James Petras Primer - Zionism (with Norm Finkelstein) (2007), Latin America (2009)

Hagit Bourer: Welcome to Radio Intifada, voices from Calcutta to Casablanca, voices of struggle, voices for change. We are broadcasting on KPFK 90.7 FM in Los Angeles, 98.7 in Santa Barbara, and streaming live at www.kpfk.org. I'm Hagit Bourer. There's little question in anybody's mind of the special relationship between Israel and the United States. Israel is the largest recipient of American foreign aid, to the tune of more than $3 billion a year, plus miscellaneous additional aid in surplus weaponry, debt waivers, and other perks. Israel is the only country that receives its entire aid in the beginning of the fiscal year, allowing it to accrue interest on it during the year. It's the only country that is allowed to spend up to 25% of its— 25% of its defense budget. Aid outside the United States, placing such expenditures outside U.S. control. Apart from financial support, the United States had offered unwavering support for the Israeli occupation and for the ongoing oppression of the Palestinians, and has systematically cooperated with Israel's refusal to enter any effective peace negotiations or peace agreements. It has vetoed countless UN resolutions seeking to condemn Israel and to bring it into compliance with international law. It has allowed Israel to develop nuclear weapons and not to sign the Anti-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and most recently, it strongly supported Israel's attack on Lebanon in July of 2006. Support for Israel cuts across party lines and is extremely strong in Congress, where criticism of Israel is rarely, if ever, heard. It also characterizes almost all American administrations from Johnson onwards, With George W. Bush being possibly the most pro-Israeli president ever. What is the reason for this strong support? Opinions on this matter vary greatly. Within strong pro-Israeli circles, one often hears that the reason is primarily moral. The debt that the United States owes Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the nature of Israel as the sole democracy in the Middle East, Israel is a moral and possibly strategic ally of the United States in its war on terror. Within circles that are less supportive of Israel and which are less inclined to view Israel and Israel's conduct as moral, opinions vary as well. One perspective is that the U.S. support of Israel stems from Israel being a strategic asset to the United States. Its support is simply payment for services rendered.

Norman Finkelstein: Thank you.

Hagit Bourer: Coupled with the stable pro-American stance of the Jewish Israeli population. Noam Chomsky, among others, is a proponent of this view. According to the opposing view, United States support for Israel does not advance American foreign policy aims. It jeopardizes them. The explanation for the support is to be found in the activities of the Israel lobby, also known as the Jewish lobby, or as AIPAC, America-Israel Public Affairs Committee, which uses its formidable influence to shape American foreign policy in accordance with Israeli interests. This perspective has most recently been associated with an article in the London Book Review authored by Professor Mearsheimer of Chicago University and Professor Walt of Harvard University. This debate is the topic of our program today. Let me introduce our guests. Norman Finkelstein is a professor of political science at DePaul University. Welcome to our program, Norman. Norman?

Norman Finkelstein: I'm here.

Hagit Bourer: Okay. Welcome to our program.

Norman Finkelstein: Thank you.

Hagit Bourer: Professor Finkelstein is the author of a number of books and articles on the history of Zionism and on the role of Holocaust in Israeli present-day policies. His latest book, published in 2005, is Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Antisemitism and the Abuse of History. Our second guest is James Petras. James is an emeritus professor of sociology at SUNY Binghamton. Welcome to our program, James.

James Petras: Glad to be here, Haggith.

Hagit Bourer: Okay. Professor Petras is the author of numerous books and articles on the making of state power and globalization in the context of the U.S. and Latin America, and most recently in the Middle East. His latest book, published in 2006, is titled The Power of Israel in the United States. Perhaps starting with you, James, maybe you could tell us just by way of a short opening statement where you would place yourself on this issue of a debate on the source of the United States' lasting and enduring support of Israel.

James Petras: Well, I think I would strongly argue that the pro-Israel lobby, the Zionist lobby, is The dominant factor in shaping U.S. policy, particularly in the most recent period. And I think one has to look at this beyond AIPAC. I mean, we have to look at a whole string of pro-Zionist think tanks, from the American Enterprise Institute on down. And then we have to look at a whole power configuration which Not only involves AIPAC, but the president of the major American Jewish organizations, which number 52. We have to look at individuals occupying crucial positions in the government, as we had recently with Elliott Abrams and Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith and others. And we have to look at the We have to look at the army of op-ed writers who have access to the major newspapers. We have to look at the super-rich contributors to the Democratic Party, media moguls, etc. And I think this, together with the leverage in Congress and in the executive, is the decisive factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Hagit Bourer: And I want to emphasize that— James, just to stop you, and maybe we can also have some kind of an opening statement from Norman.

Norman Finkelstein: Well, first of all, thank you for having me.

Hagit Bourer: You're welcome.

Norman Finkelstein: I would say I situate myself on the spectrum somewhere towards the middle. I don't think it's just the lobby which determines the U.S. relationship with Israel. And I don't think it's U.S. interests that just determine the U.S. relationship with Israel. I think that you have to look at the broad picture, and then you have to look at the local picture. On the broad picture, that is to say, U.S. policy in the Middle East, generally speaking, the historical connection between the U.S. and Israel has been based on the useful services that Israel has performed for the United States in the region as a whole. And that became most prominent in June 1967, when Israel knocked out the main challenge, or potential challenge, to U.S. dominance in the region, Namely, Abdel Nasser of Egypt. So, on the broad question of U.S.— of the U.S.-Israel relationship, that is, the regional relationship, I think it's correct to say that the alliance has been based fundamentally on services rendered. On the other hand, it's very clear from looking at the documentary record—

Hagit Bourer: Yes.

Norman Finkelstein: Just as it's clear from looking at the documentary record that the U.S. was euphoric when Israel knocked out Egypt, or knocked out Nasserism, it's also clear from looking at the documentary record that the United States has never had any big stake in trying to maintain Israel's control over the territories it conquered in the June 1967 war. That is to say, the Egyptian Sinai, the Syrian Golan Heights, and at that time, the Jordanian West Bank and Jerusalem. The U.S. clearly had no stake in it, and from very early, already from July 1967—

James Petras: July 1967.

Norman Finkelstein: Wanted to apply pressures on Israel to commit itself to fully withdrawing. And it was pretty obvious, if you look at the record again, that Israel at that point was able to bring to bear the lobby. In 1967-68, it meant principally the forthcoming presidential election.

James Petras: Right.

Norman Finkelstein: And the Jewish vote, it was able to bring to bear the power of the Jewish vote to resist efforts to withdraw. And since '67, the lobby has been very effective, I think, in raising the threshold before the U.S. is willing to act and force an Israeli withdrawal.

James Petras: Right.

Norman Finkelstein: Pretty much like the withdrawal it forced on Indonesia in 2000 to leave Timor. The 2 occupations began roughly in the same period. 1974, Indonesia invades Timor with the U.S. green light. '67, Israel conquers the West Bank, Gaza, and so forth, with the U.S. green light.

James Petras: Right.

Norman Finkelstein: And so the obvious question is, both occupations endured for a long period. The Indonesian occupation was infinitely more destructive. It killed about one-third of the East Timorese population. But it's true to say, come 2000, the U.S. does order Indonesia to leave.

Hagit Bourer: Yes.

Norman Finkelstein: to withdraw its troops? And why hasn't it done so in the case of the Israel-Palestine occupation? And there I think it's true to say it's the lobby.

Hagit Bourer: Okay. I think maybe we want to— I have a feeling that one of the things that we really need to start with when we try to address this issue is what is it that we recognize, if we could recognize, and on more or less a global level, as American interests, such that we can say that they have to some degree systematically characterize different administrations, because it seems to me it would be very, very difficult to evaluate to what extent policies that are going on with respect to Israel are or aren't compatible with American interests if we don't talk a little bit about what we perceive to be American interests. So, James, would you like to talk about that a little bit?

James Petras: Yes, I would. As a matter of fact, On that question, we have to be clear that if we're talking about the U.S. government and corporate interests in the Middle East in particular, or if we're talking about what should be.

Hagit Bourer: No, let's talk about what they are, what the aims of, let's say, various administrations are, as opposed to, let's say, what is in the best interests of either the American or the Israeli people, which may be very different.

James Petras: Very good. All right. On that count, I think it's very clear U.S. policy is directed toward empire-building, extending its political, economic, and military control over the world as a whole, and in particular in the Middle East. And it pursues that policy either through military means or through market mechanisms, such as the expansion of corporations, The capturing of client-client regimes, etc. And if we look at the Middle East in particular, the U.S. has been very successful in securing agreements with most of the oil-producing countries, except Iraq and Iran. And even there, it's mainly because of its own rejection of relations with both those countries.

Norman Finkelstein: Right.

James Petras: U.S. oil companies have done extremely well through nonmilitary means. They have expanded their commercial ties. Goldman Sachs has just signed a big agreement with the biggest Saudi bank. Britain is organizing a secondary market in Islamic bonds. Wall Street is very interested in that. None of the oil companies supported a war in Iraq. And this is part of the rubbish that's been peddled, that the war was about oil. The oil companies were doing fabulous before the war and were very, very nervous about getting involved in a war. This, I think, leads us to the whole question of why then, if it was prejudicial to the major U.S. economic interests, As we can see, there were many military people, even, that were opposed to going into Iraq, because they felt it would prejudice the U.S. overall military capacities to defend the empire, just like the war in Vietnam prejudiced the capacity of the U.S. to intervene in Central America against the Sandinistas, against the overthrow of the Shah.

Norman Finkelstein: Right.

James Petras: Etc. So, from the point of view of global imperial interests, the war in Iraq was certainly not on the behest of the oil companies. I've looked at all the documents, I've done interviews with oil companies, I've looked at their publications for the 5 years in the run-up to the war, and there's absolutely no evidence. On the contrary, If you pursue research on the various members of the Zionist power configuration in the United States, which I think is a conceptually more correct way of talking about this rather than the lobby, you will find that people of dubious loyalties, like Wolfowitz, Feith, Perle, Elliott Abrams, the felon, that had an agenda of furthering Israel interests.

Hagit Bourer: James, maybe we should sort of go on with this. So, basically, if I understand what you're saying is you're suggesting that, in fact, up to the point of getting involved militarily with Iraq, you would characterize American policies in the Middle East, you know, the lobby notwithstanding, as extremely successful. So I'm just wondering—

James Petras: Yeah, it's what we call market imperialism.

Hagit Bourer: Yeah. Norman, you want to comment on this?

Norman Finkelstein: Well, you have to look at the interests at many different levels. And unfortunately, it becomes murky and complicated, where one would prefer a simple picture. I don't think it's all that simple when you try to figure it out. Number one, you have to look at the interests in terms of who's defining them. And I agree, I think it's fairly obvious, certainly to your listenership, that there are different interests if they're being defined by corporate power or if they're being defined democratically by the desires and choices of ordinary people in a democratic system. So let's limit ourselves, the first, the question of the corporate interests, 'cause obviously they're playing the dominant role. in determining U.S. policy, or it should be obvious. Not always is.

Hagit Bourer: Let's assume it is fairly obvious.

Norman Finkelstein: They're playing the determinant role. Then you have to look at, okay, how do they conceive the best way to preserve and expand their interests? Now, the way they perceive it may seem To a person like you and me, it may seem irrational that they're pursuing policies which are actually hurting them. But the fact that they may seem irrational to us does not mean that those are the way they perceive the best way to preserve their interests. So, if you take the concrete case at hand, It may be the case that it was irrational for the U.S. to go into Iraq, because there are other ways to control the oil, or, as some people have argued, that the market mechanisms are such that— on a world scale, the market mechanisms are such that you no longer need to control a natural resource In order to make sure you get the lowest price, or make sure it's flowing at the lowest price. Control isn't all that important anymore in the modern world. It's not like when Lenin was writing his Imperialism. Now, that may be rationally correct, and maybe there's a good argument for making it, but that doesn't mean that those in power aren't making— aren't making decisions To further their own interests, which may seem irrational to us. And in the case of Iraq, if you look concretely at what happens, number one, there is no evidence whatsoever that people like Wolfowitz or the others were trying to further an Israeli agenda.

Hagit Bourer: There is no evidence— What would be the Israeli agenda? I mean, actually, let me interrupt. What would be the Israeli agenda, if there was one?

Norman Finkelstein: There is an Israeli agenda, and I'm not disputing it. The Israeli agenda is basically the following. Israel does not care which country you smash up in the Middle East, just so long as every few years, and sometimes every few months, you smash up this or that Arab country to send a lesson or to transmit the message to the Middle East That we're in charge, and whenever you get out of line, we are going to take out the big club and break your skull. Now, it happens that in the late 1990s, Israel would have preferred if the skull that was cracked was the Iranian one. There was no evidence that Iraq was uppermost on the Israeli agenda. In fact, all of this talk about the famous document that was written up by these neocons to attack Iraq, that famous document was handed to Netanyahu when he came to office to try to convince him to put Iraq at the top of the agenda. It's not as if Israel passed that document to the neocons, who then plotted to get the U.S. government to attack Iraq. It was the opposite. Israel would have preferred to attack Iran. However, once those in our government, maybe for misguided reasons, for all I know, decided to fasten on to Iraq, that is, to attack Iraq, Israel was of course gung-ho, because Israel is always gung-ho about smashing up this or that Arab country. That's always been its policy for the last 100 years. Since the beginning of Zionism, the most commonplace, the most cliché of Israeli power is, The Arabs only understand the language of force. So when the U.S. embarked on its campaign against Iraq, the Israelis were gleeful, but they're always gleeful. It doesn't mean that the people like Wolfowitz, let alone people like Cheney, are trying to serve an Israeli agenda. There's no evidence for claims like that. It's pure speculation based on things like ethnicity. Let's take a simple example, the one that— I'll call him James. I don't usually call people by their first name, but let's just call him James, Jim Petros mentioned. Let's take the case of Elliott Abrams. These are interesting cases. Elliott Abrams is the son-in-law of Norman Podhoretz. And Norman Podhoretz was the first big neoconservative supporter of Israel, the editor of Commentary magazine. But if you look at people like Podhoretz, you look at their history, I'll take a book which I'm sure Jim is familiar with. In 1967, Podhoretz publishes his famous memoir called Making It. It's how he succeeded and made it in American life. He's a young man. He's the editor of Commentary magazine.

James Petras: Right.

Norman Finkelstein: You read that book, his celebrated memoir, it's written literally 2 months before the June 1967 war. There is exactly one half of one sentence in the whole book on Israel. People like Podhoretz, Midge Decter, all the neocons— I have gone through the whole literature on the topic, I've read it quite carefully. Right. Before June 1967, they didn't give a hoot about Israel. Israel never comes up in any of their memoirs, any of the histories of the period. They become pro-Israel when Israel is useful, useful to them in their pursuit of power and fortune in the United States. Elliot Abrams is as committed to Israel as his father-in-law Norman Podhoretz was committed to Israel, when it's convenient and when it's useful. But this idea of trying to serve an Israeli agenda, especially coming from somebody as sophisticated as Jim Petraeus, strikes me as absurd.

Hagit Bourer: Norman, maybe we should move to Jim at this point.

Norman Finkelstein: He knows as well as I do their power.

James Petras: It's very strange that one says Wolfowitz was not influenced by the Israeli agenda when he was caught passing documents to Israel in the '80s. Douglas Feith lost his security clearance for handing documents to Israel. Elliott Abrams has written a book Calling for the purity of the Jewish people.

Norman Finkelstein: I know, they write that crap, and you believe them?

James Petras: I try.

Norman Finkelstein: Jim, you think they care?

James Petras: It's not a question of believing them, it's looking at the documentary evidence of uncritical support for Israel in all of its policies, a position that's taken by the presidents of the major Jewish organizations in the United States.

Hagit Bourer: Let me, let me maybe interject here a little bit.

Norman Finkelstein: ...support.

Hagit Bourer: Let me perhaps interject here a little bit. I think that there are a couple of things. One is, I'm wondering, for instance, I don't know whether you would agree, James, with the particular Israeli interest that Norman had identified with respect to the invasion of Iraq. But assuming that you would agree that the Israeli interest is precisely that, namely smashing some Arab country every once in a while because it's a good The question is whether that also hasn't been an American interest. So we have seen America go after countries which are sometimes, in terms of their power otherwise, are really quite negligible, just so as to make a point that anybody who dares to stand up to American power is just a bad example and needs to be smashed.

Norman Finkelstein: I totally agree with that.

James Petras: Israel was running guns to Iran as late as 1987 in the infamous Iran-Contra Contra scandal, to say that they weren't interested in destroying Iraq as a challenge to its hegemony, and Iraq's support for the Palestinians, particularly funding the families of assassinated Palestinian leaders. That's absurd. And I think—

Hagit Bourer: Oh, look, actually, could I stop you at this particular point? Because we need to take a station break. So please, please hold on to this particular thought, and we will come back to it. Hi, this is Shay Popovich, actor and activist with Neighbors for Peace and Justice, San Fernando Valley. And I'm Sana Ali Kohatkar, host of KPFK's morning show Uprising. We invite you to The Unembedded Truth, an evening with independent journalist Dar Jamail. From Bechtel's failure to repair Iraq's water treatment plants to the silent tragedy of the widows, Dar Jamail's stories about those most affected by the U.S. occupation The innocent civilians are covered by the BBC and the world press, in this country only by alternative media. On February 17th in Studio City, Dar Jamail will be making a rare appearance to present an update with slideshow of the current conditions in Iraq and to share with us his assessment of future U.S. plans for the Middle East. That's Saturday, February 17th at 7:00 p.m. at the Unitarian Universalist Church of Studio City, 12355 Moore Park Street. For more information, call 818-762-6695. That's 818-762-6695. Or visit kpfk.org. KPFK is a media sponsor. Welcome back. You're listening to Radio Intifada on KPFK, 90.7 FM in Los Angeles, 98.7 in Santa Barbara.

Norman Finkelstein: Thank you.

Hagit Bourer: I'm Hagit Boreu. Our guests today are Professor Norman Finkelstein and Professor James Petras, and we are discussing the role of the Israeli lobby in shaping American foreign policy and in creating consent for those policies. Welcome back, Norman and James.

Norman Finkelstein: Thank you.

James Petras: Thank you, Hagit.

Hagit Bourer: I actually wanted—

James Petras: You can call me Hagit, it's all right.

Hagit Bourer: That's okay, yes. Yes, absolutely. At this point, I thought maybe we can try to shift the topic a little bit, and perhaps—

James Petras: Can I finish my last comment?

Hagit Bourer: Yes, please do.

James Petras: I think when the Pentagon offices are flooded like a crowded bordello on Saturday night with Israeli intelligence officers, crowding out even members of their own Pentagon, full of Mossad, full of Israeli generals, In the making of Iraq policy, I don't think you can say that this is just any old Pentagon officials. I think you can't dismiss the fact that Feith, Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams have a lifetime commitment to putting Israel's interests as their prime consideration in the Middle East. And I think this is absurd to think That somehow these just happen to be right-wing policymakers that happen to support a militarist policy. Wolfowitz designed the program. Feith put together the special policy board that fabricated the information for the Iraq War. They were constantly consulting on a day-to-day, hour-to-hour basis. With the Israeli government. This has absolutely been documented 100 times, and I think it's impossible to deny this and say, well, it's just— you can't deduce policy from ethnic affiliations. Yes, you can, when that ethnic group puts forward a position that puts the primacy on a foreign government at the center of their foreign policy and prejudices, the lives of thousands of Americans, its economic interests in the area, and just say, these are a bunch of irrational policymakers.

Hagit Bourer: James, actually let me pursue this and actually go into a slightly different point, and that is, wouldn't it be possible, you know, that's a question for both of you, wouldn't it be possible, for instance, to think about whatever the neocon group is, As a group that— it's not a group that represents Israeli interests. It's a group that represents interests which happen to perhaps coincide for both countries, and which represent alliances of particular politicians of both countries with one another, and particular power configurations in both countries with one another, but not by any means all Israeli politicians or all Israeli power structure, or all American politicians or all American power structures.

James Petras: Absolutely.

Hagit Bourer: So in that case, these are not really American interests. These are just interests of a particular group of people, which is just as interested in bringing them to effect in the United States as it is in Israel. It's just basically, if you wish, a wonderful symbiotic relationship. What would you say, Norman, to something like that, let's say?

Norman Finkelstein: I've said, you know, in my remarks at the beginning, there is an overlapping of interests on a regional level For reasons which, in part, you yourself suggested earlier. You said that the United States often goes after weak regimes as a kind of demonstration effect of its power, and Israel also has a desire for demonstrating its power, and often there is, as I said, an overlapping or confluence of interests. I think, however, it's also true to say, on the specific question of the occupation, there is a conflict of interests. And were there a— were there not a lobby, it's quite likely that the U.S. would have exerted the kinds of pressure which are needed to force an Israeli withdrawal. But on questions like Iraq and Iran, I don't see any evidence whatsoever that it's being driven by cloak-and-dagger-type operations in the Pentagon. These operations which Jim mentions are so trivial next to the very high-level planning that goes on between the United States and Israel, conscious, legal, high-level planning that goes on between Israel and the United States on a daily basis. High-level planning and high-level coordination. You don't have to conjure up cloak-and-dagger tales, many of them true, cloak-and-dagger tales going on inside the Pentagon, In order to demonstrate there is collusion, planning, and coordination between the U.S. and Israel. The question is not whether that goes on. The question is whose interests are being served by it. And this notion that somehow they are managing to distort, deform U.S. policy in a crucial region, on a crucial resource, doesn't, in my opinion, have any basis in fact. And it defies any kind of reason, any kind of commonsensical reasoning, especially coming from— in my youth, I used to be a student of James Petros at SUNY Binghamton, 1971 to '74.

Hagit Bourer: Wow.

Norman Finkelstein: And he used to be, I think, a Marxist. And at that time, he would tell you how people in power act from interests which spring from what's— they act on the basis of the interests in which they are the ones who are the main beneficiaries.

Hagit Bourer: Norman, let me ask you—

Norman Finkelstein: One second. Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Feith, and all the others, their power springs from the American state. If Israel gets stronger, their power does not increase. If the United States gets weaker, their power decreases. I agree with that. So now we're having this weird phenomenon of people, due to their ethnic loyalties, are willing to strengthen another state and weaken the sources of power from which their power comes. That doesn't sound believable.

James Petras: That's some convoluted thinking. I'm sure Norman didn't take that logic from my classes, I'm afraid. He's gone off the track somewhere, despite some very good books he's written on the Zionist shakedowns on the Holocaust and the refutation of the plagiarism of, of Dershowitz. I'm afraid when it comes to dealing with the predominantly Jewish lobby, he has a certain blind spot, which is understandable. In many other national and ethnic groups, where they can criticize the world, but when it comes to identifying the power and malfeasance of their own group— OK.

Hagit Bourer: I think maybe we should all—

James Petras: OK. There's nothing cloak-and-dagger about the operations of—

Hagit Bourer: No, I know. But perhaps we can move away from this specific topic, OK?

James Petras: Just one sentence, OK? There's nothing cloak-and-dagger about the multiplicity of pro-Israel groups that have pressured Congress, that have been involved in the executive body in shaping American policy in the Middle East.

Norman Finkelstein: I agree.

James Petras: The U.S. does not support any other colonial power, has opposed colonial occupation imperialism since World War II. They opposed the Suez in '56, '55. They have been pushing these countries, Europe and other countries, out in order to establish U.S. hegemony through economic and military agreements. So the Israeli is very different from the policies the U.S. follows everywhere else. in the world. It's the only country that gets $3 billion a year for 30 years.

Norman Finkelstein: I agree with that.

James Petras: So this is not just, this is not just something that happens because of cloak and dagger. This is the result, as Norman knows, as a very brilliant analyst, from organized power, an organized power that openly admits And states, and its groupies state very explicitly that Israel is their major concern, and what's good for Israel is good for the United States. They say that, Norman.

Norman Finkelstein: I know they say that, Nora.

Hagit Bourer: OK, let me interrupt you, because I need to do a station ID, and maybe we could change a topic after that. OK. No, no, no. You're listening to Radio Intifada on KPFK. We are broadcasting on 90.7 in Los Angeles. We are talking to Professors Norman Finkelstein and James Petras about the role of the Jewish lobby. And I think that we can at this point agree that you guys have a lot of mutual respect for each other, but also obviously you do not agree on some topics. And I wanted to move on to the question of whether there are— and I think this is a crucial case— and that is whether there are in fact cases that show that when there are really issues, which presumably there would be, where there are conflicts of interest between the United States and Israel, that the United States does in fact, let's say, pressure Israel, at least in some cases, to act in ways which are against what Israeli wishes would be. Because it seems to me that if we don't find cases along these lines, then basically the discussion becomes Kind of in the eyes of the beholder. You know, we see, certainly we see a lot of cooperation, a lot of joint interests, but they could be coming from either way, either side. It's the cases where there is perhaps a— where the interests part ways and where we can see, in fact, that there is a discord that we can talk about this. So, Norman, since you were the one who believes that this is, in fact, a possible thing, could you—

Norman Finkelstein: Yeah.

Hagit Bourer: Could you talk about that?

Norman Finkelstein: Well, the thing is, I don't want to make the argument that these kinds of individual cases can prove one side or the other. You pick up a book by Steve Zunes, and he's going to demonstrate that the U.S. government always gets its way. You pick up something by somebody on the other side, And they're going to demonstrate that it's Israel that always gets its way when there are conflicts of interest. And each side can give a list of examples to demonstrate his or her case. And I don't think you can prove anything by citing a handful of cases on one side. Professor Chomsky will cite the recent case where Israel was severely reprimanded by Bush for trying to sell technology to China, and then you'll find cases on the other side. Even though it's of course important to look at the empirical record, I don't think the empirical record in and of itself resolves the question. Let me give you a couple of examples of how I think it works. Let's take 2 prime examples. Let's start with 1948. Why did Israel recognize— excuse me, why did President Truman recognize Israel? There's all sorts of debate about that question. One claim that's constantly made was, is, that it was the Jewish lobby Namely, Truman was heading for election and wanted in particular the New York vote, and the Democratic Party wanted Jewish money. And it was due to the Jewish lobby of its time that Truman quickly recognized Israel, even though he was bound to alienate Arab interests, which were hostile, very hostile, to Israel's founding. What does the record show? I've gone through the record very carefully. The record shows as follows. Number one, our main interest at that time was in Saudi oil. And the U.S. enters into discussions with the Saudis: what will you allow the U.S. government to do regarding the founding of the State of Israel? And the Saudis basically say the following: we will let you recognize Israel, but if you supply arms, then there's going to be trouble. Arms after Israel is founded and the imminent war. What does the US do? It recognizes Israel. That is to say, it goes the limit. Truman goes the limit, because he wants that Jewish vote, and he wants Jewish money, but he immediately slaps an arms embargo on the region. And Secretary of State Marshall, at the time, says, it looks like Israel is going to lose the war. That's what our intelligence told us. We were wrong, but that's what U.S. intelligence said at the time. So, they were willing to let Israel be annihilated, because that's what our intelligence told us, if the price was losing the support of the Saudis. It is true Truman went the limit. The limit was recognizing Israel to get the Jewish vote. But he never went beyond the limit of alienating a prime U.S. interest in the region, namely the Saudis. Let's take 1956, which Jim mentioned, but I don't think he knows what happened. In 1956, it's true, the United States told Britain, France, and Israel they have to get out of Egypt. And it's true, we looked very anti-colonial. But the only reason the United States did that was because the British, the French, and the Israelis acted behind the back of the United States. The very moment, the very moment the tripartite invasion of Egypt occurred, the U.S. was plotting to overthrow the government of Syria at that very moment. And the U.S. wanted to knock out Nasser, but they didn't like the timing, because the timing was not the U.S. choosing; it was the British, French, and Israelis Behind our backs. Once again, it was the U.S. interest that determined U.S. policy, not any commitment to anti-colonialism or crap like that. It was the U.S. interest.

James Petras: He's had 5 minutes already. I demand equal time.

Hagit Bourer: Okay. Please go ahead, James. You're right.

James Petras: Okay. He's been giving us long lectures.

Hagit Bourer: That's okay, James. Please just go ahead.

James Petras: If you look at U.S. policy to Israel, we alienate practically the whole world in favor of a tiny country which has virtually no economic value to the United States, is a diplomatic albatross, and has its own hegemonic military-political interests in dominating the Middle East. We go into the United Nations, we alienate the whole of Europe, The Third World, when Israel destroys Jenin, when it engages in genocidal policies in the occupied territories, it violates the Geneva Agreements. The U.S. backs it and totally discredits itself to anyone seriously concerned with international law, with the niceties of international relations. I'm not just talking about Muslim opinion.

Hagit Bourer: Right.

James Petras: Arab opinion. I'm talking about world opinion. Secondly, to say that the United States has overlapping interests with Israel is totally off the wall. I mean, I don't know where Norman's head is. The United States gets involved in countries to set up neocolonial regimes. They're not into—

Norman Finkelstein: No.

James Petras: Occupying and setting up colonial governments. They prefer local clients. And they had one in Lebanon, with the president, Sinoria, who was receiving U.S. backing when Israel attacks Lebanon, presumably to attack Hezbollah, totally undermines the U.S. puppet. Is that in U.S. interests?

Norman Finkelstein: Yes.

James Petras: And when you talk about the fact that Israel is taking measures overlapping with U.S. policymakers, you're overlooking the fact that most of the generals were opposed to the war, and the Israeli agents in the United States— and that's what they are, they should register as foreign agents of a foreign power— we're attacking them as wimps. We're attacking them because they wouldn't follow The war precepts of the Zionists in the Pentagon. There's a whole string of military officials, conservative politicians, who were opposed to going into Iraq. And if you look at the data apart— and if you look at Cheney, Cheney was getting his information from Irving Libby, another Landsman, another member of the fraternity linked To Wolfowitz. He's a protégé of Wolfowitz.

Norman Finkelstein: I think Cheney is a jerk, though.

James Petras: Now, if you're looking at the— if you're trying to set up a matrix of power dealing with U.S. policymaking in the Middle East, to simply say that this is shared interest without looking at the fact that the Israelis blew up a U.S. surveillance ship, killed Scores of U.S. sailors, and get away with it, and continue to get economic aid, and the U.S. officers that were murdered by the Israeli warplanes with the U.S. flags flying over the ship, and say, that's overlapping interests. That's chutzpah.

Norman Finkelstein: Right.

James Petras: That is really chutzpah. And it's very revealing that you went into a detailed explanation. Or purported-to-be explanation about the Suez, that you leave out in 1967 that the Israelis are the only country in world U.S. history that bombs a U.S. warship carrying airplanes and doesn't even have to apologize, and receives no retaliation from the United States.

Norman Finkelstein: Right.

James Petras: Now, that's power for you. That's influence for you. And I think that the United States— Look, the U.S.—

Hagit Bourer: —realities— Okay. Can I— can I—

James Petras: —they have interests, overlapping interests. The Zionists have no power in the U.S. government. If they are Zionists, they're not tied to Israel, etc. That's a strange kind of Zionist that don't have allegiance to the state of Israel.

Hagit Bourer: Okay. I want to ask you about the— we have only 5 minutes left, even less. There are a couple of things that I wanted to cover, and maybe the most important one has to do with the fact that this debate, that the debate about the Israel lobby in general, has broken surface into the mainstream in the last, let's say, year or so. Of course, a lot of it had to do with the Mearsheimer and Walt article, and subsequently, let's say, by the attacks on Carter's book. But there were attacks before, and there were—

Norman Finkelstein: Yeah.

Hagit Bourer: Reviews of the role of the lobby and debates about the role of the lobby before. So, but they never made it to mainstream and they were never just reviewed, let's say, by the New York Review of Books, and they were never discussed in major outlets in the United States. In fact, the Mearsheimer and Walt article originally was turned down for publication by The Atlantic magazine that had commissioned it. So maybe you can comment a little bit, the two of you, on why is it that this debate is finally breaking surface and why is it that— It is now a much more legitimate thing to debate within American mainstream circles.

James Petras: I think there are 3 fast reasons. One is because of the disaster in Iraq. The public is open to a discussion, particularly with the prominence of Zionists in bringing about the war. So I think you have public opinion open because of their discontent with the war. And their concern about who got us into the war and who got us into the mess. The second reason is that there's an inter-elite fight in the United States between sectors of the military, sectors of Congress, conservatives, with the pro-Israel crowd, the pro-war crowd. And the third reason is the arrogance and bullying By the Zionists, and particularly their organizations that go around trying to prevent discussion, has really encouraged— backfired. And I think people are fed up with the Zionists banning Corey, the play, in New York and elsewhere. So I think these are the—

Hagit Bourer: James, we have to move on. We have a minute and a half. So Norman, could you, could you say some final words?

Norman Finkelstein: Well, I agree with the reasons. Maybe I wouldn't state them quite the same way as Jim does. It's clear the debacle of— in Iraq forms the overall framework for the opening up of discussion. In my opinion, that's probably not the most positive result, because it's going to end up in, I think, creating a scapegoat for a disastrous war by the U.S. I think the second reason is that the Israeli approach, which seemed to have been successful since '67, the approach of simply applying force to every insurgency in— or every break in conformity with U.S. policy, this policy of applying overwhelming force—

James Petras: Right.

Norman Finkelstein: Plainly is not working. And so there are questions about the usefulness of Israel's guidance and instruction in how to control the Middle East. It's not worked in Iraq, and it proved to be a disaster in Lebanon this summer. So there's the whole question of the effectiveness of the Israeli approach, in addition to the effectiveness of Israel itself.

James Petras: Right.

Norman Finkelstein: as a strategic asset, which is very different than it was in 1967. And the third reason, it seems to me, is that Israel is becoming more and more what you might call a bloated banana republic, with scandals daily and this kind of squandering of resources. And that being the case—

James Petras: Right.

Norman Finkelstein: It's alienated large sectors of American Liberal Jewish opinion.

Hagit Bourer: I thank you very much, James and Norman, and I think on this point of accord between you, we need to end. Thank you so very much for being here. This perspective has most recently been associated with an article in the London Book Review authored by Professor Mearsheimer of Chicago University and Professor Walt of Harvard University. This debate is the topic of our program today. Let me introduce our guests. Norman Finkelstein is a professor of political science at DePaul University. Welcome to our program, Norman. Norman?

Norman Finkelstein: I'm here.

Hagit Bourer: Okay. Welcome to our program.

Norman Finkelstein: Thank you.

Hagit Bourer: Professor Finkelstein is the author of a number of books and articles on the history of Zionism and on the role of Holocaust in Israeli present-day policies. His latest book, published in 2005, is Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Antisemitism and the Abuse of history. Our second guest is James Petras. James is an emeritus professor of sociology at SUNY Binghamton. Welcome to our program, James.

James Petras: Glad to be here, Hagit.

Hagit Bourer: Okay. Professor Petras is the author of numerous books and articles on the making of state power and globalization in the context of the U.S. and Latin America, and most recently in the Middle East. His latest book, published in 2006, is titled The Power of Israel in the United States. Perhaps starting with you, James, maybe you could tell us just by way of a short opening statement where you would place yourself on this issue of a debate on the source of the United States' lasting and enduring support of Israel.

James Petras: Well, I think I would strongly argue that the pro-Israel lobby, the Zionist lobby, is The dominant factor in shaping U.S. policy, particularly in the most recent period. And I think one has to look at this beyond AIPAC. I mean, we have to look at a whole string of pro-Zionist think tanks, from the American Enterprise Institute on down. And then we have to look at a whole power configuration which Not only involves AIPAC, but the president of the major American Jewish organizations, which number 52. We have to look at individuals occupying crucial positions in the government, as we had recently with— The benchmark 1990 is a way of indicating a dramatic change that's taken place between the United States and Latin America in the last 20 years. During the Clinton period, 1990 roughly, or even earlier, from the middle '70s to the end of the '90s, is the golden era for U.S. policy groups, corporate interests, banks, in relationship to Latin America. This is a period where over 3,000 public enterprises were sold off to private sector and mostly foreign capital within the private sector. This is the period when loans were made to Latin America that had no impact on development, were recycled back into U.S. banks. It was a period of pillage, gross, crude, primitive pillage— interest, royalties, transfers of wealth, large-scale illegal transfers of wealth by the wealthy in Latin America to U.S. banks. The growth of U.S. banking was fueled in large part by $200 billion a year transfers. And it wasn't all narco money. So we have this period of the decapitalization of Latin America, it was during the period of the return to electoral politics. And this was the slogan at the time that Clinton— we have free markets, he said, and free elections. And that's the golden rule for the new epoch in Latin America. The 1990s, however, was a disaster for workers, peasants, Public employees, and the whole paraphernalia that we associate with marginal societies. Rural immigrants to the city, the low-paid, low-income service sector— domestic servants, gardeners, car washers, etc. Thank you. During this period, ignored by U.S. policymakers, there emerged a whole series of mass movements, in particular the landless rural workers in Brazil, who expropriated and settled over 350,000 families. Through direct action, this was the period when the Indian communities of Bolivia, Ecuador arose and began to challenge the dominant governments because they were being evicted and displaced from their lands by the mining company. This was the period in which this false boom in Latin America. Began to deteriorate. By the end of the 1990s, there was a whole series of social insurrections against elected governments in Bolivia, in Ecuador, in Argentina, and political explosions in Brazil and Venezuela. There was an attempt to overthrow the Chavez government that was defeated in 48 hours, a record in Latin America. Military coups usually last decades. So there was this golden epoch which marked the thinking of the great majority of Latin American people as the decade of indignity, the decade of plunder and pillage. And it was followed by this massive, extensive social upheaval throughout the region. In Argentina, I was there. I was working with the unemployed workers. It was like any revolutionary epoch. The middle class was impoverished. The banks froze their savings. They were literally unable to buy their meals. And they suddenly became radicalized on a massive scale, meeting in the streets and holding impromptu, what they call street parliaments. The unemployed blocked all the streets, major highways, and didn't allow any traffic to go to and from the factories. This period that lasted roughly from the— 2000 to 2003 demonstrated that the neoliberal free market capitalism was dead. It was dead in the sense that it had no social basis to sustain any more any regime that was going to pursue that policy. And yet these great social upheavals did not lead to a social revolution, even though they had programmatically positions, revolutionary positions. Now, one could discuss all the reasons why. That they didn't have a political leadership, that a movement is not a party, that they didn't have a vocation for state power. I talked to a Bolivian miner after they overthrew a government and they were massed in La Paz in front of the government palace. I said, why don't you take state power? And they said to me, and how do we rule? So you had this tremendous power to veto regimes, pro-U.S. regimes, pro-neoliberal regimes, but an incapacity to substitute a workers' and peasants' government. In that space that was open between the fall of the pro-U.S. regimes, and with it U.S. prestige, influence, and whatever, there emerged a whole series of center-left politicians who articulated an attack on the previous period and the regimes responsible for it, put distance to the United States, but also contained, co-opted, neutralized the mass movements. And they did so through a whole series of social reforms largely based on providing unemployed workers compensation, food subsidies, subsidies on food prices, and a whole series of public works projects. They were able to bring into the government in social development ministries and related positions some of the key leaders, or at least they were able to divide those radical movements. As a consequence of that, you had in place Governments that had sufficient autonomy from the United States to begin to think about developing somewhat more independent policy. The second factor that intervened was the commodity boom that took off at the end of 2002, the agricultural, mining, oil prices that provided these center-left governments with sufficient resources to pay Peter and Paul. That is, to sub— subventionar— subsidize the bourgeoisie, provide them with loans and financing to reactivate the economy, and also to make social concessions to the working class. The skyrocketing copper, tin, lead, soya, corn prices, iron, oil, gas fed into the treasuries. And this further strengthened the independence of these governments, particularly as the engine of growth shifted from the United States and Europe to Asia. China became, as I'll discuss later, the main trading partner with Brazil, the biggest, most industrialized country in Latin America. After 70 years of predominant U.S. commercial investment dominance, in the year— in this past year, China has surpassed the United States, not only in Brazil. But in Chile, a more moderate political regime, and even in Peru, which is a one of the last clients of the U.S. in Latin America because that's where the market is. So we have this situation now where Latin America has carved out for the first. Time a degree of autonomy which is beginning to manifest itself in regional politics. Let's look at the most recent developments to get a fix on this. We have, for example, 2 regional meetings just recently, the last couple of months, on April 19th and 20th, There was a Summit of the Americas, a meeting of the leading— the political leaders of this hemisphere, where Latin America, 32 to 1, voted to integrate Cuba into the hemisphere countries. There's only one country, one country alone. It couldn't even count on the banana republics. The banana republics are in revolt. Secondly, the U.S. didn't dare put forth its political agenda there. In other words, what's important is not what was voted on; it's what wasn't discussed. There was no mention of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas because everyone knew in anticipation it would be shot down. Then came the Organization of American States used to be called the Organization of American Colonies.

Norman Finkelstein: Mm-hmm.

James Petras: Once again, it took place in Honduras, of all places, emblematic of the banana republic. Zelaya, the new president of Honduras, is hooking up with President Chávez as part of a Caribbean petroleum trading alliance. In other words, the U.S. no longer sets the agenda and dictates regional policy, grosso modo. I want to underline that this relative autonomy of Latin America does not signify that we're talking about revolutionary governments. There are some— well, there is one. In the region. But we're talking about the vast majority of regimes that are center-left, center, and even some who are rightist regimes, but cannot— even the last allies of the United States, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, are not going to go to bat for Washington on issues where they're grossly outnumbered. Now, as I mentioned, we have to look at what is going on in Latin America among the established regimes. First of all, there are at least 3 new trade alliances that exclude the U.S. There's Mercosur, that has existed for the last 20 years, which brings together Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia in a trading unit. There is the new and more radical regional alliance centered in Venezuela, including Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador, which is developing joint ventures and other kinds of associations. And there's Petrocaribe, which is centered in Central America and the Caribbean, what used to be called the U.S. patio, and based on Venezuela selling cheap petroleum, subsidized petroleum to these countries in exchange for some kind of services, in the case of Cuba, health programs, doctors, dentists. Etc. George would appreciate that. That provide free medical treatment to all the poor people in Venezuela. So we have these 3 overlapping regional organizations that serve as a counterweight to U.S.-centered trade relations. What I'm suggesting is these are all indicators of the relative decline of U.S. hegemony and governance in the region. That is, at the elite level. We're not talking now about civil society. We're not talking about mass movements. We're not talking about policy. We're talking about capitalist governments orienting policy largely toward developing capitalism, taking account their social and political history. Because at the back of the mind of these current rulers is the fact that in the background are the social upheavals of the early part of the decade that define certain parameters that you can't overstep, that if you push too far In this capitalist direction, you may get another December 20th in Buenos Aires. You may get the 203, 205 insurrections in Bolivia. You may get the Indians coming down from the mountains and taking over Quito, etc. That forms the background. That provides the social constraints. Right. On the kind of capitalism that's developing in the region. Now, what I think is important as we look at the electoral politics of the recent period is that every single election except one, U.S.-backed candidates were defeated. Correa won in Ecuador. Chávez won the constitutional amendment allowing for reelection. We have the elections in Uruguay, Brazil, etc., Argentina, where the center-left candidates defeated right-wing pro-U.S. candidates. We also have, outside of the electoral arena, an attempted coup against Evo Morales in Bolivia in September, financed by AID, National Endowment for Democracy, and a whole slew of NGOs that were operating with U.S. funding and that engaged in violent activity. And they were stopped in part by large-scale mobilizations of miners, Indians, etc., who came down and put a stopper. So it's not just we have— everyone says, well, the elected government's moving from the left, but they're elective governments that are backed by mass movements. Just as President Chávez came back to power with the support of constitutional militarists and 1.5 million people that came down from the slums and took over Caracas and shoved back the coup-makers in 2002 and have subsequently defeated Every attempt to displace President Chávez. Now, one of the areas that we're told is a— where the U.S. has scored some points is in Colombia. And there's no doubt that the guerrilla movements there are somewhat in retreat, but they've not been defeated. There's no decisive defeat in that field. In Colombia outside of the guerrilla field, there are a vast number of peasant electoral center-left groups that are in positions to occupy important positions in the government. So we have also in this regard that the ideology with which the U.S. Was able to exercise its power is totally discredited. Absolutely nobody talks about the free market in Latin America today. Even the free marketeers criticize it, at least on their way to power. The second thing I think that's important to realize is that the principal allies of the U.S. At this time are under siege. Mexico is a failed state. It— half the country's run by the narcotraffickers, and the other half is run by a corrupt military-political elite. It's a very volatile area of dual power, not in the progressive sense, workers versus capitalists. It's between the narcos and the corrupt ruling political group tied to the U.S. And the root problem cannot be solved as long as the political regime maintains its alliance with the United States, because the roots of the growth of the mass organizations of traffickers is rooted in the free trade agreements. Let me explain. Free trade agreement led to the bankruptcy of over 2 million Mexican peasants. Some of them came across the border, immigrants. Others became part of these drug trafficking organizations, became vast welfare organizations as well as killing machines. There is no alternative with the import of subsidized agricultural goods from the United States. You go to a place like Zacatecas, where I used to lecture. You go through village after village, and they are empty. Some of them have gone north—Chicago, Los Angeles, etc. Others have been recruited into the drug. trafficking. Young men, especially between 20 and 30, are dead. As long as you don't have a viable legal economy where people can earn a living, they're going to look to the alternative economy. The lucrative, well-paying alternative economy in Mexico today for poor people is the drug trade, unfortunately. Now, in the cities in Mexico, there are legitimate mass movements. I just got an email from the Electrical Workers Union. Just a few years ago, under a very conservative government, they attempted to privatize the electrical industry. And once again, the mass movements came into play throughout the country. They didn't engage in givebacks. The electrical workers didn't say, well, what can you give us in exchange for privatizing? No. They're not the UAW. They said no privatization, and they organized over 350 mass meetings all around the country and said, the day you sign the privatization, the lights go out in Mexico. All the lights.

Norman Finkelstein: Lights.

James Petras: Not select— all the lights. And they stopped cold a right-wing government at the moment. Now, they didn't reverse the entire political agenda, but again, it illustrates the veto power that remains among highly organized sectors, even in Mexico. So there is the U.S. principal ally south of the border, America and Mexico. Now we have Colombia. Colombia's known as the death squad democracy. More trade unionists have been murdered in Colombia than any other country in the world. It's the most dangerous place for journalists and trade unionists. That government is sustained by Clinton first, and subsequently with Bush, and now with Obama. $6 billion in military aid engaged largely in counterinsurgency. They don't kill guerrillas. The guerrillas are armed. You've got to go up in the mountains, the jungles. They're prepared. They've got lifetime of service, military combat. Who they kill are the peasants, the workers who express sympathy not with the organization of guerrillas, but with their program. Of agrarian reform, national public ownership of utilities and strategic industries, demilitarizing the country, etc. Human rights.

Norman Finkelstein: Ooh.

James Petras: And for that, each year you get 2,000 or 3,000 trade unionists, thousands of peasants killed, In order, as they say, to empty the pond to catch the fish. And so we have 3 million internal refugees crowding the streets of Colombia, which becomes a recruiting ground for the subversive organizations. That's Colombia. That's the prized ally of Obama, as it was the United States. And that's the United States. At one time, Obama said he's going to deal with the human rights issue in Colombia. Now he's talking about promoting the free trade agreement with Colombia, because he's got nothing else going with nobody else in Latin America. The 3rd ally of the United States is Peru. Peru, 4 days ago, Alan García, a former social democrat, I don't know. He may be still a member of the Second International. It doesn't matter anymore. Murdered 50 Amazonian Indians. I just wrote a short article on it. Because they protested over the giveaway of indigenous territories to the multinational oil companies, who are in the process of contaminating their rivers, the air, The water they drink, the rivers they fish in, etc. So they protested for 50 days. They blocked highways. And Alan García said, quote, these savages— that's the word he used— these savages, he said, need to be taught a lesson, because the only way for Peru to develop is with the big investments of the multinational corporations. And all these poor peasants and Indians can do is invest a few centavos on their plots of land, and there's no future. So with that attitude, they sent in the police to break up the highway blockages. Peaceful activities, petitions, Visits to Lima, etc. They didn't even get the back door to the presidential palace. So he sends in the police to assault and break up the protest, and there's a shootout. 20 police were killed, 10 Indians. Now, the reason for that is many Indians are conscripted into the Peruvian army. Army. And after they serve their time, they go back to their village in poverty. But they take with them some of their martial skills. And apparently they applied it. Subsequently, Alan García sends in helicopter gunships, machine guns, armored carriers. And we know from reports that we've gotten from Peru That at least 50 Indians have been murdered. And there is not a single peep from that garrulous president that we have in Washington, who tells us every day how much concern he has for democratic values and social justice.

Norman Finkelstein: Yeah.

James Petras: Not a peep from that loquacious, eloquent bluff.