Iran under Siege w/Navid Zarrinnal (The Colony Archive)

Adnan Hussain: Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. Salam, hello, welcome to you all. Welcome to the program. I'm Adnan Hussain, historian of the medieval Mediterranean and Islamicate world history. We're here with a really important episode. And before I introduce my guest and the topic briefly, I do just want to remind everyone that they can support this channel. by going to patreon.com slash Adnan Hussein, or you can make a one-time contribution, buymeacoffee.com slash Adnan Hussein. Your support is greatly appreciated. But I also want to remind people that this month, this month of Ramadan, the holy month of fasting for Muslims, is also a time for charity, and I want to renew our appeal for support of to the campaigns of the Samir Project, the Palestinian mutual aid organization. They've been running a Ramadan Iftar program. You can donate to that. I will put the link in the description to this video, but also any of their campaigns, including the Rifat al-Arir campaign and so on, really deserve your support. So if you can, please make a donation and support them. Well, as I said, this is a very important, topical, timely episode because we are on the cusp of the threat of war constantly present of a U.S. attack on Iran. We've had many episodes dealing with it. We've had a great guest like Ali Alizadeh. We've had... You know, my former PhD student, Milad Dochanji. We've had my colleague and friend, Dr. David Yagoubian. who's a modern Iranian historian. In continuing with the series, we really want to find out what we can about the history of Iran, the current situation in Iran, and especially if possible, from people who are in Iran and can give us firsthand accounts of what's happening in this society that's under siege. To help us do that today, I'm really delighted. to welcome Dr. Naveed Zarinna'al, who is an Iranian academic. He has also a project, online videos, and podcast, The Colony Archive, which is also something that you can support, patreon.com slash thecolonyarchive. And he is a modern Iranian historian, Persianate world, And it's really a pleasure and an honor, Naveed, to welcome you to the program.

Navid Zarrinnal: Dr. Adnan, thank you so much for having me.

Adnan Hussain: Well, I know that it's late over there, so I really also appreciate you at the time of recording for making the time, but it's such an urgent question right now. There's many things I'd love to discuss with you, but I think the first thing is just, of course, to say that neither of us are necessarily military strategy people, so I don't know what exactly we can really contribute to the fact that, of course, there's this huge U.S. Armada. There's now a second carrier group, the Gerald Ford, in the Indian Ocean in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. And there's this constant drumbeat for war on the news media here in the West, in the Imperial Corps. And this is what we're hearing, is that the U.S. is prepared to unleash the full arsenal of its military on Iran. But what I'm interested in really is just understanding a bit more about what that effect has had on the atmosphere in Iran. How are people dealing with this kind of crisis? constant continuing sense of threat the negotiations that have been taking place there's reporting about it but i wouldn't necessarily say that there's been great progress like you know that we could you know expect that there would be a an outcome from the negotiations they're happening amidst the atmosphere of this grave military threat how are people in iran coping with this uh with this situation

Navid Zarrinnal: Yeah, so I mean, I would say Iranians are pretty used to crises because they live in a country that has chosen the path of resistance to Western imperialism and to Zionism. And because of that, they have paid a great cost. And also, the Iranian state has supported Palestinian liberation in the past 47 years. So that has also put a lot of pressure uh on the country so we're used to crises we had an eight-year war during the 1980s so from 1980 to 1988 saddam hussein invaded iran with support from the west and from with intelligence that was provided by the u.s there's a famous you know video of him shaking hands with So there was that. And so we have experienced war in the past, but then after the Iran-Iraq war, so people who were born after 1988, they hadn't experienced war. And so the 12-day war that happened in June was the first one. uh since the since the iraq war and now there's also this atmosphere that it might be an eminent war waged by us and israel on iran in which you know other western uh countries uh would also join But because we're used to crises and because we have lived under sanctions, the mood in the country is actually very calm. So people don't really talk about it very much. I mean, it is true that some people kind of put their projects on hold. So I have friends, for example, who work They're engineers and they work in industry and some of the projects that they were doing, they're kind of like up in the air because everybody's waiting to see whether there will be an attack by US and Israel. So things like that happen, but at the same time, when it comes to the everyday mood of the people, it's not really something they talk about. They talk more about inflation. They talk more about the economic hardships, but they don't talk They're not afraid. So I think the resilience and the courage of the people is very admirable because they're not threatened. So even though there's this massive military buildup by the US, and I think it parallels the 2003 buildup to the invasion of Iraq. So there's that, but the people are not scared and they go about their daily lives.

Adnan Hussain: Well, that's really quite encouraging and amazing, the strength and fortitude. But as you say, it's been built up by constant threat and suffering because of decades of sanctions and these terrorist attacks that have happened in the past. I mean, this is a reality that people in Iran have clearly been dealing with. Again, it makes me think about that the real issue is how much solidarity people maintain. That's why I say it's very encouraging to hear that because we had a conversation actually with a mutual friend of ours, producer Sina Rahmani. and Justin Poder on my Office Hours live stream a couple weeks ago. And we were, of course, having to talk about the situation in Iran to some extent. And we were marveling at the amazing turnout in the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution that was being celebrated. And somebody, I think maybe Justin said that, uh regardless of all of this military uh kind of uh forces and firepower and all of that that ultimately really only iran can defeat iran right like if iran holds strong then you know it can't really be defeated and conquered in any kind of final sort of way. And so that's something that I'm wondering, what kinds of preparations do you feel are being made to strengthen resolve or to increase morale? We know, of course, that the Western way of war, I mean, if you reference the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and we know that the way in which the dominance in the air, but the reluctance to commit actual ground troops means and a real concern and allergy to casualties in the military from the US means that they fight wars in a certain way, which is devastating bombardments, trying to you know, kind of, uh, attack civilian infrastructure and, and things like, things like that. There's, you know, a question of like, what, what can be done in this context? What sort of preparations, you know, are being made, but also, um, About the anniversary of the revolution, some estimates were between 20 and 30 million people came out to celebrate the anniversary of the revolution, which to my mind is an amazing and incredible statement of resolve and solidarity. Perhaps you can reflect a little bit on you know, these components and these aspects of, you know, the resilience of Iran's society in the face of imperialist threat.

Navid Zarrinnal: Yeah. So, I mean, I would say I kind of mentioned the resilience of the people, but there's also the resilience of the state. So you're very much right that Iran and the state is prepared. I think one reason that the population doesn't talk about the threat of war that much and it's not something on their mind is because they do have some trust in the defensive capability of the state. to defend and deter attacks by US and Israel. And we saw that with the 12 day war that eventually Israel sought a ceasefire because it saw that Iran is capable of responding. I mean, they might not be able to inflict as many casualties and as much damage as Israel would against Iran, but they can kind of respond in a way that would deter both Israel and the US. And I mean, there are reports of Chinese military equipment coming into Iran. I don't know how true they are, but I think China and Russia are probably aiding Iran in some way, even though I think they have kind of, they haven't really helped Iran in a way that's very significant that would deter US and Israel in a way that they will not attack whatsoever. So I don't think that they're the best allies and they're not the most reliable allies of Iran because of various strategic interests that they have themselves. But at the same time, there are reports China has been sending help to Iran. And I think that also creates a pause for someone like Donald Trump. And I mean, I think the Iranian leader made an interesting reference in one of his recent speeches because he talked about how the U.S., naval fleets are very dangerous, but at the same time, what is more dangerous is the weapon that would sink it. And some speculate that that might be a reference to some of the Iranian capabilities, defensive capabilities that they have in order to respond and potentially sink or inflict significant damage on the US fleets that are approaching uh the persian gulf i mean they're not coming into the persian gulf they're in the arabian sea uh but they're they're close enough to uh create a threat and i mean people talk about uh iran should preemptively strike in order to create deterrence but i wouldn't even call it preemptive at this point because when you have this kind of a build-up by the u.s military i think iran would be justified in responding by the same time the iranian state has shown great restraint in not responding and actually waiting for an attack to come and then respond And the question becomes, if the US attacks Iran in the coming days, what kind of a response would the Iranians engage in? I mean, the Iranian leader referenced that if the US attacks or if Israel attacks, this time it will be a regional war. So we have to see whether this is just bluff or whether Iran would respond in a forceful way. But going back to the second part of your question regarding the participation in the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution. So most recently, there were the rallies in support of the revolution that has lasted for 47 years. And yes, I mean, I saw some of the crowds and it was, I don't know if 20 to 23 million is accurate. I even saw higher numbers. But I think we can safely say that all the people who voted for Saeed Jalili, who was one of the more so-called hardline candidates in the last presidential election, there were 13 and a half million of them. I would say at least 13 and a half million people probably came out, even if the other estimates were inflated or exaggerated. So I would say there is a lot of support for the revolution and for Iran defending itself against US and Israel.

Adnan Hussain: yes um there's so much to talk about um you know about the revolution about the the atmosphere a couple of things that i'm interested in picking up on um you know is the economic situation that you mentioned that people um do talk about because that concerns them on a daily basis the purchasing power and with extreme sanctions the difficulty in acquiring you know like reasonably you know affordable food, medicine, these kinds of things, some of which may not be accessible. But of course, we know that the initial protests on the 28th and 29th of December began because of extreme inflation and depreciation of the Iranian currency, the rial. that we now understand. And I think even at the time, it was clear that the kind of precipitous depreciation must have been engineered somehow. And of course, just fit into the final culminating point of months and months of economic warfare by US Treasury and manipulations since the late spring and certainly accelerated even faster after the June war as a form of economic warfare. But how has that been affecting people and has there been continuing depreciation and what can you tell us about the economic situation and how that has changed over the last several weeks?

Navid Zarrinnal: Yes, I would say because of the sanctions and also because of the government's rentier corruption and this kind of West leaning oligarchical class that has emerged in the recent decades, the Iranian middle class has shrunk. And I would say it probably started under the Obama era. So the shrinking of the Iranian middle class and it has continued and intensified. Iranians have lost purchasing power over the years because of the inflation that is caused by the sanctions and also by the government's failures when it comes to addressing some of the growing class inequalities in the country. And so what happens is that when you have this inflation that is somewhere between 30% to 40% annually, sometimes higher, the wages don't keep up. So if you are, say, a merchant and you're dealing internationally, you might actually benefit from this uh or you might not lose your purchasing power over the years because some of your income is connected to the dollars but if you're just earning wages or if you're salaried professionals it will impact your wages also over the years you do lose your purchasing power and so that puts a lot of pressure on average iranians so if you live in the imperial core in a place like us and canada even if there's inflation and even if there are ups and downs or economic recessions globally, your purchasing power over the years don't go down as much. I was hearing from a friend today that Toyota Camry or Corolla are way more expensive now than they were before COVID. There is that, but at the same time, you don't really notice inflation as much. So the imperial court is able to absorb a lot of the pressure from the ups and downs of the global economy. Whereas with a country like Iran that is under imperialist sabotage, what happens is that the power of the sanctions and the imperialist sabotage the economy does impact the average consumer and the average Iranian. And the protests began in response to that economic pressure. But what ended up happening is that They began on December 29th, the morning of December 29th. And initially, they appeared to be organic and in response to inflation. But by January 8th, they became much more violent. And it appears that a foreign intelligence named the US and Israel were organizing armed groups on the streets to create a lot of chaos. And because of that, I would say they lost their legitimacy, even with average Iranian protesters. So if you talk to people on the streets, I hate to do this when they say, my sources in Iran tell me this. But the thing is just my lived experience here, which is stretched throughout many years, I kind of saw it in people. They were saying that, well, I am mad about the inflation. I'm very distressed about the economic situation. But I don't want people burning mosques, burning fire trucks, or killing these police officers that are getting paid $100 a month to be on the streets and provide safety for the country. So I would say they lost their legitimacy with the majority of Iranians as they're trained violence on January 8th and January 9th.

Adnan Hussain: Yes. Well, a couple of things to pick up on. A very important point I think you mentioned and may not be appreciated by people outside of Iran is how a neoliberal kind of policy has increased social stratification and wealth inequality in Iran, which is both a product in some ways of the sanctions and the way in which it creates a kind of black market situation kind of economy, you know, the people who can arrange to, you know, bring goods in, you know, and circumvent sanctions. And of course, usually that has to happen with some kind of government kind of approval or, you know, and so you have like the possibility for corruption, you know, really existing there. And that also widens the gap, you know, where increasingly, you know, resources are in the hands of a very few who have a relationship with the with the government and so on. But secondly, also just that there has been a period of neoliberal restructuring of the economy. My understanding and you can perhaps tell us much more is that, This has progressively happened as cuts to certain kinds of social services and, you know, opening up, you know, industries and things that might have been nationalized in the early period of the revolution and under control are then, you know, being given as sort of franchise, privatized, semi-privatized, etc. and that this has had a continuing effect and that a lot of the people who have overseen this on the part of the government and government policy are themselves people who've absorbed these ideas about how the economy is supposed to work that goes against the kind of maybe more social solidaristic kind of impetus that you know may have been there you know at the time of the revolution but that they have dealt with these neoliberal ideas and policies. I don't know if you would be able to tell us more about how that has worked out and what the devastating consequences of that has been on the society and particularly in creating, as you just called them, a Westernized, which is certainly not how most people look at the elites of Iran. They don't think of them as Westernized. They think of them, well, this is the problem that we have is that

Navid Zarrinnal: you know they're from the east and they have their own ideas and you know they it's not compatible with the west but it's a bit more of an interesting story could you elaborate on this yeah you know i mean this is actually one of the big uh puzzles or ironies of the iran revolution is that a lot of the people a lot of the revolutionaries who overtook the u.s embassy in 1979 because the u.s embassy has aided the 1953 coup d'etat against muhammad mossad their children now are studying in the west or they live in the west so that's one of the bigger ironies and i think the reason is that uh west toxification in iran has very deep cultural and historical roots that the iran revolution was not able to remedy i mean it did revolution right revolutionize the political structure, but culturally, I think a lot of Iranians remain West toxified and they kind of look to Europe and the West as the places where you would do your education and where you will do business. And even the Rouhani administration that, you know, it was led by a cleric, Hassan Rouhani, but at the same time when they did the Iran nuclear deal, They were just so delighted because they could do business with the Europeans again, even though it only lasted for about two years. But there are reports that the Rouhani administration has stopped looking towards China when the nuclear deal happened because they were like, no, now we can actually do business with the Europeans. So there is that kind of... uh constituency demographic um and perspective within the iranian elites that they look towards the west or their children to study in the west or that they're hoping that iran becomes a normal country so they can you know again do business with the west and kind of incorporate themselves into the new liberal markets but then you have the kind of the other demographic that is not like that that they try to resist the West and they don't want to engage with it because they understand. They also learn from the nuclear deal that once you deal with the West and you have deals, they try to sabotage it and they don't even observe or respect their own deals. So you have both of that. And one interesting, one really interesting example from that first demographic is that you have someone like Adi Larijani, who is one of the top Iranian officials. He was also in Oman during the recent negotiations, indirect negotiations with the U.S., But his own daughter was an assistant professor of medicine at Emory University in the US. And because of Zionist and Iranian opposition pressure, they recently sacked her. So Emory University sacked her. And she was terminated from her position as assistant professor. And I don't support the bullying that the Zionists and the Iranian opposition did against her. But I don't support her being at Emory either. Not her. I mean, I don't think it's her problem. She has her own autonomy and agency. But it's a problem of the father. So why would the father, who is supposed to be a revolutionary, enable her daughter to go and study in the West and stay there and get residency and teach at Emory University? So I blame Blayi Jani, not the daughter, because that demoralizes the revolution when you have that kind of a policy and that kind of approach. So there is that. Because of that, I would say you have this bipolarity in Iranian politics, and that's one of the reasons that I think the country is not able to resist as effectively as it should, because you have this bipolarity. Or you could provide a counterargument that this bipolarity could also help it, because in a way, it balances the power between, say, the Eastern Bloc or the Western Bloc, or maybe between Russia and the US. So I don't know. I mean, I think there are different arguments here. But my assessment is that this bipolarity does provide problems when it comes to resistance and having a kind of a unified policy against the pressure that Iran is under.

Adnan Hussain: That's interesting because he's the head of the National Security Council. In fact, I even saw a recent interview with him Basically, maybe it was about two weeks ago and talking, of course, about the threats of war and what is Iran's position in these negotiations and so on. And he seemed actually, it was interesting, he seemed extremely calm. Like the interviewer was asking a lot of leading questions about kind of how I started. Oh, there's this huge armada and like, how are people dealing? with it and he was extremely calm about it and kept saying well we have solutions for this and we're preparing for that and you know um you know he even um was asked like you know and this is something i also wanted to ask you about whether the discourse around you know the nuclear question which is you reference the nuclear negotiations with the jcpoa and know kind of what what the the fact that those were uh you know um torn up by trump you know ended up having political consequences and emboldening the more of you might say the rejectionist anti-imperialist sort of dedicated uh faction in this bipolarities you know being able to say look you can't trust the united states you may spent all this time making a deal which many people had certain problems with the limitations that iran agreed to under this jcpoa for the you know kind of fantastical idea that we could be a normal country and sanctions would be removed and that led to in fact actually a worse situation so there is that kind of uh you know kind of uh point that you were raising but the whole nuclear question he was being asked um you know Shouldn't Iran get a nuclear weapon? And of course, he presented the religious doctrinal position of the Supreme Leader and others saying, look, we are moral people. We have our religious values. We don't believe in weapons of mass destruction. And that's just not something for us. But when being pressed, he said, well, but of course, these things can change. Islamic law is flexible. If you're under existential threat, then you have to adapt to that situation. And as the interviewer pressed even further, he said, look, it's not a big issue whether you get a nuclear weapon or not. That's a matter of a technical thing. It can be assembled very quickly if you the technical capability don't worry about whether we should already have it it's not a problem i i was kind of stunned that he was willing and actually confident enough to say listen these are decisions that will be made at the right time but don't worry it's like possible to do that you know if needed um so anyway that i was just reminded of this interview uh with him but that bring brought up uh this question of you know are there people who are putting pressure feeling like look The only way to really have deterrence is to gain a nuclear weapon capability or at least demonstrate it. And are there calls for this? This has also been used as an excuse to ramp up this pressure upon Iran. So how do you see the discussions in Iranian society, how this is being thought through at this point?

Navid Zarrinnal: Yeah, you know, honestly, it's very confusing. It's very confusing because I don't understand why Iran does not go for a nuclear weapon because I think it would be a major deterrence. And there seems to be that fatwa, the ruling by Ayatollah Khamenei, the Iranian leader, that based on Islamic and humanitarian grounds, you're not supposed to possess weapons of mass destruction. So there's that, but as you're saying, Lari Jani also pointed that Islamic law is flexible, so that could change. uh but when it comes to i mean like this is not something that we talk about that much like i mean at least in my circles we don't really talk about why iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon so it's interesting it's not even something that people like it's not something that we talk about that much at least in my circles uh but i would say that you know it's probably divided again, divided that some people think that is probably not a good idea, but others are saying that it would provide a good deterrence. So I would say that it is pretty divided when it comes to the nuclear issue. But then again, the nuclear issue is more an obsession for the West. Here it's not something that people are talking about every day. But what's even crazy to me too is that over the years, I would say that, Even the Western media kind of forgot about the nuclear issue. So now they're talking more about protests, Iran's missile program. Now they're worried about the missile program. So what's crazy to me is that the nuclear program has been used as a negotiating by the U.S. over the years. Sorry, by Iran over the years. So it is a good kind of a negotiating card to have because the Westerners are so scared of a nuclear Iran that they might be able to give Iran sanctions relief. So there is that. But it does also... But the thing is that even if you put the nuclear program aside, the U.S. and Israel will pick on something else. They will pick on the missile program. They will pick on free speech. They will pick on women's status. So there will always be something that they will pick on in order to attack Iran and sabotage Iranian welfare and security.

Adnan Hussain: Yeah, absolutely. It's obviously been an excuse to put pressure. The real fundamental issue, it seems to me and to many of the guests I've had, is really sovereignty. It's Iran's sovereignty. And this is a problem for kind of aggressive hegemonic order that just cannot tolerate the idea that peoples of West Asia would have their own destiny in their own hands. It's a very fundamental problem and the nuclear question is often, of course, just used as an excuse. But you mentioned now also the protests as an excuse for this humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect. you know kind of inter imperialist humanitarianism trying to use this which was a bizarre thing and they've even sort of forgotten about that but i've noticed that just uh today or yesterday it seems that there were reports about uh new protests that were being much made of in the iranian diasporic media and of course it gets picked up in the Western media as if now they remembered, this whole thing was supposedly we were justifying around supporting the Iranian people and the protests. Thank goodness there's a few people who have done a protest and we can make a big deal out of it. But I wanted to ask from your perspective in Iran, do these reports have much substance what are we talking about it seemed like it was localized in a few universities and that it was coinciding with the 40-day memorials for people who may have been killed during the um you know initial although 40 days would not be, it has not been 40 days really since the January 8th, 9th, which is really when it became violent. But I guess it's basically been 40 days since the start of them. And the narrative is that there were massive suppression and killing of protesters early on. That was something that was manufactured without necessarily any evidence in these narratives. Timing it with the 40 days since the start of the initial economic-based protests, what's your read on these and how are they possibly being used in this situation?

Navid Zarrinnal: Yes, I mean, I saw reports of protests at Iranian universities. Seems like there were some protests. Some were even saying, you know, pro-Shah slogans. So in a way, mimicking what the Iranian opposition is doing in Canada, the monarchist opposition in Canada and the U.S., places like Vancouver and Toronto, where they have a big base. Um, and so some of it's, uh, there were protests and some of them were kind of overlapping with that kind of like diasporic monarchist opposition slogans. But I think the rest of them were not interested in that and they had more issues about a political and economic protest, um, about, uh, you know, localized issues without really any interest in what the diaspora is doing or saying. um so but but we have to see what do what direction it takes uh right now it's too too soon to say uh i mean they could uh persist and grow into something bigger or they might just be contained to the universities um and and go away so we'll see but i haven't seen it uh you know i haven't been to the university uh today and you know the the reports came out today so i only seen it on the media as well but we have to see what direction it takes. And I think one of the protests was at the Sharif University, which is basically a technological university primarily training STEM students, and a lot of them eventually go to the West for their masters and PhDs. and that's kind of a very liberal university that in a way is very like west looking um so protests often erupt there and they don't always have the best politics because if they even if they might have legitimate grievances sometimes those sharif students just kind of mimic the western discourse on iran

Adnan Hussain: Yeah, okay. Well, so I guess we'll have to watch and see whether that is a developing phenomenon or something very localized and specific to these kind of constituencies. But I think that's a concern and an issue because we saw, of course, in the 12-day war that there were Some of the more devastating assassinations and terrorist attacks that took place during that time came not from bombardments from afar and so on, but from things that were launched on the ground. That there were a lot of collaborators and agents that were part of that kind of attack in the initial day or first day or two. And likewise, of course, you pointed out the January 8th, 9th kind of turn. to a really aggressive, violent, disruptive, chaotic, sowing chaos and violence in the protests. At that point, in a lot of cases, clearly there was involvement by foreign intelligence services. There were people coming from cross-border, perhaps in Kurdish areas, Baluch, where there is already a kind of... sort of separatist or at least autonomous kind of movements and that those could be used. That seems like it's a concern. I just would recall myself that it seems to me that it's very, everyone calls it a counterintelligence kind of nightmare situation in Iran because it's such a big country with such you know, borders that are long, very difficult to control. And on these border areas, there are groups that have connections on the other side and these can be used and manipulated. I'm mindful of the fact, for example, that like in the Syrian government regime under the current Takfiri government that they have, that the agreement that was made with the Kurdish groups in the northeastern part of the country led to freeing a lot of people who had been imprisoned, who were ISIS or Al-Qaeda, people who had been kind of under control. Those people have been released. Where they might go, what they might do, whether they're going to get involved with sewing, problems in lebanon against you know hezbollah and try to foment civil war or whether they will come across maybe through kurdistan etc you know to foment problems in iraq with allies you know uh there uh that might exist or into iran like these these seem to be The way in which the imperialists are acting is to create as much destabilization as possible. Is there a discussion about this and how to respond and deal with this? I would just say that myself, when I visited Iran in December for the first time, nobody asked me any questions at the airport. I was shocked. I have a Turkish citizenship and I came in and I was not asked a single question. You know, it's like you don't need a visa because there's that agreement. But I was a little surprised that in this kind of environment and atmosphere, there's not more questions. you know control and monitoring and i'm sure there must be now because of what what's happening but that seems to be uh you know kind of uh uh a real challenge for the state to manage you know that that i'm wondering if you have any sort of thoughts yeah on this

Navid Zarrinnal: I thought you were Pakistani.

Adnan Hussain: I'm Pakistani on one side and Turkish on the other.

Navid Zarrinnal: Oh, wow. Okay, great. Very cosmopolitan and live in Canada. Yes. So I mean, no, you're very right that there is a security challenge in Iran right now. And there has been infiltration by the Mossad. And even not just now, I mean, historically, so back in 2011, if you remember, they assassinated an Iranian nuclear scientist through the MEK, which is an Iranian opposition group that is supported by foreign intelligence. And so Mossad has had successes and infiltration in Iran for a while. But I think this round was pretty bad because they were even able to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh from his hotel room. So the security was so bad that whoever Mossad was working with inside the country was able to kill him. uh in his hotel room so that was you know i think a big vulnerability and a big instance of insecurity um and part of it if i had to be honest has to do with the fact that uh what iranians when it comes to security they're not as careful as say the us or the israelis so they don't have these uh say clear protocols and they you know not everything is securitized in the same way and oftentimes things are based on personal relationships so if you know someone you know you're able to I don't know, maybe get through the security protocols. And then through that, there might be some element of espionage that knows someone that's able to get information. So through that kind of like personal, order that exists in Iran, that's not just in security and everything else, things are more personalized. I would say the Western system is more kind of abstract, the Western bureaucracy and Western war culture, everything is more abstract, more impersonal, but here things are more personal. And I think that also creates a vulnerability when it comes to the security. And you're also very right that when I enter, too, they never ask me any questions. So the airport is very relaxed. But it is true that when you're inside the country. So I think with US and Canada, how it works is that when you're trying to enter, they ask you 100 questions. And they're very difficult and kind of even harass you, hold you, interrogate you. But in Iran, you enter at the airport. They don't really care. But once you're in the country and if you raise suspicions, then they might come and take you and question you. So it works like that. But I'd say that, yes, there are the security vulnerabilities. But there are reports from the Iranian media that there has been kind of a tightening of that in the past six months. And many of the groups that were working with the Mossad during the 12-day war have been arrested. and also the groups that were working with foreign intelligence during the recent riots have also been arrested. These are some of the reports that we've been getting from the Iranian media.

Adnan Hussain: Yeah, okay, interesting. I mean one thing that came up just before we were talking a little bit, you were mentioning about the monarchists in the diaspora and this is actually something that I'm quite astonished by is that here in Toronto, well I'm not in Toronto but that's the nearest big city and in Toronto a week or two weeks ago there was a large protest in favor of Canada being involved and putting pressure that Canada should be supportive of the U.S. administration's belligerence towards Iran and get involved. They wanted action for war, essentially. And that the numbers were large enough that according to some people who've gone to many protests, and I talked with somebody who works downtown and had to pass by this big protest of the pro-monarchist Iranians in the diaspora, he told me that he thought that those might have been actually even bigger than the anti-genocide, pro-Palestine solidarity protests that have happened in Toronto, which I was absolutely astonished to contemplate such a thing. I mean, there is a large diaspora, but it's also partly because they seem to have communicated a message to the wider Canadian society as well that this is somehow being in solidarity with the people of Iran. But of course, they were full of Israeli flags and truly awful kind of rhetoric. How are these people regarded and is there a greater, because I know that they beam all of their, media. There's just constant 24-7 there, many TV channels they have and websites and that they're constantly sending this kind of message into Iran. How are they being regarded? Has it had a detrimental effect? But given the fact that these people seem to be calling for a war and bombardment you know of their own you know country um you know how are people in inside iran reacting to um the diaspora outside and the political project that they are supporting

Navid Zarrinnal: Yeah, so I would say that the, I call them the loony, on Rania's show, I call them the loony opposition. And I think they are loony in a major way. And here I would say, I mean, maybe like Iranians here are not really thinking about the diaspora opposition that much, but what is true is that there is kind of a shared ideological agenda that is fed to some people here and also the diasporic opposition through the imperialist media, including the Persian language media that are funded by the Zionists and by the US, such as Voice of America such as BBC Persian, such as Iran International, that was initially funded most likely by Saudi Arabia. But after China brokered the deal between Iran and Saudi, I think the Saudis stopped funding it. And the funding shifted to the Zionists. The Zionists began to fund it. So through that media, there is this kind of like interest in Reza Pahlavi, who is being groomed as kind of the opposition leader that could become the transitional leader in Iran or even, you know, restore the monarchy. Some of his supporters want him to restore the monarchy. So during the protests here, you do hear slogans such as Javid Shah, you know, protests in favor of Reza Pahlavi. So you hear that stuff. So there is that shared ideological kind of meeting between these groups, but at the same time, they're not really engaging with the diaspora opposition, minus them consuming the diaspora media. So if they're watching Iran International, that is necessarily being broadcasted and fed into Iran from abroad. So in that sense, they are seeing all these diaspora opposition figures that are speaking to them and they become influenced by them and partly because the iranian medias locally have not been that effective so a lot of them they don't have a big viewership partly because of their own poor way of production and their poor programming, but partly because the imperialist media cast such a large shadow over the globe. So because of that, a lot of Iranians turn to Iran International as their main source of information, but I think their minds are being poisoned because Iran International, I mean, just the kind of the constant propaganda that they are targeting Iranians with, it's just awful. And this cycle, I would say, was very unprofessional too, because before this, during the Women Live Freedom movement, I would say it was more professional, more believable. But now it's just so ridiculous and so unbelievable, including the Western language, the English language media. So New York Post, too, which is a loony right wing media, they're putting out stories that are just so ludicrous. I mean, I think they were claiming that the Iranian security forces are going to hospitals and shooting people. who are on hospital beds, or they're going and destroying women's womb in the hospitals, or they were putting photos of random shoes and saying, these are the shoes of the Iranian protesters who were being killed. So I mean, the propaganda is even just like, it's just loony at this point, that anyone with a brain should not believe it. But I think they're becoming so daring, and also they're becoming so unhinged, that they're putting out these ludicrous stories, and some people still believe it.

Adnan Hussain: Yeah, well, you know, that's interesting that you mentioned that about the hospital because I also saw a report in Iran International that mentioned a crazy story that IRGC officials were meeting secretly in a hospital. They don't have places that are like bunkers and all of this, but what it suggested was that they're trying to say that if the US attacks and they destroy all the civilian infrastructure, you know gazification of iran right is to basically say oh it's like you know what israel and it's the israelification if you want to put it that way and it just shows you what like has been made possible increasingly you know by uh israel's genocidal assault upon gaza is that you know of course there was like collateral damage you know in the iraq war in 2003 this is when we started really hearing about collateral damage but there was this theory of it like well they're not our target but sometimes it happens and and so on that has been dispensed with by saying, well, look, the terrorists are meeting in these, they're using it as a, they're using hospitals, ambulances, all these things in order to enable, they're meeting in schools, et cetera, in order to enable and justify the devastation of all these civilian infrastructures and institutions that normally everyone would condemn as war crimes, but in the West it's now become possible.

Navid Zarrinnal: That story, I saw the Iran International story, and it was absolutely crazy the one you just mentioned, that the Revolutionary Guard was meeting in hospitals. I mean, also, if you just use your basic brain power here, you would understand that Iran is a country right now. The Revolutionary Guard is a powerful organization. They have their own homes. They have offices. They have buildings. They have everything they need. have meetings why the hell would they meet in hospitals i mean the story is just so ludicrous and so my point is that if you're going to have propaganda at least professionally and do it in a way that's believable but as you're saying they're doing it in order to manufacture consent for the war and i think the western audience is so bombarded by that anti-palestinian anti-hamas propaganda that Hamas is using these human shields and meeting in hospitals and meeting in civilian homes and all that. So you start propaganda that they think it would also work with the Iranian case, even though if you had the most basic brain power and the most basic information, you would know that this is not true. I mean, it might be true that there's a member of the Revolutionary Guard because Revolutionary Guard is a big organization that received care at a hospital. That might be true. But the fact that they're kind of like having these sophisticated meetings in hospitals, it is just ludicrous. But they're pushing it in order to generate consent for a war on Iran.

Adnan Hussain: Yeah. And a particular approach to war, right? You know, an approach to war that is the Western way of war now, which is devastate the Dahiya doctrine, you know, for all the global South, right? It's like, it's okay now to destroy schools and hospitals and to bomb ambulances and aid workers and all of that, because, you know, this is the new reality that has been established. The, the, the, you know, what Israel has, you know, Israel's genocide is a gift to Western genocidal, you know, colonial style violence, you know, exterminate the brutes, right? So this is, this is kind of what's happening, it seems to me, you know, and this is also partly allowable, as you're pointing out, because of the kind of propaganda in the imagination that associates, you know, all these Muslims, you know, as like religious fanatics that, you know, it's justified because they're a danger and a threat and, you know, are outside the bounds of civilization. And so they can be treated in this way. They are barbaric, so we can treat them barbarically. Right. You know, and and so on. And, you know, this seems to rely on these kind of very durable ideas that, especially post-revolutionary Iran, that it's a kind of totalitarian theocracy, right? And this is something that I wanted to talk with you a little bit because I know of your interest in your historical studies of trying to really understand what kind of social theory is being used and applied, its limitations from Western kind of It's not even just Orientalism. Of course, there's the reason why it's so easy to apply it and not question it when it comes to societies in West Asia is because of Orientalism, because of Islamophobia and so on. But there is also just the Western social theory thinks or creates these categories. And when they're applied in various ways, they they may produce, you know, distortions that don't actually make sense for society like Iran. So this idea that they are a theocracy. Right. You know, and you know, that it was a reversal of a secular sort of government by this kind of religious revolution that has imposed now a theocracy and therefore everything that, you know, we can understand about Iran is through the lens of it being this, you know, kind of religious fanatical and therefore aggressive and very dangerous and irrational, you know, force. I'm wondering, you know, how you would respond to this, particularly, you know, you know, the post-revolutionary Iranian society, how would you counter these sorts of kind of very durable and present kind of embedded ideas about Iran?

Navid Zarrinnal: Yeah. So, I mean, when you hear the term theocracy in the Western media and the Western discourse, even the academic discourse, it is usually implied that it's inherently a bad thing, that if you have a theocracy, it is necessarily oppressive and repressive. So, I mean, what's interesting is I even see it from Muslim friends. I was having kind of a debate on my social media. where one of my Muslim American friends was like, I like the Iranian people, but I condemn the Iranian theocracy. So the implication is that if the government is theocratic, it will necessarily be a bad government. But I think what is happening here, going back to your question or your interest in social theory, is that people are universalizing from the European experience. So because in the European experience, you had, in a way, the destabilization of theocracy to have something better. So you destabilize the Catholic clergy in order to have, say, secularization, to have liberalism, to have individual liberty, to dispossess the clergy and the church of their power. So you have these new possibilities. And that is kind of the history of modern Europe. But the Iranian case is very different. So you cannot universalize your opposition to theocracy from the European case to the Iranian one, because in the Iranian case, the Muslim Shia clerics or the ulama were actually the mediators between the rulers and the people. So historically, I mean, yes, there were the bad clerics that were siding with the rulers or they were enriching themselves at the expense of the population. But then there were also a major demographic within the ulama that stood for the people. There were also the judges and the legislators. So if there was an injustice, people would come to their courts, to the Sharia court, so that Muslim Shia cleric would adjudicate between somebody who had oppressed them and the person who was making the complaint. So historically, they served as the representative of the people. And then when you had the Pahlavi dynasty, and you had major modernization, their power was weakened, but they were still big participants in the social movements and in the revolution of 1979. I mean, in a way, they made the revolution. The most prominent leader of the revolution was Ayatollah Khomeini, who was a Shia cleric, and he had large popular and social support. So people like people in my family who were close to the Shah, they didn't like Khomeini. But then he had a very large social and popular base. And that's one of the reasons that his leadership of the revolution was successful. And then after the revolution happens, then you have the Shia clerics that populate the legislative branch, namely the parliament. Khomeini himself serves as the executive leader. And then you also have the revolution, revamping and a revolution within the judiciary too, where you have a lot of the clerics that also populate the judiciary. So in that sense, if you look at that history, you cannot really say that a theocracy is necessarily oppressive and repressive and all that. I mean, it has a potential. I mean, it is true that, you know, once the clerics take over the modernist state, there is this potential for them to act in oppressive ways because the modernist states you know, if you take the arguments by people like Walhalaf seriously, it does have this inherent immorality to it, right? So once the Shia clerics kind of move to the modern state and become the custodians of the modern state, then you have the potential for problems. But then if you look at the Iranian history, you cannot say that mediocrity is necessarily something that is oppressive. And you could say that within the Iranian context, it does make some sense.

Adnan Hussain: Yeah, it's definitely a much more complicated story and it follows a different historical trajectory. So the kind of narrative of historical progression that would make sense for if you are studying European history, I think the problem is, as you put it so well, the universalizing, I guess we would say, is universalizing the outcomes of Western history for the world as theory. If we developed our theory from a base of Islamicate history, we might come up with rather different theoretical insights, social categories, and so on. It's just that modern academic discourse hasn't really developed that. It's only developed this Western set of ways of looking and naming these phenomenon that as you're pointing out, I mean, it has a different historical background behind it. And so the insights of how we would judge and understand theocracy or the relationship between the secular and the religious, what kind of a division that is, whether it's meaningful, These are questions that sound very abstract and academic, but in point of fact, they are so far, so deeply rooted in the way that the Western media and propaganda, it can rely upon these as very well-established kinds of categories that it can appeal to in this propagandistic move to justifying and mobilizing for war. So it makes the counterpoint that much more difficult. You can't say in a sound bite that there's this whole other history and reality to humanize the Iranian people and their experience for this Western audience. It takes time. And I have to say, and that's why an opportunity to have a discussion with you like this for people is really valuable, because it takes time and it takes this knowledge to really try and change people's minds and frameworks by which they're looking at the situation. But I'm hoping that people, after learning some of this history and this analysis and your own lived experience and analysis of what's going on in Iran, you know might feel like um this is a pressing issue uh that it is a shame that the only people who are out in the streets um you know kind of making demands on uh you know governments in the west is that they should you know go to war over this um like you know what can people do in the imperial core what do you think um you know what kind what is solidarity what might solidarity uh for people in iran mean you know how might it express itself Yeah, great question. Great question.

Navid Zarrinnal: You know, I would say what is not solidarity because, you know, during the 12 day war, I saw these letters that were being circulated by Western academics and they were saying that, you know, we don't like what Israel is doing attacking Iran. But at the same time, we condemn the theocratic regime and we support the grassroots activists in opposing Israel. But to my mind was that this is not solidarity. I mean, I understand that the Iranian estate is a modern estate. It has a repressive estate apparatus. It does, you know, kill people. It does repress dissents. There's all that. You know, it does generate inequality. There is all that. But at the same time, if you want to express solidarity, you're not going to issue some abstract statement about this abstract iranian grassroots people that would fight israel you would actually support the existing infrastructure that is capable of defending iran and that is iran in the state so when it comes to the us and israeli aggression on iran i don't think people in the imperial court should moralize about the iranian regime rather they should defend Iran's sovereignty and Iran's right to defend itself. And Iran here also means the Iranian state. So I think that is the best way to express solidarity and also to advocate for the removal of sanctions and for treating Iran as a pariah state that has to be sanctioned and sabotage and all that. And once the sanctions are lifted, once the hybrid war on Iran is over, and once iran is no longer being attacked militarily or economically by u.s israel and the collective west then the iranians can decide their own fate and i give you one really interesting example here i mean there was all this talk during the women like freedom movement that if the u.s doesn't militarily intervene or if you know there's not some sort of material support by the westerners the iranian women will never become free but what happened is that after that protest movement the mandatory bailing is pretty much gone now i mean it's it's still in the laws but it's not being enforced at all so cracks within the iranian society and changes from within cause the loosening of the bad policies against women and of the loosening of mandatory bailing. And the same thing could happen in other areas. So I think what the people in the imperial court need to understand, especially the leftists and the liberals who love to moralize about everything, is that if you just focus on the Western policies, the bad Western policies, then you will provide breathing room and a space for Iranians themselves to change things and decide their own fate and destiny.

Adnan Hussain: Absolutely. I'm so glad that you put it in those terms, because the worst thing that you can do is have these imperialist interventions and the sanctions and all of these things that prevent the Iranian people themselves from being able to make these decisions and choices for the future of their society and their country. And in fact, actually, if they had the space, as you're saying, there might be all kinds of very interesting social and economic and political and religious developments taking place in such a complex, diverse, society like Iran and this is something that I think unfortunately our listeners know and understand, but I think the people in the West that are fulminating now about how they're going to destroy Iran and we've got all this military there and they're so arrogant and self-satisfied in their imperialist self-projections that they forget that Iran is a society that has had a continuous kind of like political culture, forms of political organization for several thousands of years. It's like all the governors, the military was Turks historically in West Asia. became the Turks, but the governors, the people of statecraft, the managers of a state were Persian peoples because they have that tradition. This is a sophisticated society and The worst thing that has happened is these sanctions and this attempt to persecute Iran for pursuing its own sovereignty through its revolution that happened in 1979. has only led to outcomes of greater war and animosity and polarization and been devastating for the region. Just think if Iran was able to be a nation that could develop on its own basis, what it could do in the region. Yeah. So I really appreciate so much having you on, Naveed, to talk about this and to bring your very historical and analytical perspective for our audience. I'm wondering if there's anything else that you'd like to say about the situation or about Iran, particularly since This audience is of mostly, I would say, kind of diasporic Muslims, leftists, anti-imperialists, and so forth, who are going to be receptive to your message, but might want to be encouraged or emboldened further in their solidarity with the people of Iran.

Navid Zarrinnal: Yeah, so the last thing I would say is that we should not look at the situation as just a couple of states fighting, because how it's often represented in the Western media is that you have Israel fighting Iran. There are two states, and they're just fighting. That's how it's represented. But then I see it as an issue of justice. I mean, there's this suspended professor at University of Arkansas, Shirina Saidi, who has done great work. She's a great scholar of women's history and women's politics in post-revolutionary Iran. And she was recently suspended from her position as an associate professor of political science at the University of Arkansas for a couple of tweets she had about the situation in Palestine and Iran. And she was also removed as a director of the Middle East center there. So very repressive stuff that's happening at American universities. I think Canadian universities are a little bit better right now. um and she was you know what i loved about her her social media profile is that her kind of bio was justice for iran and i hadn't seen that before because oftentimes you would see no war on iran but i think justice for iran is a beautiful expression because what it means is that this is not about a couple of states fighting or not about some you know just some geopolitical conflict it's also about fundamentally an issue of justice because Iran is being denied her basic sovereign rights because all these other countries have nuclear energy programs that helps them for civilian purposes, such as a generation of electricity. But here in Iran, we're denied those basic fundamental sovereign rights that everybody else gets to enjoy because the Iranian state and the Iranian revolution has refused to toe the line and follow what the West and the Zionists tell them. And because Israel does not want any competition, any hostile competition in the region. So fundamentally, it's an issue of justice. And I think we should look at it that way. And once we see it that way, we are able to probably bolster and strengthen our advocacy for Iranian sovereignty. So the Iranians are left alone. And this war that now is degenerating from an economic war into a military war is lifted. And then Iranians are able to live with peace and security and also decide their own destiny and political fate.

Adnan Hussain: Wonderful. Those are great concluding words, Navid. And I encourage all of our listeners to go check out the Colony Archive. I know, of course, given the internet situation and sanctions and all of that, it's been difficult. to be as active there perhaps as you have been in years past. But there's a lot of wonderful archival recordings and essays and things there. And I hope, inshallah, there will be much, much more. And people should support it. So they can go to patreon.com slash thecolonyarchive to support it. But also check out the past videos on your YouTube channel. There's still quite a bit there. and they should follow your work. And we hope that we'll have a chance to have you back on the program, both to talk about the continuing situation as it develops, but also about your work and your research, which is fascinating. And I feel like there's a lot of sympathetic interest that we have about rethinking social theory from a non-Eurocentric perspective that you know would also be exciting and interesting to to talk about uh and not just about you know the terrible you know military threats and so on so we hope to be back on again soon

Navid Zarrinnal: Yeah, and I think this is the one last thing I say is that you're very much right that I think if we write historical explanations from the experience of people outside the West and revise historiography and social theory based on that, then a lot of this also I think it ties back to imperialism. Because I think intellectual thought feeds into imperialism. And if we actually revise our understanding and revise also theory, then we come to a place where imperialism also loses some of its intellectual power. So I think that's also very important. I think it's a little bit more of an abstract academic discussion that I don't want to bore your audience with. But I think some of them have the patience for it. But yeah, hopefully we can talk about that at some point as well.

Adnan Hussain: Yes, we must. I mean, that's a great topic, a really important and interesting one for the reasons you just pointed out. And I know it's also very late there. You've been so generous with your time and staying up late. My audience really appreciates it, as do I. So we'll look forward to talking again soon. To all the rest of you, thank you for watching. And we'll see you again soon, inshallah. Peace with justice, very important point. Let's think about even the Iran situation through the lens of justice and solidarity to you all.