Gamal Abdel Nasser - His Words

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Speaker 2: And Back to Egypt to talk to Colonel Nasser, Egypt's prime minister, who helped throw Farouk out of his palace. As later on in Israel, I also interviewed their prime minister. I've put their answers together. First, Colonel Nasser.

Speaker 3: What do you think are the prospects of tension being reduced in the Middle East?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Really, it depends completely on the Israeli attitude. If they continue to adopt their hostile attitude, Hostility and their hostile policy, I think the tension will continue. Mr. Ben-Gurion said one time that he wants to force a peace, to force settlement. As I can understand, to force a thing must be by strength, must be by war. As long as they are adopting this policy, there will be no easing of the tension in this area.

Speaker 3: I'm sitting with Mr. David Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel. Prime Minister, what is the present attitude of Israel towards Egypt and the Arab countries?

David Ben-Gurion: The same as it was all the time after we defeated the invading Arab armies in Palestine, and that is peace and cooperation between us and our neighbors for the mutual benefit of all the peoples in the Middle East.

Speaker 3: What is the Arab case against Israel?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Really, the Arab case is the case of Palestinians, the case of human rights, the case of those people who were driven out of their land, their motherland, to be refugees in the other Arab countries. This is really what we feel is the most important problem. We have 2 problems. The problem of the refugees, the 1 million refugees, and the problem of the frontiers.

Speaker 3: What contribution is Israel prepared to make towards the Arab refugee problem?

David Ben-Gurion: Well, we would help them financially, we would compensate them for their property, and we would put our experts and our experience in settling refugees, as we have settled since the establishment of the state, More than 700,000 refugees, most of them from Arab countries. We will put all our experience at the disposal of the Arab countries to settling Arab refugees in their countries.

Speaker 3: Well, on what sort of conditions do you think it would be possible to have a peace settlement?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Really, it is not a matter of conditions. The United Nations have decided a solution about the Palestinian problem. If these resolutions can be put into effect, I think this will ease the tension in this area.

Speaker 3: But didn't that include an Arab state inside Palestine, a new Arab state?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes.

Speaker 3: But would, would that still be acceptable to the Arab countries?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: This is what all the Arab countries have asked. In Bandung Conference, for instance, we asked the Arab countries and the Asian-African Conference asked to put into effect the United Nations resolutions.

Speaker 3: But as it stood?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes.

Speaker 3: Well, on what sort of conditions do you think it would be possible to get a peace settlement?

David Ben-Gurion: The conditions is if the other side also will feel the need for peace.

Speaker 3: Well, Colonel Nasser said to me that as far as he was concerned, the conditions for peace would be based on the U.N.A. resolutions. How do you react to that?

David Ben-Gurion: You mean U.N.A. resolutions of '47?

Speaker 3: Yes.

David Ben-Gurion: Well, those resolutions were not only opposed by all the Arab states and Egypt, but they were violated. And the Egyptian armies, together with other Arab armies, invaded Israel the day it was established. And as we cannot bring back all our dead sons and daughters who died in that war, of independence, that resolution cannot be brought back. The peace must be made on the status quo.

Speaker 2: President Nasser, King Hussein of Jordan said in a speech in Washington recently that he was speaking with your personal authority when he offered Israel a 6-point settlement of the 1967 Do you wish to add to or elaborate upon the King's statement?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, it was said by the news agencies and the press that in the Press Club in New York, King Hussein said these points. It was said that this was a new project for peaceful Well, I, I don't think that there is a new project for a settlement. There is only one project. This is the United Nations Security Council resolution of 1967. Of course, King Hussein and I have agreed about the implementation of this resolution. What is the So there is nothing new, there is no new plan.

Speaker 2: Well, I think I agree with you that King Hussein's points were precisely the same ones that you gave to Newsweek in February in a conversation like this one. And they are based, I believe, on the— clearly on the resolution of the United Nations. King Hussein was more specific, it seems, on only one point. That is the point, I think, that attracted the greatest interest in the United States. He said, or implied, that Israel would get freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal in any settlement of the war. Is that, in your view, a correct interpretation of the 1967 resolution and of your own 6 points?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, according to the United Nations resolution, there are 2 main points. The first point was about the complete withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the occupied Arab territories. The second main point was the non-belligerency by all nations in the area, then the right of each country to live in peace, then the integrity of the countries in the Middle East. This was the main first point. The second main point was about the freedom of navigation on the water passages. Then solving the refugee problem according to the United Nations and must be just solution. And the third point was about demilitarized zones and something like that. So there was nothing in the resolution specifically about the Suez Canal, but It is a package deal. You know, if Israel agrees about the implementation of all the points of the resolution, well, so they, they will have free passage in the Suez Canal. If they don't agree about the implementation of all the resolution, then there will be no peaceful settlement. The problem will continue.

Speaker 2: Let me be sure I am understanding your point now. The United Nations resolution referred to, I think, freedom of navigation on international waterways. Do you consider that the Suez Canal is an international waterway and should be free to all nations, assuming, as you say, that a peaceful settlement was reached with Israel?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes, yes.

Speaker 2: And the Israelis, in case of a peaceful settlement with the Arab governments would then be on the same footing as all other nations when it came to using the Suez Canal.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, the problem between the Arabs and the Israelis is a problem going on for 20 years. I think many people in your country don't follow the reasons of the continuation of this problem for a long time. He was talking now just to the audience and skipped You are speaking about the war of 1948. Well, there was a war in 1948. Some people under the Israeli propaganda accuse us of beginning this war, which is not true. I saw that in many of the newspapers and magazines in the United States. In 1948, well, there was the partition. There was the Palestinian state and the Jewish state. Before naming the Jewish state, this was decided in the United Nations. And on 15th of May, Britain decided to leave Palestine. Before the 15th of May, 1948, the Israelis attacked the Palestinian state. They occupied Jaffa. They occupied Acre. They occupied many territories of the so-called Palestinian state, which was really said by the United Nations. Well, this was the reason of the first war. The Arabs went on, of course, to secure the Palestinians and to help the Arabs in the Palestine state. What happened after that? There was the armistice agreement. But also there were United Nations resolutions by that time, after the war and during the war, that the refugees, the Palestinians who were expelled out of their country, return back and have compensation about the damages. Israel refused to implement this resolution. Then there was a resolution for a conciliation committee, and the Israelis agreed and the Arabs agreed to attend this conciliation committee. This was in '49. We went there. The committee was formed from the United States, France, and Turkey. And still the committee until now in the United Nations. But after the first meeting, the Israelis refused to talk about the rehabilitation of the Arabs or the return of the Palestinians. They refused to talk about it? This was the reason. We were insisting about the rights of the Arabs, of Palestinians, according to the United Nations resolutions. The Israelis refused, and that's why the problem continued for 20 years. From that time, the Suez Canal question continued also. Israel was not permitted to use the Suez Canal until they implement the United Nations resolution.

David Ben-Gurion: That's right.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: They refused to implement the United Nations resolution, and so they were not permitted to use the Suez Canal until today. So the question is connected together.

Speaker 2: How do you think that a settlement— you say that if a satisfactory settlement were reached with Israel, then they could be given a normal place in the life of the Middle East, is I think what you're saying. How do you propose that the settlement should be reached? What would you say of the Jarring mission, the mission of Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations envoy? Is that the way to go about it, or should we— should there be negotiations with Israel or an exchange of declarations? What is your view of the way the settlement should be approached?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, in order To reach peace, we have to give up— or the Israelis have to give up expansion. If they insist about expansion, there will be no peace. From the statements of all the Israeli leaders, they speak about expansion, about Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and parts from Sinai, and parts from the Western Bank. Yes. So if we want, or if the world community want peace, they must feel that peace don't mean expansion to any party. Then after that, Israel was created by the United Nations. So in order to achieve peaceful settlement, this must be through the United Nations.

Speaker 2: Through the United Nations?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yeah.

Speaker 2: Through the Yaring Mission or through other means?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Any means to the same.

Speaker 2: The Israelis, as you very well know, have repeatedly said that they want to sit down face-to-face with the Arabs. They prefer that method of approach, or keep saying that they do. What is wrong with that from the Arab point of view? I have just been in Paris, for example, where the United States is sitting down with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. What is wrong with direct face-to-face negotiations? I might add that the negotiations in Paris are not proceeding very rapidly, but nevertheless they are going on.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, the question is different from the meetings of Paris. Now there is a nation, country, with their armed forces occupying Big part of the Arab territories— Sinai, the Western Bank of Jordan, the Golan Heights in Syria. So if we sit with them on a table to negotiate terms for peace, we'll be sitting on a table of capitulation. They'll be in the strong situation. And, well, the— I think that's a very important point. They will ask, either we accept their terms, they will be in a position to dictate, or they will not leave the occupied territories. And, well, that's what they say today. They say today, either the Arabs do so, so, and so, and so, or we will not evacuate the occupied territories. So, as I said, Israel was created by the United Nations. The United Nations was responsible about all these developments in this area, about all these troubles in this area, so we think better to have the peaceful settlement through the United Nations.

Speaker 2: Well, U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, has just said in the past few days, as you know, that there has been no perceptible progress through the Jarring mission and that he doesn't think that Dr. Jarring will wish to continue for another year and a half to Meanwhile, the big 4 powers are continuing to meet, at least on the level of ambassadors. They seem also not to have accomplished a great deal, but they are continuing to meet. Do you have any hopes from the 4-power meetings? Do you support their effort and encourage it?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, we have to ask and we have to know why U Thant has said that there was no progress in Yaring mission. Well, the Israelis refused to implement the United Nations resolution. They refused to answer. They insisted only about one question in their talks with Yaring, that the Arabs have to come and sit with us, and after that we are ready to say our points of view. But on the other hand, the statements of the leaders of Israel are mainly concentrating on the point of view of expansion. They want to take the Arab land and add it to the Israeli land. Well, about the Four Powers meeting, this is a step which is going now from the beginning of this month for 15 days. Well, we have to wait and see how the Four Powers will come Are you being informed regularly about the 4-power negotiations? Well, I'm not informed, but I know what's going on.

Speaker 2: Oh, I see. You have your means.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes. Good.

Speaker 2: Do you feel that a 4-power guarantee of any settlement reached with Israel would be desirable? Do you want such a guarantee, or do you feel the need of such a guarantee?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I think if there is a guarantee, to the settlement. We prefer to have this guarantee through the Security Council. The 4 powers are members in the Security Council.

Speaker 2: Would you— when you say a guarantee by the United Nations, would you envision then a restoration of some kind of United Nations force in this area?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, these are details. If we have United Nations forces in this area. These forces have to be according to our consent and according to the Israelis' consent. And we think that these United Nations forces have to be astride the borders. And, well, if there is peace, really, if the Israelis agree to solve the 2 main problems— and the first main problem is the land, that is, not to keep the occupied territory.

Speaker 2: Right.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: And the second main problem is the people, the Palestinians. If they agree to give the Palestinians their rights according to the United Nations resolution, there will be no trouble in this area. There will be peace. So there will be no need to the international forces or any other means.

Speaker 2: You alluded there indirectly to something that might be of interest, and that is You said that the United Nations force would have to be here by the agreement of the Arabs and the Israelis, and that they should be along the borders. I believe that this implies that you would not consider the demilitarization of the Sinai Desert, which is the largest part of Egyptian territory now occupied by the Israelis. Is that the correct interpretation?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: We haven't said anything about the Demilitarization of Sinai Desert. This was said by some of the Israeli leaders or military people. But if we agree about the demilitarization of Sinai, by that we will be giving the Israelis opportunity to be in Cairo within 12 hours, because if they move from the borders through open Sinai, well, we'll not be feeling at all security. And if there is peace, why we agree about demilitarization of Sinai? If the Israelis ask about the demilitarization of Sinai, this means that they don't want peace or they don't intend peace.

Speaker 2: Can you envision a situation where the United Nations might simply supervise The borders, however, and leave Egypt in full occupation of its territory, that is the Sinai Desert. Can you envision a United Nations force patrolling the borders, at least in the early stages of a peace settlement, in order to avoid incidents?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I think these are details to be discussed to achieve the peaceful solution. You know, in 1956, the recommendation of the United Nations was to have a police force, international police force, in the Israeli side and in the Egyptian side. But there was only one condition, that's to have this— to Yes. With the consent of the campers. We agreed. Then the Israelis refused, and then the police force continued for 10 times. When we asked the withdrawal of the police force, well, there were protests from the Israelis that we asked the withdrawal of the police force, but they refused to say, or people forget to remember, that they refused 10 years ago, or more than 10 years ago, To have police force there. By having the police force on either sides, this will give security to everyone. If they don't consent to have the police force, there will be police force on our side. If we withdraw the police force, there will be police force on the other side of the borders.

Speaker 2: I see. The question comes down then to this point, it seems to me. What measures would you take to provide the secure borders that is mentioned in the United Nations resolution? What measures would be taken? Simply the signing of a peace treaty or the signing of a peace agreement or a declaration of peace between the powers? Or would you take any measures at all to—

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, there are many measures, but the most important one is Peace. If there is a solution about the territory, about the withdrawal of the Israelis from all the occupied territory, and if there is also solution to the Palestinians' problem and implement the United Nations resolution according to their rights in their homeland. Well, there will be no problems after that. There will be no reasons for tension.

Speaker 2: You've mentioned several times, and other spokesmen of the Arab cause have mentioned frequently, the plight of the Palestinian Arab refugees. You seem to place great stress on that. That is, the plight of the people who've been displaced from the territory that is now Israeli or Israeli-occupied. Is there— do you consider that their right to repatriation or compensation is an absolute prerequisite for peace? In other words, if the Israelis would not agree to repatriate these people, allow them to return to their former homes, or to compensate them to allow them to settle elsewhere, a peace agreement would be impossible. Is that the Arab view?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, as I told you at the beginning, Why this problem have been going on for 20 years? After '48, we accepted to go to Lausanne and to attend there with the Israelis and meet through the conciliation committee in order to solve the problem of the refugees according to the United Nations resolution. The United Nations resolution said that they have to return back and be compensated to their homeland from where they were expelled during the war. Then the Israelis refused to implement that, and that's why the problem is going on for 20 years, mainly.

Speaker 2: The Israelis say, I believe, that this— they consider this an international problem and that they are prepared to make their contribution. contribution to the resettlement of refugees. Would that be sufficient in your view, or must the Palestinian Arabs have the absolute right to return to their homes if they wish to?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, when the Israelis say that this is international problem, that this means that they refuse to implement the United Nations resolutions. And they were refusing to implement the United Nations resolutions from '48 until Now, and I want to say that the treatment of the Palestinians and expelling them from their homeland, from Palestine, was the main reason— I'm stressing that again— for the continuation of this problem for 20 years.

Speaker 2: Mm-hmm.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: I feel that the people abroad don't understand why we continue without reaching peace or without reaching settlement. Many people, especially in the United States, Put the blame on us, really forgetting completely what happened on '48, forgetting the 1 million refugees who were getting expelled by the Israelis from Palestine. Well, we have here 1 million people. United Nations said by that time— the United Nations, who said that there will be Israel, decided the creation of Israel, said that those refugees have to return back. They have to return back. Israelis refused. So if we don't solve the problem of the personnel, the people, the Palestinians, there will be no peace.

Speaker 2: Is it realistic to expect, however, that Israel, which wishes to be and has constituted itself as primarily, predominantly a Jewish state, would accept a very large number of Arabs back into their territory?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, why not? The Jews and the Arabs, the Christians and the Muslims were living here in the Middle East for centuries, for thousands of years. The Jews were living here in Egypt, and they are living here in Egypt, in spite of the propaganda which was used against us in your country, that we don't treat the Jews well. You can go all over the country and you can see Some of them asked to leave the country, and we refused— we agreed, and then they refused to leave the country, and they said that they want to stay. We arrested Jews, about 80 Jews. But we arrested also, after the war, Muslims and Christians for the security of the country. The Israelis now are arresting more than 7,000 Christians. 100,000 Arabs from the occupied territories and Gaza. So I want to say again, the Jews and the Muslims, the Christians, the Arabs were living here for centuries.

Speaker 2: As a matter of information, how many members of the Jewish community in Egypt are left now? How many are still remaining?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: We have here about 5,000 Jews.

Speaker 2: About 5,000. And how many, you say, are under detention now, 80?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: About 80, yes.

Speaker 2: Some of the—

Gamal Abdel Nasser: there were more than that, but we released—

Speaker 2: Some have been released.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes. So I want to complete my explanation. We were living together, and there was no hatred. We said that— it is well known, but some— I think some people have forgotten that. That we and Jews are cousins. Moses was born here in Egypt. We were always living in very good conditions. So why the Muslims and Christians, the Arabs and the Jews don't live together?

Speaker 2: Let me turn to a question now, if I may, of Arab unity. I believe I am correct in saying that only the United Arab Republic and Jordan have endorsed the United Nations resolution of 1967. Is that correct? The other Arab states have not lent their support to it.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Lebanon, I think, has.

Speaker 2: Lebanon has. Does this mean a disunity among the Arabs in their approach to the Israeli problem, or is there some other explanation?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, it is not a question of unity or disunity. It is a question of points of view. Everyone has his own point of view according to such a sensitive question like this question.

Speaker 2: Then it seems to me that it might be impossible, granting the position of Syria, which is referred to enter into any kinds of discussions at all on this matter, that a settlement might have to be reached between one or two of the Arab states and Israel. Is that conceivable to you? Is there any objection to that from your point of view? That agreement might be reached, for example, by Jordan with Israel separately, or by the United Arab Republic with Israel separately?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, if we Agree about solving or settlement this question between Egypt and Israel alone, this means the continuation of the occupation of the Arab territory in Western Bank of Jordan and the Golan Heights. Then when we speak about the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the occupied territory, we mean the occupied Egyptian and Jordanian and Syrian.

Speaker 3: Thank you.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: territory. So if they only withdraw from one country and continue on the other countries, there will be no solution or settlement.

Speaker 2: That is clearly not satisfactory to you.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes, yes, of course there must be a complete evacuation from all the Arab territories.

Speaker 2: We have often heard it said, and how true it is I don't know, I want to ask you, That no Arab leader, no Arab government could actually sit down at a table and negotiate with Israel and sign an agreement. Is that really the case?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I want to tell you something. In 1949, in February, well, we sat with the Israelis on a table, and there was a representative of the United Nations Punch. And we agreed about arms. We know about the arms agreement of '49. So what happened after that? The Israelis refused to implement the arms agreement, and they said this agreement is dead. These are the Israeli agreements. And that's why we— and that's why we insist about the United Nations agreement and securing I believe that I'm interpreting you correctly when I say that—

Speaker 2: let me first state Israel's position in this matter, and I'd like to hear yours. Israel holds, I believe I'm correct in saying, that in order to establish the secure and recognized boundaries that are provided for in the United Nations resolution that there need to be some adjustments in the borders in various places in what was formerly Palestine. Are the Arab states, or are you personally prepared to see any such adjustments? I'm speaking now of border adjustments, not of large areas of territory. Are you prepared to—

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes.

Speaker 2: agree to such adjustments or not?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, if you remember the Security Council resolution, it was said about secure and recognized boundaries, not for Israel, but for all countries. Now Israel is trying to give the impression that secure and recognized boundaries is only for Israel. So we have to reach agreement about secure and recognized boundaries in connection with the Israeli interests. But in the Security Council, it was not mentioning the Israelis, but mentioning all the areas. Then let me say something for you. Our borders were here for years and years. centuries. So how anybody could ask me to agree to give him adjustments in these borders, or on other— on other way, give him parts from our territory?

Speaker 2: Let's put the shoe on the other foot for a moment. Is there any territory you want from Israel?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: From our borders, we We don't want any territory.

Speaker 2: Specifically, I think the American public would like to know is whether the Arab states could agree to the continued Israeli control of East Jerusalem, the Old City of Jerusalem. I know what King Hussein has said about that. I believe you may have said the same thing, but I'd like to hear it.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I said to you at the beginning, we have to speak either about peace or expansion. By what you said, the control— I say occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem, this is expansion. No Arab or Muslim Could agree about that.

Speaker 2: Have you considered what is said to be a United States proposal— I don't know that it's an official proposal— that the city of Jerusalem might remain unified under Israeli administration, but that there would be a special status there for Jordan or the Arab states generally? Has any such proposition been made to you? Have you heard of such a proposal?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: This was in the American working paper.

Speaker 2: It was in the American working paper?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: To the— which was represented to the—

Speaker 2: Submitted to the Yarring Commission.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Big powers, I think. Oh, yes, the 4 powers. But, you know, when you speak about unifying a city like Jerusalem, really unifying something like that needs self-determination by the people. If you unify the Old City of Jerusalem with the Israeli city of Jerusalem in spite of the will of the people of Old Jerusalem, this will be occupation, this will be dictation, not unification. And also, well, one time also somebody came in Europe and he said that he's going to unify Europe. Then he was occupying country after another country in order to unify— unified Austria with his country, and then he unified also Czechoslovakia. But you said about that by that time that this is not unification, this is occupation. I hope that you can remember that in the meantime now.

Speaker 2: If a peace settlement were reached with Israel, what would happen to the Arab commando groups that are now operating against the Israeli occupation forces? These groups, al-Fatah and the others, I think, have said that they would not support the 1967 resolution of the United Nations. Is there— would they be disbanded? Could they—

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yes.

Speaker 2: Would they disappear? What, in your opinion, would happen to them?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, first of all, we have to say something about these groups. These groups are formed from the Palestinians who were expelled out of their country by 1948. Those groups are composed of the Palestinians, those who Yes. In 1967, the rest of their country was occupied. All what those people want is to achieve their rights to return back to their homeland. I told you, without solving the problem of the Palestinians and giving them their rights to return back to their land and the complete withdrawal of the occupied territory, there will be no peace. be speaking about something which nobody will be able to fulfill. So if there will be peace, this means that the problem of the Palestinians will be solved. So there will be no big problem for them.

Speaker 2: You think that these groups would dissolve automatically or naturally?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, peace, if we achieve peace, real peace, as I said, peace means The land and the people. If we solve the problem of the land by the evacuation, if we solve the problem of the people by giving them all their rights according to what was said by the United Nations resolution, well, there will be real peace. Then we should not worry about the Palestinians' commandos.

Speaker 2: Do you think now, speaking of, again, of what Secretary U Thant said that there had been little discernible progress made by the United Nations. Do you think that the prospects for peace are now slipping away?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, as long as the Israelis are insisting not to implement the United Nations resolution, and as long as the Israeli leaders are intending to expand and add Arab territory, more Arab territory, to their country, well, everyone will be feeling that there will be no opportunities for peace, either peace or expansion.

Speaker 2: Was there a time in your memory when the peace prospects were rather better than they are now? Looking back, I had personally the idea that in 1957 the prospects for peace were rather better than they are now, and that they were better at the time of the United Nations debate in 1967 than they are now.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, we here in this country were not feeling peace at all during the last 20 years. And we were looking to Israel according to what they say to us. I want to tell you something. They say to us— they say here something different from what they say abroad or in the United States newspapers. Always there were threats to us by the Israelis, the Israeli leaders, the Israeli military people. Well, they say about the wars, '48 war and '56 war, and then '67 war. I told you about the '48 war. Well, what about the '56 war? Who began the war? Who attacked? The Israelis got the opportunity of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and being in bad terms I mean, we were in bad terms with the United Kingdom and France. And then there was the plot to attack Egypt by that time. After attacking Egypt, they were also giving statements to join Sinai to Israel. Well, of course, after the withdrawal of the French troops and British troops, and lately the Israeli troops from our territory were not also feeling peace, because they were always speaking about forcing a settlement. The Israelis say that their strategy based on the idea of forcing a settlement. This means to everyone that forcing a settlement is war, because if you fulfill something by force, this means war. This was always their strategy. We're not feeling peace here.

Speaker 2: Now, President Nasser, On that point, I'd like to ask you a question which I think is very serious for you, for all the world really, and that is whether failing a settlement with Israel, is there an immediate and serious threat of war in this part of the world now?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I think there is a low international level if your country is occupied by armed forces, by your enemy. It is not only your right to liberate your country, but it is your duty. And I think you remember what happened in the Far East when you— the United States was attacked. When MacArthur returned back, he said that he will return to liberate the occupied territory. Well, it is the intention of every Arab, of every Egyptian, here to liberate our occupied territory.

Speaker 2: Well, do you have the strength now to use your own phrase— I think I'm quoting it correctly, at least in translation— to regain what belongs to you? I think that was the phrase you used. Do you feel you have the strength?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, the question is not a question of strength. I cannot say to the Israelis if I have now, because they will see the program. If I have now the strength or if I don't have the strength, but I can say only our intentions.

Speaker 2: Well, can you say anything without giving away military secrets about the strength of your arms? Have they been fully restored to the 1960— to the 1967 level?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I can say also only for you.

Speaker 2: Only for me.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: That we are building up our armed forces.

Speaker 2: Looking at the other side, the Israeli side, what are they doing, in your view, with their armed forces?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, the Israelis are building their armed forces. They received after the invasion, because they invaded our country and the Arab countries in '67, they received Skyhawks, This is— these are airplanes from the United States. And now the United States have agreed to give them Phantom airplanes. They received also armored cars and tanks from United Kingdom. They could have the possibility to get varieties of arms from everywhere. Also, they can— they are threatening us now. Yes. And they are occupying our territories. And they say everywhere that they are threatened by the Arab and go to collect money. They collect millions of dollars from the United States. They collect millions of dollars from other countries. We don't collect dollars from anywhere. And by dollars, of course, they can get arms, and also by these dollars, they can buy weapons. And by dollars, of course, they can get arms, and also by these dollars, They can face the economic situation because, of course, they can have mobilization. Also, we have mobilization, so they are in better conditions.

Speaker 2: Let's take a still more serious question. Do you think that there is a possibility that Israel might develop a nuclear bomb and thus radically alter the balance of power in this area?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, about this, This question, of course, if they develop atomic bombs, we also could develop atomic bombs. We have our technicians, and they can do that. But it's expensive, of course. It's very, very expensive. But if they got it, we'll get it. But I want to say something.

Speaker 2: Yes.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Non-Proliferation Treaty, and they refused to sign it. Of course, in this treaty there are assurances by the United States and the Soviet Union that all countries who sign this treaty must have security against any atomic threat.

Speaker 2: You would in that case count on support from the Soviet Union and the United States if you were threatened with an atomic bomb?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: And also we have to try to work in the same field as the Israelis.

Speaker 2: For several days now there's been heavy shelling between the Egyptian and Israeli positions on the opposite sides of the Suez Canal.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: From the—

Speaker 2: from your point of view, from the Egyptian point of view, what is the What is the aim and purpose of these bombardments? What is causing all of this shooting?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, from the first beginning after the occupation, the Israelis were in a better situation than us, because the Israelis were on the eastern side of the canal, facing 2 big cities with the population of about 600,000. These cities are the cities of Suez and Ismailia and some other small cities on the western side of the Suez Canal. And they began from the first time after ceasefire, the bombardment of Suez and Ismailia. Of course, as a result of the continuation of the bombardment, We suffered many civil casualties, because they were bombarding the civilians and aiming the houses of the civilians. And on the other hand, their aim was to affect our refineries there. We have decided after that to evacuate the bulk of the people from Suez and especially Ismailia, and keep only there those who are needed to run the work in the 2 cities. So also we were rebuilding our army. After that, after when we thought that time is ripe for counteraction from our side, we also began to— To fight back. Bombard them. This is the story in brief.

Speaker 2: It doesn't, in your opinion, signify anything more serious than that at this time?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: We think that our plan was based on 3 main points: defensive, building up the defensive situation, then turning from the phase of the defense to the phase of retaliation, and then after the phase of retaliation, we have to enter the phase of liberation. Now we are in the second phase, the phase of retaliation.

Speaker 2: Let me turn from military affairs to politics and ask you a question about President Nixon. Since he took office, has there been any change that you have observed in in the United States' attitude toward these issues in the Middle East? Is American policy, to use Governor Scranton's phrase, which has now become so familiar, is American policy more even-handed in your view?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, the first thing which we feel that we are not dealing with Rostow brothers. Rostow brothers, I think you know them. One of them was in the White House, the other one was in the State Department. They were representing the The point of view of Israel, not the point of view of the United States. Excuse me by saying that, but this was our impression. And also, you know, your representative in the United Nations by that time was defending Israel more than the Israeli representative. This was Goldberg. After leaving their posts, of course, they are now giving statements which are clearly Let one know that they support 100% the point of view of Israel. Now, well, we don't have the Rostow brothers, we don't have Goldberg. There is a new administration and new people dealing with the question, but just beginning.

Speaker 2: Do you think this is an appropriate time for Is it possible for you to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I'll tell you something. Of course we like to have diplomatic relations with the United States. But, of course, in order to have these diplomatic relations with the United States, there should be a change, of course. Until now, there was no change in the policy of the United States. All what we want from the United States to be fair and to be just in dealing with this problem. We don't want the United States policy to be on our side. We don't want the United States policy to support us against the Israelis. But we want the United States policy to be just in dealing with the problems. We want even-handed, as it was said when Governor Scott Granton visited us before January.

Speaker 2: And the answer seems to be that you are not yet convinced that American policy is such that you would want to reestablish relations just now.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, of course, the main point is the occupation and the evacuation of the Israeli armed forces. Of course, in order to establish relations There must be a clear situation by the United States, and it is a question which is affecting our internal policy because we will say to our people we will resume the relations because of so-and-so. So we wait for that to happen.

Speaker 2: Do you think then that the United States is in position to require the Israelis to withdraw?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: We hope. We hope so.

Speaker 2: Well, are you encouraged then by the interest that the United States is taking in the 4-power talks, by its willingness to participate in these talks, even though I think the Israelis are somewhat opposed to American participation? It would seem so from their statements.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I want to say something. When Yaring was appointed, It was clear to everybody that he will continue for more than a year and a half, and he continued for more than 1 year and a half without reaching any solution. Well, let us hope that the 4-part talks don't continue for 2 or 3 or 4 years. The conciliation committee, which was appointed by the United Nations, in '49 is still alive until now without any result. Something what happened in the past about the Israeli-Arab problems was that committees, meetings, discussions begin, but they don't come to an end.

Speaker 2: Turning to another aspect of foreign policy, your critics, as you are well aware, say that the Soviet Union, through military and economic aid to this country, now dominates the United Arab Republic, and that you've given, in effect, given Moscow a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean. What is your observation on that criticism?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: You know, this is not a new criticism. If you remember what was said about us in '55, especially in the New York Times. You know, this was said in the New York Times—

Speaker 2: You'll have to refresh my memory.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: In the New York Times on 55, when we reached the arms deal with the Soviet Union, it was said that this will put us under the domination of the Soviet Union and so on. And I had interviews after that with the editors from the New York Times, said this will not happen. Then when we reached agreement with the Soviet Union about building the Haidam after the withdrawal of the offer of financing the High Dam by the United States, it was said also in the newspapers, including the New York Times, that will be under the influence of the Soviet Union. We got for the High Dam 5,000 technicians participated with us. Now, after 9 years, we have finished the High Dam. The Soviet technicians have returned back to their countries, leaving only now here about 300. They will go next year after ending the— having the turbines in the high dam. But nothing have been done, that's to say, to be under the influence of the Saudis. Then, after '67, it was said so in the You say that now, but after '67, the Soviet Union really helped us. We lost all our army. Well, many countries have lost their armies before. Well, during the Second World War, the United States have lost their navy in Pearl Harbor completely, but they were able to study after that. We lost our army. And we were in need, of course, to have new arms and to rebuild our armed forces. The Soviet Union have agreed to give us. Then we asked them to give us technicians. They agreed. We have technicians. And we asked them about many things: to help us in the economical field, to give us raw materials. Supply us with wheat. They agreed about that. Well, how they can influence us? This is the question. And about what you said about having food, strategic food in the Mediterranean. Well, the Soviets are there, the Soviets were there, and the Soviets will be there.

Speaker 2: Soviet Union is a bit And a big power for the first time, I suppose, in history in the Mediterranean.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, they were very clever to be a big power in the Mediterranean in order not to have the Mediterranean only for one country. And I want to tell you something. The Israelis said that they got assurances from President Johnson that the 6th Fleet is ready for their help if they need it. This was said by the leaders of Israel.

Speaker 2: Well, before we end this conversation, President Nasser, I think we should take advantage of what is really a rare opportunity, a rare opportunity for you and a rare opportunity particularly for our audience, an opportunity for you to address to the American people personally and directly, any message you like. What would you like to tell the American people that I haven't asked you about?

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, I think that I have to say to the American people that they have to understand us, the Arabs, and not to listen to the hostile propaganda which is concentrated against the Arabs and against us, especially in the United States. And the Israelis are very, very influential and very clever in that field. I want to say also to the United States people that the Arab people have great appreciation to the United States people. And while the Arab people are friendly people and they want to have the opportunities for good and better relations between the two peoples, there is no—

Speaker 2: Yes.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: direct conflict between the United States and the Arabs. The only reason for conflict between the United States and the Arabs is the Israelis and the United States taking the sides of Israel. We want the United States and the United States people to be even-handed in this problem.

Speaker 2: One final question, a brief one. I've asked you about your country's military strength. What about its economic strength today? Great or small? Our growing— your country, its economic strength.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: It is growing. This year we are fulfilling growth of production of 6.5% in spite of the difficult position in which we face. We are building steel mills. We are now building steel mill, a new steel mill, and the production will be 1 million tons in addition to our steel mills which we have. We are building the strip mill. I will open it on the 1st of May. The investment of it is £70 million.

David Ben-Gurion: So—

Gamal Abdel Nasser: We are progressing in all fields. We are, in spite of that, going on in our plan of industrialization, all our plans, and we're having opportunities of work for everyone. We don't have unemployment. We are building schools. We are going on in the development of our country, and we are going on in our Our plan to raise the standard of living, double the national income every 10 years.

Speaker 2: Well, as they say in Washington, thank you, Mr. President, and goodbye from Cairo.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Well, that's all. Thank you.

Speaker 7: Thank you for accepting this interview to Hayat. What do you think made Gamal Abdel Nasser the iconic leader that was venerated across Egypt, but also across the Middle East?

Speaker 8: I think that Gamal Abdel Nasser was an iconic leader because he embodied the hopes and dreams and aspirations of the Egyptian and Arab people in a very important context, in a colonial context. And he reflected the hopes for independence, liberation, Arab unity, social justice, not only in this colonial context, but also afterwards. And I think that he is— he has so haunted the Arab imagination, and he continues to this day to haunt the Arab imagination, because his vision so radically changed the Arab world and Egypt. And we still feel the presence of his ideals.

Speaker 7: Now, how would you describe your grandfather, Gamal Abdel Nasser? Gamal Abdel Nasser being a family member?

Speaker 8: Gamal Abdel Nasser was a very charismatic and powerful leader, and he was an Arab hero to many Arabs, not just Egyptians, over time. I would also describe him— I haven't seen Gamal Abdel Nasser, but I would describe him from the stories I was told and from the memoir, from my own I would describe him as a very kind and supportive and loving father and also husband, as we see in the memoir. And I grew up with so many interpretations of Gamal Abdel Nasser, but from my life and from my family and from what I have read, I can feel and sense that he has been an Arab hero.

Speaker 7: He's been very charismatic and also What is the decision that Gamal Abdel Nasser was best remembered for?

Speaker 8: I would say that he was best remembered for the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This was a very important turning point for Nasser. And it's after the nationalization of the Suez Canal that he was seen as an Arab hero across the Arab world. And he was also seen as a very important figure on the global stage. So I think that this decision, it also announced the beginning of his policy in Egypt and the Arab world, this freedom from foreign influence and imperialism. I think it would be one of the greatest achievements, because I see many of his achievements I think, influenced and benefited Egypt and the Arab world. So I would say that this was one of them.

Speaker 7: What would be the one decision that he made that you think he's been the most criticized for over time?

Speaker 8: I think that he's been most criticized not necessarily for a decision, but for an event, which was the 1967 War. So this is what he's most criticized for, and it's a defeat, and it was catastrophic for Egypt and the Arab world. But I don't think it was necessarily his decision because it was— he was at the center of political and economic forces that really shaped the Arab world then, and he was very much struggling for Egypt and the Arab world. So I would say he's mostly criticized for this, and often I I think it was— the defeat was very much devastating, but I think much of the criticism is unfounded because he also took responsibility for 1967. And we saw that really the crowds of people that poured out into the streets of Egypt and even in the Arab world and how they responded and reacted to Nasser's decision to resign.

Speaker 7: Castro's wife, Tahia, who writes the memoir, seemed like a very understanding, supportive, discreet and even at times shy woman. What would be an accurate description of her?

Speaker 8: In my opinion, and based on my knowledge of my grandmother, I would say she was intensely private. She was also, from stories that she would tell us in the family, she was always at the side of And after his passing, she was very devoted to his memory. We see this in the memoir. She's very devoted to his life and his memory. And also, she is— in addition to this, we see that she's a very strong woman. We feel the strength and the endurance, because for her, the years after Gamal Abdel Nasser were very difficult. And she always, I think, focuses on that in the memoir, that she led a very difficult life after Gamal Abdel Nasser, and she always struggled to tell his story in the way that it really happened, because there were so many changes to the story of Gamal Abdel Nasser in that decade, in the '70s. He was very concerned about his family during all these political upheavals, but he was also very careful that his family wouldn't live an exceptional life. And we see, for example, in October 1956, after the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion, we see how his family was the last to be evacuated from the family house in Sheikh al-Bakri after all the residents had evacuated. And so, but he was very concerned about his family and about his people, and I think this has to do with his character really rather than the—

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Yeah.

Speaker 8: The Arab man in Arab culture, because I could sense, and I knowing him and knowing all the stories and also reading the scenes in the memoir, and also I could see some parts of my own father in him, and I could sense that he was— this was his character. He always felt concerned and burdened by the problems of his his country and his family and his people. And he very much, for example, when he's in the buildup to the revolution, Tahiyya didn't know that there was going to be a revolution on the eve of the revolution. And we see that in the memoir. And also, for example, when he's questioned by the authorities before the revolution, he doesn't want her to know because he doesn't want Is there something about your grandfather that you did not know that you discovered while you were editing the manuscript? There were many things that I did not know, so there were a few surprises for me. Like any reader, I knew the historical facts. I also knew some of the stories that were told by my grandmother, like a story of the eve of the revolution, but I always imagined my grandmother in the sitting room in Manshiyet al-Bakri when she told the stories, when actually, as she tells us in the memoir, it was in the Abbasia flat. So the way I had imagined it was very different. But also, I— there were so many things about my grandfather's character that I also discovered reading the memoir. And I could also imagine his voice and his His expressions and his humor. And as I said, I can also— could also imagine the president I had seen during his speeches and the husband and the father I read about in the memoir.

Speaker 7: What did you find challenging while working on the manuscript?

Speaker 8: I really approached it as a creative work, and I felt it allowed for so much creativity and freedom. I think it was both a joy and a challenge. On the personal level because of the personal aspect of the project. So it was very difficult at times for me to read all these stories of my grandfather and also of my father. And I, for example, I read about my father's birth. I read about the conversations my father would have with my grandfather after a very long day. And he, my father had always told me about these conversations. So to read these scenes and these events was for me both a joy, but it was also deeply moving. And I felt there was an added ethical responsibility to the original because I had to produce a very accurate representation of my family, the events, the scenes. So I had to be very careful in my translation. We didn't edit anything. We didn't take anything out of the manuscript, and we didn't change and we didn't add anything except for the footnotes for explanation of context. And we were very careful that the text would be the same in both the Arabic and the English, so that it would be an accurate representation of the Arabic. And it did not— it does not depend on the audience.

Speaker 7: It is the same for both a local There are over 100 photographs, many in color, and some of them have never been published before.

Speaker 8: We included so many photographs that show the private life and the public world of Gamal Abdel Nasser. And some of the photographs— the way in which we presented the photographs was that we focused on the private life. And then we included photographs that show Gamal Abdel Nasser with world leaders. And the photographs also deal with events that are mentioned in the memoir. Some photographs are referenced in the memoir, like the photograph of Tahia that Gamal kept on his desk. So for us— for me, actually, I had not seen some of the photographs, like this particular photograph, some of the photographs of Gamal Abdel Nasser with world leaders, and also there are additional photographs of some political figures on visits to Egypt and in the family house that I had not seen. We were selecting from probably more than 100 pictures from the family archive, and we We chose many pictures, black and white, but some also in color. And we really wanted to focus on the pictures that included Tahiyya, because the book is Tahiyya's memoir, but also that includes aspects of Tahiyya's private life with Gamal Abdel Nasser, and also how she also appeared at formal receptions with him.

Speaker 7: What does this memoir mean to you?

Speaker 8: It was a way for us, Gamal Abdel Nasser's grandchildren, who had not met Gamal Abdel Nasser, to know more about him. And it also was very important for me to be involved in the editing of the manuscript. And I felt also that it— for me, by working on this manuscript, I'm also contributing in some way And I remember, for example, my father would give some interviews in the press about Gamal Abdel Nasser and his private life, and I would tell him, you know, to collect all these interviews in a book. And he would always tell me that I could someday produce a collection of reminiscences and memories.

Speaker 7: What is it like being a grandchild of Gamal Abdel Nasser?

Speaker 8: This is a very difficult question. I think I was very fortunate to have grown up with the aspirations of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the aspirations that he lived for and he struggled for. Also this idealism, this— the importance of social justice and Arab unity and nationalism. So I found I was very fortunate in a way to have grown up with that. But growing up also, I— there was a There was a lot of sadness because of— after the passing of Gamal Abdel Nasser. And I'm also careful to— of all the different interpretations. I know that Gamal Abdel Nasser was— he inspired different interpretations or translations, so I'm very aware of that.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: And—

Speaker 8: For me, I feel that both the— that it is— this is my own cultural inheritance, and he has been a great inspiration to me in my life. I think his commitment to Egypt and the Arab world, and also to social justice, which is something also that we still feel today, and we could We could hear the slogans during the January 25th Revolution: bread, freedom, and social justice. So I think this is very much still present today in Egypt.

Speaker 7: How popular do you think Gamal Abdel Nasser would be today in Egypt's present political context?

Speaker 8: I think that in Egypt's present political context, I think there's a nostalgia for all the ideals and dreams that Nasser stood for. And I think he's— we very much feel his presence today in the Arab world. And as I said, we could— in the slogans for the Arab revolutions, we could see the pictures of Nasser in Tahrir Square in Tunisia. So I feel that this is a very important figure. I think that's a very good point. There's this longing and this nostalgia for everything that he stood for in his context. And also there's this kind of— in Egypt, I think, particularly, there's this sense that there's a longing for Egypt's— for the renewal of Egypt's important political role on the global stage. And I think especially after the failures of last year, we have this longing for Egypt's greatness again. Thank you.