones. And there are more moderate groups within the so-called Israel lobby or pro-Israel community whose views are much more sensible. There would be nothing wrong with having a politically influential pro-Israel community in the United States if it were pushing politicians to adopt a sensible set of policies. So, again, the problem is not the fact that there's a powerful lobby. The fact is that the— the problem is that that powerful lobby has been pushing for a confrontational approach to most of the Middle East and against a 2-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians. If we had a lobby that was pushing the other way, I'd probably be supporting it.

John Mearsheimer: Sir? Hi. I was at your presentation at MIT earlier this month and asked a question that you either failed or refused to answer. And I want to ask it again, because I think it gets to the heart of the— of what this discussion is actually about. Do you believe it is possible for somebody in good faith, in good conscience, who's looking at the evidence to come to a different conclusion about what U.S. policy ought to be? Of course. Then what's the point of your book? Are you asserting that the people who are in favor of a policy that's different from yours are acting in bad faith?

Stephen Walt: No, we think they're wrong, but they're not acting in bad faith. This is America, where we debate policies, we debate disagreements, and we see who can win the debate. One of our objections is that there hasn't been much of a debate on this policy in the United States, 'cause anytime people try to raise this, they immediately get accused of being anti-Semitic. Right? So we haven't had much of an open discourse in the United States. We don't have very many people representing the Palestinian views on the pages of The New York Times or The Washington Post.

Speaker 6: Yeah.

Stephen Walt: Jimmy Carter is one example, and look what happened to Jimmy Carter, right? Jimmy Carter gets accused of being a Jew-hater, right? So, but we're not— we do not believe our critics are acting in bad faith. We think they're wrong.

John Mearsheimer: Jimmy Carter didn't pursue the policy that you're advocating when he was president. And George Bush Senior didn't pursue the policy that you're advocating when he was president. President Eisenhower didn't pursue the same policy. So what is your point? But what is your point? The point is that you're claiming that this policy hasn't been pursued, yet at least 3 presidents have tried it. They've all failed.

Stephen Walt: Actually, if you look at Shlomo Ben-Ami's book, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace— he's the former Israeli foreign minister— he points out that the 2 presidents who made the greatest contribution to Israeli-Arab peace were Jimmy Carter and George Bush the Elder. And he— this is Ben-Ami, not me saying it— he says they were successful in doing this because they were willing to take on the Israel lobby. So, yes, we agree with you. If more presidents were willing to take on the Israel lobby, we'd actually make more progress towards peace. That's certainly what Ben-Ami was arguing.

Wendy Pearlman: And we're just about out of time, so I think this will have This is going to have to be our last question.

Speaker 9: First of all, I'd like a little bit of— can you hear me? I'd like a little bit of clarification. I don't speak Farsi or read Farsi. I've read numerous translations of President— I use that term advisedly— Ahmadinejad of Iran in his comments about wiping Israel off the map. I assume you speak Farsi and read Farsi fluently. But considering the fact that his remarks came at the confluence of installing 3,000 centrifuges to produce fissionable material, his Holocaust denial conference, and preceding his presidency, the moderate President Rafsanjani's nuclear threats against Israel as well, I'm a bit puzzled by your absolute certainty that this was not an ominous and existential threat That's number one.

John Mearsheimer: Could you just specify what the nuclear threats against Israel were?

Mark Sarnaki: Yes.

Speaker 9: I refer anybody here to Google Rafsanjani, Israel, and nuclear, and you will find specific ominous nuclear threats that the former president of Iran made against Israel. You can check it. But secondly, my second question is— and I want to be brief—

Wendy Pearlman: We're just about out of time.

Speaker 9: How do you explain the very broad trashing of your book by respected analysts from journals as diverse as The New York Times, The New Yorker, The New Republic, and institutions like the Council on Foreign Relations, which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered pro-Israel or neoconservative.

Wendy Pearlman: Thank you, sir.

Speaker 9: Specifically, specifically, specifically, Walter Russell Mead, in a recent review, and I quote, called your work Remarkably slipshod handling of evidence. And also Benny Morris, who you rely on in your book quite substantially, and his— wait, his comment was, and I quote, Walt and Mearsheimer are outrageously incorrect historical asserters, and they provide very voluminous footnotes to that.

Speaker 14: Right.

Speaker 9: If your book is so rock solid in its scholarship, how do you explain these very respected Thank you.

John Mearsheimer: I'll take the second one.

Stephen Walt: Yeah. The— with respect to— I was right before— Please, ma'am, please. I think the question was directed at us. The— with respect to Ahmadinejad— With respect to Ahmadinejad's statement, again, I stand by what I said earlier. It's in the book, and the sources we used for the correct translation— this was actually heavily debated in a number of places, and I think there's actually no real disagreement about what he actually said. And as I indicated, I found that remark and his Holocaust denial deeply objectionable, as well. I already also indicated that I think it's It's easy to understand Iran's interest in a nuclear capability, given the strategic environment that it faces. And I don't think this is based on the ambition to one day launch nuclear bombs at Israel. Jon's going to take the other question.

John Mearsheimer: With regard to the gentleman's comments about the negative reviews of our work in the United States, there's no question that the book has gotten almost universal condemnation here in the United States. And the response to the article, which came out in March 2006, was not much different. First of all, with regard to the article, Steve and I wrote an 80-page response to all the criticisms that were laid out by individuals like Benny Morris, who the questioner referenced And his comments. And for anyone who is interested in reading our responses, you can go to the website that FSG has established for our book, and Setting the Record Straight is there. And I believe we set up and knocked down virtually all of those criticisms, including Benny Morris's.

Stephen Walt: That's— by the way, that's www.israellobbybook.com.

John Mearsheimer: Right. So we dealt with the sort of first wave of criticisms. With regard to the more recent ones, anybody who reads our book would predict that we would be clobbered in the United States and that we would get actually quite good reviews outside of the United States. And surprise of surprises, that's almost exactly what's happened.

Speaker 13: Right.

John Mearsheimer: We get clobbered everywhere, or almost everywhere, in the United States. And I would say that we've gotten about 8 major reviews in Britain, and 7 of them are very positive, and one of them is so-so, but nothing like the United States. And where is the best, the most favorable review we got? Where did that come from? It comes from Israel itself. Wow. It's written by Yuri Avnery, who's actually invited us to Israel, and we plan to go there this spring. It's called Two Knights and a Dragon, and you can Google it and read it. Furthermore, furthermore, two of the best reviews we've gotten have been in Haaretz, the New York Times of Israel. Daniel Levy's review in Haaretz is long and very favorable. MJ Rosenberg has also written a piece in Haaretz. That is very favorable. What's really remarkable here is that this book has been received much more favorably in Israel, which is not to say that everybody in Israel agrees with it. And go back— to go back to a previous questioner, we didn't write the book because we expected everybody to roll over and say, we agree with Jon and Steve, end of story. We wrote the book to generate a discussion, to generate debate. And the fact that people disagree with All right. That's fine. But again, to get back to the reviews, what is truly remarkable here is that we get slammed at every place in the United States, and we get treated very differently overseas. And you, of course, all know the reason— the lobby.